Title page for etd-0627105-151944


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URN etd-0627105-151944
Author Yu-Hui Chou
Author's Email Address m926040008@student.nsysu.edu.tw
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 5575 times. Download 15 times.
Department Economics
Year 2004
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title The Optimal Loan Contract of Cash Card
Date of Defense 2005-06-23
Page Count 58
Keyword
  • Separating Equilibrium
  • Abstract The cash card emphasizes is the fast nuclear card facilitates the loan to be allowed to borrow the loan immediately, therefore its verification procedure is more loose. Also the cash card verification basis majority of all is extends with the credit card service pattern written credit comments the chronometer, this to the loan latent
    credit risk appraisal effect and the ability is very limited.Therefore, how completes the credit risk the appraisal, correct distinguishes the loan risk degree, this for this research center of gravity. But this research mainly emphatically analyzes in monopolizes with under the market mechanism which completely competes, how does the bank subscribe decides the most suitable cash card to lend money the contract to avoid the counter choice question the production, causes to be supposed to lend money the contract to be able to satisfy the bilateral biggest expectation benefit.
    When market mechanism for monopolizes, the bank cannot use collaterals to come the loan which the area weight plants the different type. If in perfect information, low risk type loan payment interest rate and handling charge higher risk for high, also this time bank cannot to be high, the low risk loan implementation credit ration. If in asymmetry information, can have two kind of possibilities the conclusions: First kind with to perfect information situation, but silver guild to high risk loan implementation credit ration; The second kind pays the same interest rate and the handling charge for all loans, but the bank cannot to the loan implementation credit ration.
    When the market mechanism for completely competes also the perfect information, the bank does not request the loan to provide collaterals, also cannot to its implementation credit ration, but the low risk loan pays interest rate and the handling charge higher risk loan comes low. If when asymmetry information, the bank can request the low risk type the loan proposes collaterals, the use collaterals differentiates the loan type, this time the loan which lends money the agreement to be allowed to differentiate the different risk degree, is a separation is balanced (Separating Equilibrium).
    Advisory Committee
  • Jeun-Sheng Lin - chair
  • Tru-Gin Lau - co-chair
  • Shan-non Chin - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-0627105-151944.pdf
  • indicate in-campus access in a year and off_campus not accessible
    Date of Submission 2005-06-27

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