Title page for etd-0629109-161255


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URN etd-0629109-161255
Author Guei-yi Lin
Author's Email Address No Public.
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 5362 times. Download 10 times.
Department Economics
Year 2008
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title none
Date of Defense 2009-06-24
Page Count 63
Keyword
  • a cooperative game
  • double auction
  • R&D
  • inefficiency theorem
  • Abstract If the market of military procurement conforms to the double auction (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983), the government and the manufacturer can try to reach a binding agreement and maximize the monopoly profit. When they both comply with the agreement, the game constitutes a cooperative game. The government and the firm can extend the periods of the game from one to two through signing the research and development contract. When they carry out the research and development contract in the second phase, the trading probability in the first phase that is double auction model will rise.
      However the R&D contract causes an increase of transaction probability, the market offers an opportunity let the ineligible manufacturer participate in the defense procurement. We can find the trade-off relationship between the advancement of trading probability and the appearances of unqualified firm. The result is consistent with Inefficiency theorem that an incentive-compatible mechanism which is ex post efficient will not be individual theorem.
    Advisory Committee
  • Shih-shen Chen - chair
  • Yung-nian Tung - co-chair
  • Tru-gin Liu - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-0629109-161255.pdf
  • indicate in-campus access in a year and off_campus not accessible
    Date of Submission 2009-06-29

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