業外損益因缺乏持續性且細項種類繁瑣，過去多起知名弊案皆利用此一特性進行盈餘操弄，藉以吸引投資人目光或汲取私利，因此業外收益佔企業盈餘比重過高的公司，總被貼上投機的標籤。本文以1996年至2016年間非屬公股控制及非金融產業之上市櫃公司作為研究資料，檢視業外損益對公司績效的影響，有鑑於臺灣公開發行公司中家族企業佔比約達七成，在近年各產業多因毛利率過低進行多項業外轉投資的情況下，遂欲進一步探討對於董監事股權結構具獨特性的家族企業而言，業外轉投資會否成為家族成員攫取私人利益的手段。研究實證發現，業外損益對於企業的績效表現有正向影響，另根據差異檢定分析的結果顯示，公司業外營運的多寡並未受家族企業與否影響。

Companies usually make use of non-operating earnings to manipulate earnings because of their discontinuity, such as much scandal in the past. So it is always labeled as speculative when a company’s non-operating earnings account for a large proportion of its profit. This paper uses the listed companies in Taiwan from 1996 to 2016 excluding public enterprises and financial industries to examine the relationship between non-operating gains and losses and corporate performance. According to the fact that the percentage of family firms in Taiwan’s public entities is about 70% and the unique of their board composition and ownership structure, the paper also explore whether the diversification will be one of the means family members make use to manipulate the corporate earnings. Empirical evidence shows that non-operating gains and losses have a positive effect on the corporate performance. According to the results of the Mann-Whitney U test, family firms or not doesn’t affects a company to make more non-operating earnings.

論文審定書.................................... i
中文摘要....................................... ii
英文摘要....................................... iii
第一章、緒論.................................1
1.1 研究背景與目的.......................1
第二章、文獻回顧及假說建立......2
2.1 企業經營績效..........................5
2.1.1 TobinQ..................................4
2.1.2 ROE.......................................6
2.1.3 ROA.......................................7
2.2 家族企業..................................8
2.3 業外損益..................................9
2.4 公司治理.................................12
第三章、研究方法與設計.............14
3.1 資料來源及樣本篩選過程......14
3.2 變數定義.................................15
3.2.1 應變數.................................15
3.2.2 自變數.................................16
第四章、實證結果與分析............22
4.1 敘述統計................................22
4.2 變異數分析............................24
4.3業外損益對企業績效之影響..24
第五章、結論..............................26
參考文獻.....................................40

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