Title page for etd-0719115-162412


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URN etd-0719115-162412
Author Yi-ting Chen
Author's Email Address No Public.
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 5537 times. Download 648 times.
Department Economics
Year 2014
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title Credit Rationing and Loan Collateral for Risky Investments under Asymmetric Information
Date of Defense 2015-07-28
Page Count 54
Keyword
  • loan collateral
  • credit rationing
  • optimal credit contract
  • asymmetric information
  • screening
  • Abstract The thesis studies how bank may design a set of credit contracts, under asymmetric information, to screen and ratio loanable funds among the firms that each of which owns a different kind of risky project to invest. By correcting Bester’s (1985) modeling error which assumes a risk-neutral bank and risk-averse firms but lead to certain conflict results, the study rebuilds the model with a risk-averse bank and risk-neutral firms in contrast and arrives at more rigorous and general conclusions. Besides the credit equilibrium situation, the thesis explores possible corner solutions resulting from an excess demand for credit and further clarify the relationship between repayment and collateral for different kinds of risky project, a result which Bester (1985) failed to demonstrate. It shows that, under reasonable conditions, the repayment required for a high-risk project is always higher than a low-risk project whenever the collateral required for the former is not higher than the latter.
    Advisory Committee
  • Jia-Hsi Weng - chair
  • Chi-Jia Hung - co-chair
  • Shul-John Li - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-0719115-162412.pdf
  • indicate access worldwide
    Date of Submission 2015-08-19

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