Title page for etd-0610113-214031


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URN etd-0610113-214031
Author Ting-An Lin
Author's Email Address No Public.
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 5560 times. Download 922 times.
Department Economics
Year 2012
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title The optimal gang structures in a shadow economy
Date of Defense 2013-06-20
Page Count 46
Keyword
  • organized crime
  • confiscation
  • counterfeit
  • Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium
  • Abstract This article will discuss which form the gang structures will take when the government tries to reach the maximum potential for social welfare through either confiscating or pretending to confiscate couterfeit goods. The article shows when the government works as a successor, the gang structure will entail a grand gang and all the criminal members of the grand gang will work together to produce counterfeit goods. On the other hand, when the government works as a predecessor, the form of the gang structure depends on two factors: the market demand and marginal production cost. When the market demand is relatively large, the government will be inclined to be a predecessor. However, this predecessor government will announce to the public that they plan to confiscate the counterfeit goods but in reality they may only confiscate a small amount of goods.
    Advisory Committee
  • Hai-tao Tsao - chair
  • Shan-Non Chin - co-chair
  • Tru-Gin Liu - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-0610113-214031.pdf
  • indicate access worldwide
    Date of Submission 2013-07-10

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