本篇研究以台灣上市上櫃企業為目標，資料期間為2005年1月至2017年12月。以往的企業投資文獻中記載了信息不對稱和管理者與外部投資者之間的代理衝突進而阻礙了公司的最佳投資策略。在本研究中，我們調查政治關係的介入是否為另一種形式的干擾，透過關係影響公司的投資行為並導致過度投資的現象。首先，我們比較具有政治關係與不具有政治關係之企業的投資行為，我們發現具有政治關係的企業，自由現金流量對於投資支出的敏感性較為顯著。其次，我們再加入政治關係的控制變數，測試具有政治關係的企業是否透過政治關係的手段影響投資支出。我們實證結果顯示企業每年的投資支出，將會受到政治關係的影響，具有政治關係的企業相較於不具有政治關係的企業較容易受到影響，研究結果顯示，政治關係企業具有過度投資的現象。

This study aims to target Taiwan-listed companies, and the data period is from January 2005 to December 2017. In the past, corporate investment literature documented information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and external investors, which hindered the company's best investment strategy. In this study, we investigate whether the involvement of political connections is another form of interference that affects a company's investment behavior and leads to over-investment. First, we compare the investment behavior of companies with political connections and non-political connections. We find that companies with political connections have more sensitivity to investment expenditures. Secondly, we then add control variables of political connections to test whether companies with political connections influence investment spending through political connections. Our empirical results show that the annual investment expenditure of enterprises will be affected by political connections. Enterprises with political connections are more likely to be affected than those without political connections. The research results show that political connections enterprises have excessive investment.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
Contents iv
Table vii
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review 5
2.1、 Corporate investment related literature 5
2.2、 Free cash flow and investment behavior 7
2.3、 Political connections and investment behavior 12
3. Hypothesis Establishment 17
4. Data and Research Methods 20
4.1、 Data and Sample Screening 20
4.2、 Variable Definition 22
4.3、 Empirical Model 31
5. Empirical result 39
5.1、 Descriptive statistics and corconnection coefficient analysis 39
5.2、 Univariate analysis 46
6. Regression analysis result 49
6.1、 Investment expenditure and free cash flow analysis 49
6.1、 Analysis of Political Connection Enterprises and Investment Expenditure 50
6.2、 Political Connection Enterprises and Over-investment Analysis 51
7. Robustness Test 56
7.1、 The impact of company size on free cash flow and investment behavior 56
7.2、 The impact of company size on political relations and investment behavior 57
8. Conclusions 61
References 64

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