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博碩士論文 etd-0616119-111505 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0616119-111505
論文名稱
Title
薪酬話語權投票與CEO薪酬:以美國不動產投資信託上市公司為例
Shareholder Say-on-pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts in the US
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
97
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2019-07-16
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2019-07-16
關鍵字
Keywords
機構投資人持股比例、經理人薪酬、薪酬話語權投票、薪酬標竿團體、不動產投資信託產業
Real Estate Investment Trusts. (REITs), Compensation Peer groups., Institutional Shareholdings., Shareholder Say-on-Pay Vote., CEO Compensation.
統計
Statistics
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中文摘要
本論文針對美國不動產投資信託產業探討薪酬話語權投票與經理人薪酬之關聯性,實證結果有以下發現。首先,經理人薪酬與異常薪酬是決定薪酬話語權投票結果的關鍵因素,經理人薪酬與異常薪酬愈高,則股東投薪酬話語權投票反對比率越高。第二,我們沒有發現薪酬話語權投票結果對經理人薪酬有直接的監控效果;經理人薪酬直接受到公司自己的薪酬政策影響,部分受到薪酬話語權投票結果的中介影響。第三,薪酬標竿團體對經理人薪酬有顯著的正向影響,有參照薪酬標竿團體公司薪酬水準的經理人薪酬比沒有參照標竿團體公司薪酬水準的經理人薪酬來得高。再者,薪酬話語權投票對薪酬標竿團體與經理人薪酬之間的關係具有負向調節效果;薪酬話語權投票反對率弱化了薪酬標竿團體對經理人薪酬的正向影響效果。
本研究對不動產領域研究做出許多貢獻。就我們所知,在不動產研究領域,我們的論文是第一篇討論薪酬話語權投票與經理人薪酬之間關係的文章。研究結果補充了不動產產業公司治理領域的新觀點:雖然近年來薪酬話語權投票對經理人薪酬內容大部分投贊成票,致該投票結果對經理人薪酬並沒有發揮直接的監控作用,但存在有中介效果與間接監督效用,因此,實行薪酬話語權投票在不動產投資信託公司是必要的。
Abstract
This dissertation examines the relationship between Say-On-Pay (hereinafter also referred to as SOP) votes and CEO compensation of publicly listed US equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). There are several findings in our empirical results. First, we find that high CEO total and excess compensation is an essential determinant of SOP disapproval voting. The high CEO total and excess compensation have a positive impact on SOP disapproval votes. Second, negative SOP votes do not have a direct monitoring impact on CEO compensation; CEO compensation is directly affected by the company’s compensation policy and is partly influenced by the mediation effect of SOP disapproval voting. Third, we find a significantly positive impact of compensation peer groups on CEO compensation. The CEO compensation with reference to the compensation peer groups’ pay level is higher than without reference to the compensation peer groups’ pay level. Moreover, SOP disapproval votes have a negative moderating influence on the gap between the CEO compensation with and without reference to compensation peer groups. The negative SOP votes weaken the positive impact of compensation peer groups on CEO compensation.
We provide considerable contributions to the literature on REITs. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to discuss the relationship between SOP votes and the REIT CEO compensation. Our findings make a new contribution to the governance literature of REITs. Our empirical results are robust to show that SOP disapproval voting does not play a direct monitoring role for CEO compensation but has an indirect mediator and moderator effect on CEO compensation. We suggest that the implementation of SOP voting regulations in REITs is necessary.
目次 Table of Contents
誌 謝 i
摘 要 ii
Abstract iii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 1
1.2 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND PURPOSE 5
1.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THIS RESEARCH 6
CHAPTER 2 SAY-ON-PAY VOTE LEGISLATION BACKGROUND IN THE US 10
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 14
3.1 DETERMINATION OF CEO COMPENSATION 14
3.2 REIT SAY-ON-PAY VOTING DIRECTION 18
3.3 MONITORING AND MEDIATING EFFECT OF THE SAY-ON-PAY VOTE ON SUBSEQUENT CEO TOTAL AND EXCESS COMPENSATION 20
3.4 ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR OWNERSHIP AND COMPENSATION PEER GROUPS IN CEO COMPENSATION CONTRACTS AND THE INFLUENCE OF SOP VOTING 23
CHAPTER 4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 30
4.1 SAMPLING DATA 30
4.2 ESTIMATED REIT CEO EXCESS COMPENSATION 31
4.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 32
4.4 SUMMARY STATISTICS 32
4.5 UNIVARIATE TESTS OF REIT FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 34
CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 38
5.1 DETERMINANTS OF REIT CEO COMPENSATION 38
5.2 SAY-ON-PAY VOTING DIRECTION IN REIT CEO COMPENSATION 40
5.3. MONITORING AND MEDIATING EFFECTS OF SOP VOTES ON CEO COMPENSATION CONTRACTS 43
5.4 EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR OWNERSHIP AND COMPENSATION PEER GROUPS ON REIT CEO COMPENSATION AND THE MODERATING-MONITORING ROLE OF SOP VOTES 49
5.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 52
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS 56
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 56
6.1.1 Determining factors of REIT CEO compensation 56
6.1.2 Monitoring effect of SOP voting on CEO compensation 57
6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 59
REFERENCES 60
APPENDIX A1: STUDY MOTIVATION 67
APPENDIX A2: VARIABLES DEFINITION 69
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