Title page for etd-0904112-102042


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URN etd-0904112-102042
Author Shih-Chieh Chung
Author's Email Address wiibasara@yahoo.com.tw
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 5537 times. Download 777 times.
Department Economics
Year 2011
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title Government's choice of deterrence rate against piracy under asymmetric manufacturing costs
Date of Defense 2012-07-24
Page Count 45
Keyword
  • piracy
  • asymmetric manufacturing cost
  • deterrence rate
  • Abstract With the possibility of imitation, we discuss the pricing strategy of an inventor and the piracy-deterrence policy of a government. When inventor and imitator have asymmetric manufacturing costs, piracy may not be deterred by the government. When the inventor’s cost of production is low enough, the inventor always stays in the market and the piracy only occurs if the social welfare is enhanced by the competition. When the inventor’s cost of production is high, a monopoly market emerges and the identity of the monopolist, which can be the inventor or the imitator, is determined by the government through the piracy-deterrence policy such that the social welfare is maximized.
    Advisory Committee
  • Chun-Chieh Wang - chair
  • Shul-John Li - co-chair
  • Yung-Nian Tung - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-0904112-102042.pdf
  • indicate access worldwide
    Date of Submission 2012-09-04

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