企業是技術創新的主體，在中國經濟處於快速增長階段的背景之下，中國企業卻陷入了「低技術鎖定」的狀態。同時，企業高管腐敗問題也日趨嚴重，近年來多起企業的高管腐敗案例無不證明瞭高管腐敗務必會影響到企業的正常資金運作，投資與發展這一事實，並且，中國企業仍然對債務的依賴較為嚴重。
為此，論文先是研究了高管腐敗對企業創新的影響，實證檢驗結果發現，高管腐敗與企業創新顯著負相關，即高管腐敗對企業創新有抑制效應。具體地，企業高管腐敗每提高1%，企業研發投入/總資產就下降0.0638個單位，企業高管腐敗每提高1%，企業研發投入/職工就下降2.4489個單位。
隨後，論文考察了異質性債務對高管腐敗的治理效應。研究結果發現：債務與高管腐敗呈顯著負相關關係，即債務水平越高，高管腐敗程度越低；同時，經營性負債對企業高管腐敗有治理效果，而金融性負債卻提升了高管腐敗概率。通過進一步分析發現，異質債務對高管腐敗的影響會隨著產權性質以及市場化程度的差異而不同，具體來講，異質債務對高管腐敗的治理效果在民營企業和中東部地區表現得更好，在國有企業和西部地區則較弱。
因此，本文的結論對高管腐敗在影響企業經濟質量上的後果，以及高管腐敗治理、債務治理機制的認知與管理有現實意義。企業應務必重視高層的管理，監督和治理，優化企業研發環境，以有效推動企業投資結構的合理化發展。

The subject of technological innovation is company. However, with growing economy in China, companies still are in a “Low-tech Locks”. Meanwhile, the problem of executive corruption is increasingly serious. Increasing number of executive corruption in recent years has shown that executive corruption will impact the functioning of the company’s normal operation investment and development. Firstly, this paper uses the data from listed companied having transparent financial statement, providing a new explanation for the phenomenon of “Low-tech Locks” in China through analysis of management fee. Research shows that corruption has a negative impact on innovation and return of research & development. With each 1% increasing in implicit compensation, corporate research & development investment to total asset will decrease 0.0638 units, and corporate employment will decrease 2.4489 units.
Then, this paper explored the impact of corruption on executives from the perspective of corporate debt heterogeneity. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between debt and executive corruption, that is, the higher the level of debt, the lower the degree of corruption. At the same time, Operating liabilities can enhance the governance effect of corporate executive corruption, while financial liabilities will increase the probability of executive corruption. Through further analysis, it is found that the impact of heterogeneous debt on executive corruption will vary with the property rights and the degree of marketization. Specifically, the governance effect of heterogeneous debt on executive corruption is stronger in private enterprises and in the middle and eastern regions, and is weaker in state-owned enterprises and western regions.
Therefore, the conclusion of this paper is of practical significance to the recognition and management of executive corruption and debt governance mechanism. Companies should focus on management, supervision and governance, and optimization of research & development environments to improve the development of corporate investment structures.

Acknowledgements i
Abstract in Chinese ii
Abstract in English iii
Contents iv
Tables vi
Chapter1 Introduction 1
Chapter2 Executive Corruption Affects Technological Innovation 5
2.1 Theoretical Analysis 5
2.1.1 Definition of Executive Corruption 5
2.1.2 Examples of Executive Corruption Cases 6
2.1.3 Proposal of Research Hypothesis 8
2.2 Data Source and Research Design 11
2.2.1 Data Source 11
2.2.2 Research Design 11
2.3 Empirical Test 15
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 15
a) Statistical Analysis of the Description of the Main Variables 15
b) Correlation Analysis 17
2.3.2 Analysis of Regression Results 19
a) Full Sample Regression Analysis 19
b) Regression Results that Distinguish the Nature of Property Right 22
c) Robustness Test 25
2.4 Research Summary 26

Chapter3 Research on Heterogeneous Debt's Governance of Executive Corruption 28
3.1 Research Question 28
3.2 Proposal of Research Hypothesis 30
3.3 Model Design and Data Source 34
3.3.1 Model Design 34
3.3.2 Sample Selection and Data Source 39

3.4 Empirical Analysis 39
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 39
a) Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Main Variables 39
b) Correlation Analysis 41
3.4.2 Full Sample Regression Analysis 42
3.4.3 Subsample Regression Analysis 45
a) Regression by the Nature of Property Rights 46
b) Regression by Region Grouping 49
3.4.4 Robustness Test 52
a) Endogenous Test 52
b) Logit Regression 53
3.5 Research Summary 55

Chapter4 Conclusions, Recommendations and Future Research Directions 57
4.1 Analysis Conclusion 57
4.2 Policy Suggestion 58
4.3 Future Research Direction 61
References 62

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