Title page for etd-0620113-104451


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URN etd-0620113-104451
Author Ling-Ju Yen
Author's Email Address No Public.
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 5560 times. Download 1 times.
Department Economics
Year 2012
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title The Optimal Strategy for Patent Competition-The Game Theory Approach
Date of Defense 2013-06-27
Page Count 34
Keyword
  • game theory
  • patent competition
  • Nash equilibrium
  • patent litigation
  • infringement act
  • Abstract This study investigated the optimal strategy for patent competition from two firms on the similar marketing based on the game theory. The model was set to be that two firms deploy patent trap for infringing upon each other. In the case of infringement, the participants have to consider their own payoff influenced by mutual decision; as well as seek for maximize profits in the existing conditions.
    The result indicated that “settlement” is the optimal strategy for manufactures when the cost is more than the payoff of litigation. By contrast, if the payoff is more than the cost, acquiesces will be manufacturers’ strictly dominated strategy. 
    However, no mixed strategy equilibrium does exist from settlement to litigation. It only depends on the relationship between "reward of litigation" and "cost of settlement with defense." It exists unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
    Advisory Committee
  • Hai-tao Tsao - chair
  • Shan-non Tseng - co-chair
  • Tru-Gin Liu - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-0620113-104451.pdf
  • Indicate in-campus at 5 year and off-campus access at 99 year.
    Date of Submission 2013-08-05

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