Since being developed in 1956, no matter it’s category, function or quantity, Chinese ballistic missiles have kept renewing and increasing. For example, the development of its strategic missiles has undergone the 1st through the 3rd generation with models from Dongfeng-1 to currently developing Dongfeng-41 Ballistic Missile, and its warhead has been gradually developed from carrier of single nuclear head to combination of both traditional and nuclear warheads and to multiple warheads now. Under such multiple developments, Chinese nuclear strategy according to their official speech has still adopted “minimum deterrence” claimed by the 1960’s and 1970’s until now, and which has already led to external speculations.
They think that Chinese has devoted to modernization of ballistic missiles lately, actively developed more land-based strategic missiles and sea-based nuclear submarines, techniques of multiple warheads and space-based weapons, and reinforced the practicality of tactical nuclear missiles etc. that such development has already exceeded the “minimum deterrence” strategy, which even develops
towards the “limited deterrence” strategy. Therefore, whether China’s deterrence strategy is changing is one of the assumptions in this study. If China’s deterrence strategy is no longer equipped with the minimum deterrence, then whether the most important features of the minimum deterrence by “no use of nuclear weapons at first” and China’s“three nos principle on nuclear weapons”will be changed accordingly is the second assumption in this study.
Chinese ballistic missiles apart from being used as deterrence can also be used to practice coercive and annihilative strategies. Especially in the issue of Taiwan, when Chinese deterrence strategy fails in terms of Taiwan, it may use coercive or annihilative strategies to achieve their political and military objectives. As the ability of Taiwan’s anti-ballistic missile is obviously insufficient; so if Taiwan suffers the attack from Chinese missiles, the result will be unimaginable. Therefore, how to prevent the attack from its missiles is what I would like to discuss in this paper.
For the probable battle by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future, in order to quickly facilitate the victory, whether Chinese will use micro-kiloton nuclear warhead to destroy the important and stable military targets in Taiwan to help smooth the warfare and further crash the myth that Chinese will not use nuclear weapons against Taiwan is the 3rd assumption in this paper. Finally how to increase our defense against ballistic missiles and whether we should participate in the TMD (Theatre Missile Defense) provided by America, I will provide several suggestions for references of the related units, hoping to make certain contributions towards Taiwanese prevention against the threat from Chinese ballistic missile.