本研究主要探討我國薪酬委員會的成立及其品質是否會對於公司績效與經理團隊總薪酬之間的相關性(薪酬績效敏感度)有所影響，確立薪酬委員會綜合品質對薪酬績效敏感度的影響後，再進一步研究薪酬委員會品質對於經理人盈餘管理程度的影響。本研究以我國2005年至2016年之上市櫃公司為研究對象，發現薪酬委員會的成立能顯著提升公司績效與經理團隊總薪酬間的正向關係。本研究使用會計績效(淨值報酬率、資產報酬率)及股價報酬率進行分析，發現不論績效是以會計績效指標或股價報酬率來衡量，薪酬委員會的成立對於薪酬績效敏感度都有顯著提升的作用。接著以2011年至2016年有揭露薪酬委員會執行狀況及委員身份資歷的上市櫃公司進行分析，發現薪酬委員會的品質愈高，愈能提升會計績效與經理團隊總薪酬間的正向關係。在確立薪酬委員會品質對薪酬績效敏感度的正向影響後，本研究最後分析薪酬委員會品質對於經理團隊進行盈餘管理程度的影響，實證結果顯示：薪酬委員會的品質愈高，經理人進行盈餘管理的動機愈強，進行盈餘管理的程度顯著提升。

This study mainly investigates whether the establishment and the quality of the compensation committee in our country influence the correlation between the total compensation of the executives and corporate performance (pay-performance sensitivities). After analyzing how the quality of the compensation committee affects the pay-performance sensitivities, this study further investigates the effect of the quality of the compensation committee on managerial earnings management. This study takes the listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2016 as the research subjects and finds that the establishment of the compensation committee can significantly enhance the positive relationship between the corporate performance and the total compensation of the executives. This study uses accounting performance (Return on Equity, Return on Assets) and the return on stock price as corporate performance index and finds that the establishment of the compensation committee has a significant impact on increasing the pay-performance sensitivities regardless the corporate performance is measured by accounting index or return on stock price. Further, this study uses listed companies from 2011 to 2016 that revealed the implementation of the compensation committees and the qualifications of the members to conduct the analysis and finds that the higher the quality of the remuneration committee, the higher the pay-performance sensitivities. This study finally analyzes the impact of the quality of the compensation committee on the level of managerial earnings management. The empirical results show that the higher the quality of the compensation committee, the greater the greater the level of earnings management.

摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
表次 v
第一章　緒論 1
第二章　文獻探討與假說發展 4
第一節 薪酬委員會的成立與功能 4
第二節 薪酬委員會對於經理人薪酬及企業績效連結性之影響 5
第三節 經理人盈餘管理行為 7
第三章 研究方法 9
第一節 研究架構 9
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 9
第三節 分析方法 10
第四章　實證結果 18
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數檢定 18
第二節 薪酬委員會成立及其品質對於薪酬績效敏感度之影響 26
第三節 薪酬委員會品質對於盈餘管理程度之影響 29
第五章　結論 31
第一節 研究結論 31
第二節 未來研究方向 32
參考文獻 34

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