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URN etd-1122115-150809
Author Yu-Chen Hu
Author's Email Address No Public.
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Department ICAPS
Year 2015
Semester 1
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title A study of the PNTR policy made by the U.S. to China: A View on the theory of two-level games and the participation of politics by MNCs
Date of Defense 2015-12-22
Page Count 178
Keyword
  • foreign policy decision-making
  • MNCs
  • PNTR
  • win-wet
  • two-level games
  • Abstract Generally speaking, in an international multilateral trade organization, the behavior to give mutually and unconditionally the most-favored nation treatment or the permanent normal trade relation is deemed as a fundamental principle. However in the case of Jackson-Vanik Amendment violated evidently the mutually favored non-discrimination international commerce principle in the non-market economy countries such as China on the yearly deliberation; especially when the American Government and China reached the bilateral agreement allowing China to join the committee in 1999; based upon the whole entity benefits of economy and commerce for both America and China and also to avoid the conflicts between the domestic law and the international standard, the legislation giving China PNTR was thus produced.
    However, because the legal Act was of important significance to discontinue the yearly deliberation on China, thus the standpoint of domestic civilian voters appeared big contrast which led to a serious legislation deadlock. Briefly speaking, the legislation background of America giving China PNTR is filled with various stages of benefit conflicts between America and China, American Government and the Congress, and the American domestic beneficial groups. According to the concept of Two-Level Games Theory by Robert D. Putnam, we could find that American government on one hand was forced by the pressure of international environment to have the diplomatic measurement of PNTR, and on the other hand it also needed to face the legislation obstacle which is produced by the congress, beneficial groups and the civilian voters. Nevertheless, the policy of giving PNTR to China is finally successful, among these except for the policy manipulation to seek for the domestic approval, the participation of transnational corporations also functions importantly.
    Based upon these, this study takes the point of view to integrate both the Two-Level Games structure and the political participation of transnational corporations to analyze the inside and outside influencing factors during the process of PNTR, and further explain what’s the possible international and domestic limits to face with when America gives non-market economy nations PNTR under two-way interactions of both international diplomacy and domestic politics. Furthermore if limits exist, how is the PNTR policy finally settled by the influence of transnational corporations? Try to further provide a relative study from another angle to have a dynamic analysis path for the American economy and commerce diplomatic policy.
    Advisory Committee
  • Yi-Ren Dzeng - chair
  • Hsien-chao Chang - co-chair
  • Jeng-Rong Shyu - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-1122115-150809.pdf
  • Indicate in-campus at 99 year and off-campus access at 99 year.
    Date of Submission 2015-12-22

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