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赫胥黎<<美麗新世界>>與歐威爾<<1984>>

中本真生活之追尋

The Quest for the Authentic Life in Aldous Huxley's *Brave*

New World and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty- Four*

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論文提要：

本論文旨在研究赫胥黎《美麗新世界》與歐威爾《1984》中本真生活之追尋。在二十世紀，由於極權主義的產生與科技之進步，人類對於自身自由備感威脅。赫胥黎與歐威爾在各自的小說中，即對現代社會朝向非人性化發展提出警告。另一方面，存在主義哲學家海德格、沙特等，在他們各自的哲學著作中，對個人本真生活的探討與肯定，也反映了現代人在現實環境的壓力下，對於自我生命意義的追尋。

第一章導論概述沙特與海德格各自的哲學著作中，對於本真性之探討，在《存在與時間》中，海德格提出非本真生活之特點，焦慮感、良心之召喚、與本真性等，在《存在與虛無》與《存在主義與人文主義》中，沙特則探討人類的本然自由，強調透過個人自由選擇以創造自我價值。顯然，兩位哲學家對人類創造自我生命的價值持肯定態度。

第二章則透過比較赫胥黎《美麗新世界》、歐威爾《1984》、柏拉圖《理想國》這三部著作，探討赫胥黎與歐威爾在各自小說中對當代世界的批評，與暗示柏拉圖的烏托邦思想，如何可能成為當代獨裁者所濫用之對象。

第三章論述赫胥黎的反烏托邦小說《美麗新世界》中之世界秩序與對生命的理念，實為當代存在主義之夢魘。透過小說中主要人物的反叛，赫胥黎暗示讀者，真正的人類本真生活實為真、善、與美之追求。

第四章討論歐威爾小說中主角對於本真生活之追求。藉著忠實紀錄過去事實，開始一段真實的感情生活，與加入兄弟會，主角溫斯頓·史密斯實為歐威爾對於人類追求本真生活理想之代言人。

The Quest for the Authentic Life in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

Abstract

This dissertation intends to study the quest for the authentic life in both Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In this dissertation, I attempt to examine how Huxley and Orwell criticize the modern trend toward dehumanization and how both writers assert the value of the authentic life in their individual dystopian novels. In the twentieth century, the rise of totalitarianism and the development of science and technology threaten the independence of the individual. In their respective dystopian novels, both Huxley and Orwell reflect this crisis of the death of individuality in the modern world and warn us against it by portraying the quest of the characters for an individual meaningful life. On the other hand, the rise of existentialism also reflects the human desire to live a life of authenticity in this excruciating modern condition. Philosophers like Heidegger and Sartre all try to assert the value of the individual authentic life in this modern world where traditional values seem no longer sufficient to guide the individual in his life. Thus, it seems that the four authors Heidegger, Sartre, Huxley and Orwell all share the concern for the freedom of humans in the modern world. To them, an authentic individual life has a value in itself. It overrides the past utopian concern for rational order that overlooks the freedom and independence of the individual.

The introduction focuses on presenting the major tents of Heidegger's and Sartre's ideas on authenticity. In his *Being and Time*, Heidegger mentions the characteristics of a life of fallen-ness, the individualizing effects of anxiety, the call of conscience and the authentic life. And in his *Being and Nothingness*, and

Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre emphasizes the freedom of the individual to define himself through his own free choice of actions. In their individual philosophical works, both of them emphasize the freedom of the individual to take the initiative to create an authentic life. Chapter two focuses on a comparison between three works, Plato's *The Republic*, Huxley's *Brave New World* and Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-four*. In my discussion of their similarities and differences, we try to point out both Huxley's and Orwell's reflections on the modern world and their implied criticism of Plato's utopian ideals which can be taken advantage of by the modern dictators. Chapter three treats Huxley's dystopia *Brave New World* as essentially an anti-existential world in which there exists no possibility for the individual to lead a truly authentic life. Through the characters' rebellion, Huxley suggests to the reader that the true authentic life consists in the quest for beauty, love and truth. Chapter four focuses on the protagonist's quest for the authentic life in Orwell's dystopia *Nineteen Eighty-four*. By starting a diary to keep a faithful record of the past, by developing a love affair and joining the Brotherhood to revive the past authentic life, Orwell's protagonist Winston Smith actually serves as the novelist's alter ego to express his ideal for the individual authentic life.

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Chapter I. Introduction

What is existentialism? And how is it related to the two novels *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*? In this first chapter, I need to give an account of this philosophical direction and analyze its major ideas. And in light of these ideas, I may interpret the two novels in the following chapters.

To start this analysis, I need to account for the historical conditions that give rise to this philosophy. After the Second World War, existentialism arose out of man's deep self-reflection on the human condition and its dilemmas. As William Barrett pointed out, existentialism is not a passing fad or a mere philosophic mood of the postwar period, but a major movement of human thought that lies directly in the main-stream of modern history (18). Indeed, the philosophy and literature of a specific time and place often arise out of the faithful reflection of its social, political, and spiritual problems that humans confront and need to cope with. In the modern period, several historical factors contributed to the rise of existentialism. First and foremost, it is the decline of religion. Commenting on the significance of the decline of Christianity, Paul Roubiczek remarks that in the nineteenth century, the most significant event is the loss of faith in Christianity among the majority of Europeans, especially intellectuals. What follows then is a void at the very heart of the European civilization, which had been based upon the Christian concept of God. Instead of God, "there is nothing, *das Nichts, le Neant*" (39). This is a very disturbing situation since this sense of emptiness is not static. Actually, what ensues from this loss of faith is the fact that "more and more concepts, values, beliefs, creeds--hitherto the foundations of human lives--crumble and have to be discarded" (39). This decline of religion thus renders man spiritually disorientated. To

medieval man, Christianity was not just a theological system but it actually offered a way of life in which man could find spiritual peace. With this loss of faith, man lost his connection with a transcendent realm of being and was therefore left free to deal with this world in all its harsh objectivity. He is bound to feel homeless in such a world, which can no longer satisfy his spiritual needs. Without spiritual guidance, he actually becomes a wanderer upon the face of the earth.

As history develops, Protestantism, science and capitalism mark the coming of a new age, our modern world. The spirit of Protestantism, though seeming to have little to do with that of the New Science in its emphasis on the irrational datum of faith, fitted in very well with the New Science. “By stripping away the wealth of images and symbols from medieval Christianity, Protestantism unveiled nature as a realm of objects hostile to the spirit and to be conquered by Puritan zeal and industry” and like science, “Protestantism helped carry forward that immense project of modern man: the de-spiritualization of nature, the emptying of it of all the symbolic images projected upon it by the human psyche” (Barrett 27). As the modern world moves onward and becomes more and more secularized in every department of life, the Protestant faith consequently becomes attenuated: “Protestant man begins to look more and more like a gaunt skeleton” and “the more severely he struggles to hold on to the primal face-to-face relation with God, the more tenuous this becomes, until in the end the relation to God Himself threatens to become a relation to Nothingness” (Barrett 29).

Not only fitting well with science in its de-spiritualization of nature, Protestantism was also in accord with the spirit of capitalism in its secular ethic. Both believe in the validity of zeal and industry. And “for several centuries the two went hand in hand, ravaging and rebuilding the globe, conquering new continents and territories, and in general seeming triumphantly to prove that this earth is itself the

Promised Land” but “even in the midst of the nineteenth century, Capitalism had also succeeded in erecting the worst slums in human history” (Barrett 29). Citing the great German sociologist Max Weber, William Barrett remarks that he “has provided one of the chief keys to the whole of modern history by describing its central process as the ever-increasing rational organization of human life.” As Max Weber observes, what characterizes the capitalist is the enterprising and the calculating mind who must organize production rationally to win a favorable balance of profits over costs. Thus, in capitalism, it follows that everything is schemed according to this principle of organizing economic activities in the interests of efficiency such as “the collectivization of labor in factories and the consequent subdivision of human function; the accumulation of masses of the population in cities, with the inevitable increase in the technical control of life that this makes necessary; and the attempt rationally to control public demand by elaborate and fantastic advertising, mass pressure, and even planned sociological research” (Barrett 30). This process of rationalizing economic activities knows no bounds and actually comes to cover almost every aspect of our social life. In the twentieth century, over large areas of the world, though communism with its form of total collectivization has taken the place of capitalism, yet it does not alter the fundamental human issues involved. Actually, “the collectivization becomes all the more drastic when a mystique of the state, backed by brutal regimentation by the police, is added to it” and “collectivized man, whether communist or capitalist, is still only an abstract fragment of man” (Barrett 30). This collective life of man in the modern society only causes man’s alienation. By this, he suffers the disintegration of his self-identity, becoming only a functionary in the great machine of society. And with the power of the state growing ever stronger, man gradually loses his individuality. Man becomes alienated from his fellow beings. Because of this ever-increasing collectivization of modern life,

human relationships become ever more superficial. And with the loss of faith in God, man's life stays on the practical level of hedonism. In his *Existenzphilosophie*, Karl Jaspers observes that "the community of masses of human beings has produced an order of life in regulated channels which connects individuals in a technically functioning organization, but not inwardly from the historicity of their souls" (140). Actually, caused by dissatisfaction with mere achievement and the helplessness that results from the break-down of the channels of relation, there is "a loneliness of soul such as never existed before, a loneliness that hides itself, that seeks in vain in the erotic or the irrational until it leads eventually to a deep comprehension of the importance of establishing *communication* between man and man" (140). In both Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, we can see very clearly these modern phenomena as described above, such as the death of God and his subsequent replacement by some degenerate form of worship, Big Brother in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and "Our Ford" in *Brave New World*. And we can also see how the collective life of man leads to the soul-less hedonism in *Brave New World* and the complete death of individuality in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Science and technology, in both worlds, serve not to better man's life but instead are taken advantage of by the sinister rulers as a means of domination. In *Brave New World*, such technological inventions as biotechnological hatchery, conditioning, sleep teaching, the feelies, and soma work as the means to prevent people from developing a sense of individuality and personal meaning. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, such means as surveillance through technological means also serve the same effect. In both the two authors' fictional worlds, the abstract fragment of man as Barrett describes indeed becomes a reality.

The First World War in fact marked the ending of the European bourgeois civilization. In his poem "The Wasteland," T. S. Eliot faithfully portrays the spiritual

dryness of the western world after the war. In “The Burial of the Dead,” Eliot presents many death images, such as the Hanged Man, and the drowned Phoenician Sailor. And water, commonly used as a symbol of life and regeneration, is associated with death here. It seems Eliot wants to suggest the spiritual death of modern men. In this modern world, man has lost his faith in God, and being spiritually bewildered, can only trust a fortune-teller. Still, after the lines of the fortune-teller section, the reader reads these lines describing the collective life of modern man:

Unreal city,
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
I had not thought death had undone so many.
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled.
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet.

(60-66)

From this typical modern scene of men hurrying on their way to their offices, Eliot suggests the alienation modern men feel in their relationship to their environment. They can find no joy in their collective life, as Eliot describes: “Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled. / And each man fixed his eyes before his feet” (64-5). No one feels kinship with his fellow-beings. They are, actually, spiritually dead automatons, not unlike the phantoms in hell which Dante describes in his *Divine Comedy*. The anonymous viewer of the scene, therefore, begins his laconic comments on the scene, with a short word “unreal city.” To him, this life is only inauthentic. It is death-in-life, as he explicitly comments, quoting a line from Dante’s *Inferno*: “...so many/ I had not thought death had undone so many” (62-3).

This feeling of alienation, of estrangement of humans from their fellow beings

and surroundings and finally from themselves finds its most powerful expression in Franz Kafka's novella *The Metamorphosis*. At the beginning of the novella, the reader reads these words: "As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams, he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect" (I). The protagonist never knows why this happened to him. In his world, he is only a man holding a little job under his boss and he finds no self-fulfillment in his work:

Oh God, he thought, what an exhausting job I've picked on!
Traveling about day in, day out. It's much more irritating
work than doing the actual business in the office, and on top
of that there's the trouble of constant traveling, of worrying
about train connections, the bed and irregular meals, casual
acquaintances that are always new and never become
intimate friends." (2381)

Maybe, this life of constant striving for mere survival, of shallow human contact only plunges the protagonist into a deep sense of worthlessness. He can only feel himself dehumanized, living like an insect.

Not only writers such as T. S. Eliot and Franz Kafka join in the reflection and serious criticism of the modern human condition but also philosophers come to see the inadequacies of traditional philosophy and thus try to find a way to help humans out of this predicament by their philosophies. From their viewpoints, traditional philosophies are inadequate in their failure to account for man's existence. In their concern with objective knowledge and with the nature of ultimate reality, they fail to offer men spiritual guides to live their lives, which, in this age of collectivism and dehumanization, are desperately needed. In the nineteenth century, both Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard have individually voiced their discontentment with traditional philosophies.

Nietzsche suggests the possibility of establishing new values according to new principles. The West has founded all of its values on Christianity. Yet when the doubt on the existence of God becomes prevalent, the foundation of all moral values becomes shattered. Yet Kierkegaard, nevertheless, intends to reintroduce Christians to Christianity. Himself a devout Christian, Kierkegaard was disappointed with his age's concern with objective, scientific truths and its neglect of ethical and religious truths. Like Socrates, he tries to awaken his contemporaries to these subjective religious and ethical truths, which can never be substantiated by human reason and yet are essential to our very existence. He began his work by criticizing traditional rationalistic philosophy. He asserts that traditional rationalistic philosophy, beginning with Plato, then passing on to Descartes and finally culminating in Hegel's idealistic philosophy, has dissociated itself from our true existence. In these grand systems created by the philosophers, the individual loses his significance; as William Barrett puts it: "Philosophers before Kierkegaard has speculated about the proposition. 'I exist', but it was Kierkegaard who observed the crucial fact they had forgotten: namely, that my own existence is not at all a matter of speculation to be, but a reality in which I am personally and passionately involved" (Barrett 162). Indeed, in his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Kierkegaard criticizes Hegel and other philosophers by remarking:

A system of existence cannot be given. Is there, then, not such a system? That is not at all the case.....Existence itself is a system – for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit. System and conclusiveness correspond to each other, but existence is the very opposite. Abstractly viewed, system and existence cannot be thought conjointly, because in order to think existence, systematic thought must think it as annulled and consequently not as existing. (CUP 197)

Therefore, Kierkegaard asserts that only God can be this systematic thinker, for God is the only one “who himself is outside existence and yet in existence and who in his eternity is forever concluded and yet includes existence within himself” (*CUP* 198). By contrast, “the human knower, as a creature in a state of becoming, is situated in existence, which means that both the subject and often the object of knowledge are in process” (Westphal 296); thus, it is impossible for him to have an objective knowledge of reality, as Kierkegaard expresses:

If...being is understood as empirical being, then truth itself is transformed into a *desideratum* [something wanted] and everything is placed in the process of becoming [worden] because the empirical object is not finished, and the existing knowing spirit is itself in the process of becoming. Thus truth is an approximating whose beginning cannot be established absolutely, because there is no conclusion that has retroactive power. (*CUP* 199)

By this argument, “Kierkegaard, like Kant before him and Derrida after him, considers the radical temporality of the human condition to be the barrier to absolute knowledge” (Westphal 296). Thus, he argued in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* that “subjectivity is truth” and “truth is subjectivity.” Elucidating the difference between objective and subjective truth, Paul Roubiczek remarks that “the subjective method should reveal a truth which, in contrast to factual information, can become a personal experience and thereby have a deep influence upon what we believe and do—an influence such as is exercised by any kind of faith. (101).

Considering man to be an “existing spirit,” Kierkegaard thinks man has to take the initiative to take responsibility for his own relationship to God. Since truth is subjectivity, one’s very attitude to the Christian idea of God’s entering human history for the salvation of mankind can be of great importance to him. For Kierkegaard, true faith involves absolute commitment to this paradoxical religious truth. For this

faith in God transcends reason alone and belongs to the existential sphere of the individual who must take decisions that may influence his entire life and eternal salvation.

Thus, according to Kierkegaard, what is in question here is one's own personal *appropriation* of the truth – “appropriation” coming from the Latin root *proprius*, meaning “one's own” (Barrett 171). Elucidating Kierkegaard's idea of the relationship between creed, life, and action, Paul Roubiczek remarks:

What the method itself means is perhaps best illuminated when Kierkegaard says ‘An objective acceptance of Christianity is either paganism or thoughtlessness.’ Christianity is a way of life; to accept it as an interesting line of thought, as an abstract explanation of the universe, or as ritual, but without acting on it, makes it well nigh meaningless. The subjective method always establishes first the relationship between creed, life and action; to give reality to the creed, the method involves us in its consequences. (103)

In a word, the individual can only learn from the experiences he gains through his commitment to what he believes. To Kierkegaard, true faith consists in an individual's absolute commitment to his beliefs. By this commitment, one actually reaches his authenticity. Truth, as lived out by the individual, is no longer outside of him but becomes the very essence of his existence.

Following Kierkegaard's emphasis on the individual comes Martin Heidegger's criticism of traditional philosophical trend. Concerning this point, William Barrett remarks that from the beginning, the thought of western man has been preoccupied with the thing-which-is, while ignoring the to-be of what is. Traditionally, “that part of philosophy which is supposed to deal with Being is called ontology – the science of the thing which is – and not *einailogy*, which would be the study of the to-be of Being as opposed to beings” (Barrett 212). Thus, Heidegger's philosophy is an effort to

redirect the attention of western man from an over concern with ontology to einailogy.

The approach that Heidegger adopts to describe, without any obscuring preconceptions, what human existence is in his great philosophical work *Being and Time* is Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Defining phenomenology, Calvin O. Schrag remarks that "phenomenology, in its broadest intention, is an attempt to return to the immediate content of experience, and to analyze and describe this content as it actually presents itself" (10). The phrase "Zu den Sachen selbst!" was first formulated by Edmund Husserl as the guiding principle of the phenomenological method. As appropriated by Heidegger in his existential analytics, "phenomenology as the method of existentialist philosophy thus seeks to disclose and elucidate the phenomena of human experience as they present themselves in their existential immediacy" (Schrag 10-11). By this approach, "Heidegger maintains that phenomenology enables us to consider our being as a possibility rather than a simple actuality" and "he reveals that we are beings who exist beyond our present selves, always extending ourselves along ever expanding temporal horizons" (Kearney 300). By this approach, Heidegger discovers men "as beings in time, continually moving beyond the actual givens of the present towards the future and the past: those dimensions of ourselves which we possess as absences, as *possibilities*" (Kearney 300). By this approach, Heidegger also destroys the Cartesian world view that there exists an unbridgeable chasm between man and nature, or between consciousness and the external world. He asserts that "My Being is not something that takes place inside my skin (or inside an immaterial substance inside that skin); my Being, rather, is spread over a field or region which is the world of its care and concern" (Barrett 217). Heidegger calls this field of Being Dasein. Dasein (which, in German, means literally Being there) is his name of man. He avoids using the term consciousness, which may bring us back into the Cartesian dualism. In "Becoming a

Self; the Role of Authenticity in *Being and Time*,” Charles Guignon elucidates that as Heidegger suggests, “the ongoing happening of our lives never exists in isolation from the wider context of the world” (123). Actually, as the common state of our everyday activities makes clear, we are always involved in concrete situations in such a way that “there is no way to draw a sharp distinction between a “self” component and a “world” component” (Guignon 123). Thus, “there is usually such a tight reciprocal interaction between self and situation that what is normally *given* is a tightly interwoven whole” (Guignon 123). In a word, Heidegger’s claim is that “when everything is running its course in ordinary life, the distinction between self and world presupposed by the tradition simply does not show up” (Guignon 123).

By pointing out Dasein as being in a state of openness to our everyday existence, Heidegger defines Dasein as characteristic of care: “For as ‘care’ the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined” (BT 157). And Dasein, as a being of care, is living in a “with-world,” “the one that I share with others” (BT 155). And living in such a “with-world,” Dasein has two modes of existence. The first mode he calls “the inauthentic existence” and another he designates as “the authentic existence.” As Michael Gelven points out, what Heidegger means by “authentic” is the awareness of one’s own self; by “inauthentic”, the awareness of the self merely as others see it, or perhaps to see one’s self as having a meaning or essence that is prior to and hence ‘other’ than one’s existence” (Gelven 51). Elucidating the two modes of existence, Charles Guignon remarks that “the German word for ‘authentic’ *eigentlich*, comes from the stem *eigen* which means ‘own,’ so an inauthentic life would be one that is unowned or disowned”(126). Actually, characterized by “falling, fleeing, and forgetting,” an inauthentic life lacks any focus or cohesiveness. It is actually fragmented and disjointed. A person leading such a life drifts with the latest fads and preoccupations, blind to one’s ownmost ability- to-be and to the possibility of

realizing what, as an authentic Self, one truly is (51). On the other hand, “authentic Dasein seizes on its ‘mineness’ and lives in a way it is already making as a participant in the they” (126). By “choosing to choose,” in Heidegger’s words, it is “answerable and or responsible (*Verantwortlich*) for one’s life” (129). Thus, what distinguishes the authentic existence from the inauthentic is the individual’s awareness of his or her life orientation. In the state of inauthentic existence, an individual’s life orientation is actually deprived by the dictatorship of the ‘they-self.’ This ‘they-self’ dominates an individual’s everyday existence and deprives this individual’s possibilities of making meaningful choices for himself. But what is this ‘they-self?’ Elucidating the term, Thompson M. Guy remarks that “both Nietzsche and Heidegger saw anxiety as a necessary accompaniment to acting authentically” (148). In the modern age, he argues, man feels his anxiety due to a deep sense of alienation that Nietzsche suggests comes with the belief in the non-existence of God. As modern man, we no longer have solid, universal values to cling to. Sensing our alienation, in Heidegger’s phrase, we feel “thrown” into a world that is indifferent to our very existence. Nevertheless, we are obliged to project a future course for ourselves by the choices we make, “even if our so-called choices are predominantly unconscious” (Guy 148). In this condition, troubled by a sense of loneliness in our decisions and the world we live in, “we mitigate our anxiety by complying with what we imagine others want from us” (Guy148). This ‘they-self’ is thus formed. And as dominated by this ‘they-self,’ people in this state of inauthentic existence tend to lose their independence:

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the others,’ in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the

“they” is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they (man) take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (*BT* 164)

This ‘they-self’ is responsible for our everyday decision-making and value judgment, for it has its characteristic of having to make meaningful choices: “The ‘they’ presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability” (*BT* 165). By its taking away the anxiety of freedom, the “they-self” becomes the means for Dasein to escape from itself. It thus becomes a common way of living: “By thus disburdening it of its Being, the ‘they’ accommodates Dasein if Dasein has any tendency to take things easily and make them easy. And because the ‘they’ constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by disburdening it of its Being, the ‘they’ retains and enhances its stubborn dominion” (*BT* 165).

Elaborating on the state of fallen-ness, Heidegger observes three everyday phenomena; they are, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Defining idle talk, Heidegger points out that it is not to be used in a disparaging signification but regarded as a positive phenomenon which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting.

Idle talk, as Heidegger elucidates, is “the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own” and “it releases people from the task of genuinely understanding and develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer” (*BT* 213). In other words, people engaged in idle talk never take the burden of discovering the truth. Instead, they actually believe in the truthfulness of what is groundlessly said. “For what is said is always

understood proximally as ‘saying’ something – that is, an uncovering something” (*BT* 213). Things are so because people say so. Gradually, what is said-in-the-talk spreads. In this modern age, thanks to the development and flourishing of public means of communication, idle talk is not just spread by word of mouth but by other means as well, until finally it takes on an authoritative character. The general public can’t tell the truth from the fabrication, and in fact they don’t take the pains to differentiate. Thus, a state of closing-off is reached. Any new inquiry, and any disputation is discouraged, suppressed and held back. Besides, as Heidegger points out, “the dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood – that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world ‘matter’ to it” (*BT* 213). The “they” prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and what and how one “sees.” People in this modern world are thus “conditioned” in their ways to see and interpret things. Their taste, views of things and their ideas and attitudes never get out this arena. For life, they are used to this condition and are lost themselves, leading an inauthentic life without knowing it.

The second phenomenon that Heidegger observes is curiosity. As defined by Heidegger, curiosity “concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being toward it) but just in order to see” and it seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty” (*BT* 216). In other words, a curious man never seeks to understand; rather, by having his attention distracted from one thing to another, he only seeks to entertain himself with new excitements. He has no concern with discovering truth, and in his hunger for knowing for the mere sake of knowing, he only loses himself. This kind of life is typical of our everyday living. In this kind of living, one loses his sense of authenticity. As Heidegger puts it, “Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This

mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein—a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself” (*BT* 217).

Furthermore, idle talk also controls the ways in which one may be curious, as Heidegger puts it: “These two everyday modes of Being for discourse and sight are not just present-at-hand side by side in their tendency to uproot, but either of these ways-to-be drags the other one with it” (*BT* 217). Indeed, as Michael Gelven puts it, “the curious human being allows its attention to drift everywhere its desire for the new directs it, that is, to nowhere in particular. And what it sees in this attitude gets expressed in idle chatter” (Gelven 113). But in its conceited self-delusion, in which nothing is closed off and nothing is not understood, the human being only lives in a state of inauthenticity.

The third phenomenon that Heidegger points out is ambiguity. It is the understanding engendered by idle talk and an unbounded curiosity. In our everyday life, we encounter the kind of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything. Soon it becomes impossible to decide what is the actual truth. As Heidegger points out, “this ambiguity extends not only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein’s Being towards itself” (*BT* 217).

In the state of ambiguity, “the two possibilities of interpreting the curious world of idle chatter reveal the following dilemma: either, by the effects of conventional wisdom, everything already seems said and therefore understood, and yet is not because we are curious to see something new; or, by our curiosity, everything does seem understood, yet is because all we can say about what we discover is what has already been said by someone else” (*BT* 217).

This self-defeating character of our “openness to the everyday world” is likewise apparent when we see that what everyone says is what we are impelled by curiosity to

find out. But once that happens, no room is left for surmise. Not only are the genuine and the new already out of date when we encounter them, but “one” already understands and has stated what the result of any investigation has to be. And whether we are talking of events or of other people, gossip and surmise are taken for reality. In the everyday relationship, this gossip and surmise sometimes play a major role. As Heidegger puts it:

Into primordial Being-with-one-another, idle talk first slips itself in between. Everyone keeps his eye on the other first and next, watching how he will comport himself and what he will say in reply. Being-with-one-another in the “they” is by no means an indifferent side-by-side-ness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening in. Under the mask of “for one another,” an “against-one-another” is in play (BT219)

Camus’ *The Outsider* clearly furnishes an example of society’s dependence on conventional wisdom for its judgment of truth. In the novel, the protagonist Meursault suffers from society’s misunderstanding and condemnation because of his “unconventional” behavior. Reading the novel, the reader clearly sees that he is not a cold-blooded murderer. As a matter of fact, he did not kill the Arab willfully, but merely because he acted impulsively, being dazzled and blinded by the glaring sun and suffering from its heat. Besides, the reader can also see that he did not weep at his mother’s funeral not because he hated his mother but merely because he felt indifferent. Having not much emotional attachment to his mother, he simply could not exaggerate his feelings, succumbing to the rituals of emotional breast-beating. Furthermore, the reader also knows that he sent his mother to a nursing home not because he was heartless and unfilial, but because he could not afford to pay the rent

and buy food for them both. Besides, he thought his mother needed someone to be around her a great deal of time. Yet, the fact that he sent his mother to a nursing home, combined with the fact that he behaved callously (according to rumor) at her funeral, becomes strong evidence for the jury to be convinced of his “essentially heartless” nature, which makes his “cold-blooded” murder possible. In a word, as Camus’ title indicates, the protagonist is indeed an outsider of his society.

After his elaboration of the three everyday phenomena, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, Heidegger points out that these three phenomena mark the characteristics of our everyday existence: “In these, and in the way they are connected in their Being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the ‘falling’ of Dasein” (*BT* 219). The term “fallen-ness,” as Heidegger defines, does not express any negative evaluation. Rather, it is used to signify that Dasein has lost itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its self and has fallen into the world, lost in the publicity of the “they,” since it is proximally and for the most part alongside the “world” of its concern. Indeed, as we have explicated, the three everyday phenomena have a common characteristic of being rootless, as Heidegger points out:

Idle talk discloses to Dasein a Being toward its world, towards others, and towards itself – a Being in which these are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating. Curiosity disclosed everything and anything, yet in such a way that Being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein’s understanding, but only in order that Being-in-the-world should be suppressed in this uprooted “everywhere and nowhere.” (*BT* 221)

But why is it that Dasein is liable to stay in the state of fallen-ness? Heidegger lists several causes. First, it is tempting to be in such a state, owing to our being disburdened by adopting the attitudes of an impersonal self: “If Dasein itself, in idle

talk and in the way things have been publicly interpreted, presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in the “they” and falling into groundlessness, this tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation towards falling. Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting” (*BT 221*).

Second, since everything seems to be understood, the removal of all doubt and personal anxiety can tranquilize us, as Heidegger puts it:

Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that Dasein’s disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its Being will be secure, genuine, and full. Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the “they,” it gets spread abroad increasing that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind that goes with it. The supposition of the “they” that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life,’ brings Dasein a tranquility, for which everything is “in the best of order” and all doors are open.” (*BT 222*)

Third, since it is doubt that motivates the ontological questions such as “Who am I?”, “What am I doing?”, “Why?”, and they are obviated by the first of our two characteristics, the condition of falling becomes exacerbated until the acting self is alienated from its own true possibilities (Gelven 114). “When Dasein, tranquilized, and ‘understanding’ everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it” (*BT 222*).

Fourth, since the alienation of self from self denies the authentic possibilities for human action, the fall becomes entangling: “The alienation of falling--at once tempting and tranquillizing--leads by its own movement, to Dasein’s getting entangled in itself” (*BT 223*).

Fifth, as there is no ground for the world into which one is falling, the fall of the self into an essentially foreign world is turbulent, as Heidegger puts it:

This downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic Being of the “they,” has a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquillized supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within its reach. And since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and into the ‘they,’ the movement of falling is characterized by turbulence. (*BT* 223)

The state of fallen-ness, as Heidegger maintains, characterizes our everyday life. “Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the “they” inauthenticity (*BT* 223). In other words, Dasein can’t help being thrown into the turbulence of the “they-self,” since in essence, it is in the state of Being-in-the-world, never separated from the world it is involved. Frances Bernard Kominkiewicz comments that “the concepts discussed by Heidegger establish a rationale or explanation of a person’s environment and how that environment influences that person” (50). Indeed, as Heidegger contended, every person is nurtured and therefore influenced by his or her culture. And since we actually have no control over our social environment, we then become a part of that environment and consciously or unconsciously learn behaviors from the culture of our social environment. The social environment into which we are born becomes our world.

But what is authentic existence? How is it different from the state of fallen-ness? Heidegger asserts that “authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon” (*BT* 224). Thus, the state of authentic existence is reached through Dasein’s being conscious of itself. But how can Dasein reach the

state of self-consciousness? It is through the anxiety of Dasein.

But what then is anxiety? How can it have the effect of individualization and “making manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself”? (BT 232) In defining anxiety, Heidegger especially distinguishes it from fear. He defines fear as always a fear of something, “a detrimental entity within-the-world which comes from some definite region but is close by and is bringing itself close, and yet might stay away” (BT 230). But anxiety, however, is not a fear of something. It does not have something definite as its object: “That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere*. Anxiety ‘does not know’ what that in the face of which it is anxious of” (BT 231). As a matter of fact, what anxiety is anxious of is the world itself. “In that in the face of which one has anxiety, the ‘It is nothing and no-where’ becomes manifest. The obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’ means as a phenomenon that *the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety*” (BT 231). Describing the state of anxiety, Heidegger remarks:

In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The world can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the world and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. (BT 232)

Indeed, this is the significance of anxiety. With this anxiety, entities within the

world are absolutely irrelevant, and therefore, in moments of heightened anxiety, the world (suddenly rendered “unfamiliar”) seems to collapse into insignificance. This state of anxiety pierces through the crust of the they-self under which the self is hidden and tranquillized, leaving it feeling “uncanny” and “not at home.” Though this puts the self into flight back into the comforts of inauthentic everydayness, yet “in anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes” and “this individualization “brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities for his Being” (*BT* 235). This disclosure brings the message that the individual is free, free for determining one’s ownmost potentiality, and when that is understood, the realization occurs that Being is always “beyond itself”; that is, Being always comports itself towards its own possibilities. These possibilities, which formerly have been submerged in the domination of the collective they-self, emerge solely as *my* possibilities. Elucidating the individualizing effects of anxiety, H. J. Blackham remarks that in the state of anxiety, an individual is withdrawn from his preoccupations, enclosed in a solitude, where he is forced to choose whether he will be himself or not. In this moment, the individual sees its personal reality and henceforward he has chosen what he wills to be. For anxiety separates him from the interests and meanings of his life in the world, absorbed and lost in his relations and preoccupations, and isolates him in this recognition that he can either continue this impersonally determined inauthentic existence or by heroic effort takes personal charge of his own existence, and that in any case he never is but always will be, because he can will to be (94-95). Thus, in the state of anxiety, there may occur a turning point for the individual from a life of fallen-ness to that of authenticity.

Dasein’s being lost in the they-self, Dasein has ensnared itself in inauthenticity. The “they-self” has always kept Dasein from taking hold of its possibilities of Being.

It even hides the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing its possibilities. It then remains indefinite who has “really” done the choosing. So, carried along by the nobody, Dasein actually makes no choices. As for this point, Richard Kearney comments:

The horizon of the possible is always covered over by the anonymous crowd (das Man) which reduces life to the uniform, compelling the past and future to conform to the one form of an insular present. The crowd hides the possible because it threatens to expose the mediocrity and inertia of our daily life. The crowd protects its subscribers from the responsibility of having to choose their actual manner of existence from a host of possibilities. It isolates the present from the unsettling dimensions of past and future. It assures us that all is well and could not be otherwise. (302)

In the state of inauthenticity, the individual is thus carried away by the nameless crowd. Situated in this state, he can not see that his daily life is a kind of death-in-life. He lives unreflectively in the present, and being blind to his true possibilities, takes no actions for his future. He does not try to find meanings from his past experiences. The past, to him, can only be a host of broken, unrelated events that come to his mind sometimes like a remembered but meaningless dream. Afraid of the future and forgetful of the past, by losing himself in the crowd, he escapes from his self, from the future that casts before him a shadow of uncertainty and from the past that may offer him helpful experiences for his plans for the future. In a word, spiritually, he is dead.

To reverse this process, Dasein must first find itself. The individualizing effects of anxiety, regarded by Heidegger as “the call of conscience,” help Dasein to see its potentiality for authentic living:

Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its

potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead of itself...). Dasein is falling into the “they” in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience – that is, conscience itself – has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care.

(BT 322-3)

The call awakens a sense of guilt in Dasein, for Dasein realizes that one is responsible for the self; therefore, “in understanding the call, Dasein is *in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence*. It has chosen itself” (BT 334). This sense of guilt, as Heidegger explicates, is out of Dasein’s being, care. It is the base of all morality, as Heidegger expresses:

Not only can entities whose Being is care load themselves with factual guilt, but they are guilty in the very basis of their Being; and this Being-guilty is what provides, above all, the ontological condition for Dasein’s ability to come to own anything in factually existing. This essential Being-guilty is, equiprimordially, the existential condition for the possibility of the ‘morally’ good and for that of the ‘morally’ evil – that is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factially. The primordial “Being-guilty” cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself. (BT 332)

The self who listens to the call coming from the soundlessness of uncanniness is brought back from the loud idle talk which goes with the common sense of the “they.” As a contrast, the “they,” who hear and understand nothing but loud idle talk, can not ‘report’ any call and is held against the conscience on the subterfuge that it is “dumb” and manifestly not present-at-hand. As Heidegger sees, “the ‘they’ merely covers up

its own failure to hear the call and the fact that its 'hearing' does not reach very far" (BT 343).

Hearing the call of conscience, the individual then chooses to "have a conscience." No longer enslaved by the they-self, the individual becomes resolute: "'Resoluteness' signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'" (BT 345). Although the irresoluteness of the 'they' remains dominant notwithstanding, it cannot impugn resolute existence (BT 345). It is just as Mariana Ortega asserts: "The call of conscience leads to the appropriate understanding of our ontological make-up, our Being-guilty, and subsequently our making the choice "to choose" and "another way of making this point is to say that conscience ultimately discloses one's freedom as well as one's responsibility" (24).

In the condition of resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-self, Dasein is not detached from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a "free-floating 'I'." Rather, "to experience the *Augenblick*, to be in the authentic situation after we understand the call of conscience, is to be at a time in which we are faced with concrete possibilities and situations that include others" (Ortega 24). Instead, resoluteness "brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into Solicitous Being with Others" (BT 344). This resolute Dasein then frees itself for its world and it helps others to free themselves, to see their potentiality-for-Being, as Heidegger puts it: "Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates" (BT 344). When Dasein is resolute, says Heidegger, it can become the 'conscience' of others. In other words, as Mariana Ortega maintains, "authentic care involves acting in such a way that we help others understand their Being guilty, their responsibility for their lives" (24). And only

when people are authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can they authentically be with one another.

The authentic self, in resoluteness, can see its own situation. As a contrast to the “they” who knows only the general situation, loses itself in those opportunities which are closest to it, the authentic self “does not withdraw itself from ‘actuality,’ but discovers first what is factually possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the ‘they’” (*BT* 346). In this knowledge of its own particular situation, Dasein sees its potentiality-for-Being and takes action: “Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a situation and put that situation before itself; it has put itself into that situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already taking action” (*BT* 347).

In resoluteness, the authentic self sees its potentiality-for-Being. But only when individuals see also their Being-towards-the-end do they achieve the state of true authentic life: “When the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the ‘they’ is revealed. Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-self. When one has an understanding of Being-towards-death – towards death as one’s ownmost possibility – one’s potentiality-for-Being becomes authentic and wholly transparent” (*BT* 354).

In the state of fallen-ness, however, our Being-towards-death is covered up by the they-self. The they-self regards death as “an indefinite something which, above all, must duly arrive from somewhere or other, but which is proximally not yet present-at-hand for oneself, and is therefore no threat” (*BT* 297). Dying, which is essentially mine in such a way that no one can be my representative, is thus leveled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular, as Heidegger puts it: “In Dasein’s public way of interpreting, it is said that ‘one dies,’ because everyone else and oneself can talk himself into saying that ‘in no

case is it I myself,' for this 'one' is the 'nobody'" (BT 297). In Leo Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Illich*, the protagonist's sudden realization of his impending death reflects clearly people's everyday attitude to death:

Ivan Illich saw that he was dying and he was in continual despair. In the depth of his heart he knew he was dying, but not only was he not accustomed to the thought, he simply did not and could not grasp it. The syllogism he had learned from Kiesewetter's logic: "Caius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal," had always seemed to him correct as applied to Caius, but certainly not as applied to himself. That Caius,...man in the abstract...was mortal, was perfectly correct, but he was not Caius, not an abstract man, but a creature quite, quite separate from all others. (D I I VI)

This way of viewing death gets death passed off as always something "actual," but its character as a possibility gets concealed. By such ambiguity, then, "Dasein puts itself in the position of losing itself in the 'they' as regards a distinctive potentiality-for-Being which belongs to Dasein's ownmost Self" and "the 'they' gives its approval, and aggravates the *temptation* to cover up from oneself one's ownmost Being-towards-death" (BT 297).

To reach an understanding of one's Being-towards-death, the individual has to come to see death as one's ownmost possibility: "Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 'actualized,' nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing" (BT 307). If the individual can see this possibility as his ownmost possibility, he'll then be wrenched away from the "they," for, as Heidegger expresses: "Death does not just 'belong' to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death *lays claim* to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of

death, as understood, in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself” (BT 308). With the understanding of death as our ownmost possibility, “all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-being is the issue” (BT 308). Just as Richard Kearney comments:

Death presents the finitude of *my* temporalization; it cannot belong to another. In order to live our life, as a ‘being-towards-death,’ authentically we must live it as our *own*, as individuals over and against the collective ‘they.’ In thus authentically experiencing death as *my* supreme possibility, I experience the possibility of the impossibility of my existence, the possibility of being–no-longer-able-to-be. Death is the end of all our possibilities. I exist authentically when I live my possibilities *towards* my death. (303)

Charles Guignon also maintains that “facing death, and recognizing the ultimate contingency of the ways of living made accessible by the ‘They,’ we are able to see possibilities as ‘possibilities,’ something we choose, and we see our lives as something we are defining through our choices”(130). In a word, the individual is awakened to his authenticity by the very consciousness of death that allows him to consider that his life has a limitation and thus he must take immediate actions to realize his true possibilities or else his life will be meaningless, just like that kind of life led by a they-self. By this, the true authentic life is reached. Life will then no longer be “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing” (*Macbeth* 5. 5. 27-8).

Commenting on Heidegger’s idea of authenticity, Richard Rorty remarks that for Heidegger, it is “the practices that one engages in, especially the language, the final vocabulary one uses” that determine what one is. In Heidegger’s terms, he

argues, “to say that Dasein is guilty is to say that it speaks somebody else’s language, and so lives in a world it never made” (109). But while most people would not feel guilty about this, people “with the special gifts and ambitions shared by Hegel, Proust, and Heidegger do” (109). Thus, Rorty thinks that Heidegger “seems genuinely to have believed that the ordinary states of mind and life plans of non-intellectuals were ‘grounded’ on the ability of people like himself to have spectacularly different anxieties and projects” (110). Here we can say that Heidegger considers that most people easily follow conventions because it relieves them of the burden of having to make choices and taking responsibilities for their choices. Yet, as he believes, there exists the call of conscience that is coming from his very being, care. This call of conscience may be ignored by the individual or it may be accepted and then propels him or her to a life of authenticity. So if Heidegger’s observation is true, it should be common of humanity. Concerning an individual’s possibility of leading an authentic life, Mary Warnock asserts that “it may be that a man can go through the whole of his life in the inauthentic state, and he may never emerge from it” but “reflection may bring his attention to the true state of affairs and may open his eyes to his position in the world, which is above all a position of responsibility” (57). In such a state of anxiety, fearing the burden of freedom, “he may throw himself entirely on the mercy of people in general, defend the orthodox, the bourgeois and the normal, and go on frantically pursuing his inauthentic goals” (Warnock 58). Or listening to the call of his conscience, “he may determinedly change the character of his concern for the world, and keeping before his eyes his lonely and responsible position, he may exercise resolution, and launch himself forward into authentic existence” (Warnock 58).

To end this part of discussions about Heidegger, I may compare Heidegger’s ideas of authenticity and fallen-ness with that found in a chapter entitled “The grand

Inquisitor” in Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*. In this chapter, there is a rather impressive portrayal of the conflict and struggle between freedom and security. In this chapter, Dostoevsky portrays a grand inquisitor who plans to put the reincarnated Christ to death as a heretic in the belief that Christ’s reappearance will only disrupt the people’s sense of security as established by the church. Believing that most people are by nature weak and therefore afraid of taking the terrible burden of freedom and responsibility, the Grand Inquisitor thinks that he is offering them happiness with his mechanical way to salvation. By this way, people know exactly what to do and expect in order to achieve salvation. This mechanical way, though false and deceptive, yet offers men a sense of comfort and security and takes away the anxiety of freedom and responsibility: “The most painful secrets of their conscience, all, all they will bring to us, and we shall have an answer for all. And they will be glad to believe our answer, for it will save them from the great anxiety and terrible agony they endure at present in making a free decision for themselves” (BK 259). Christ, as the cardinal believes, will only break this illusion and instead burden them with the unbearable weight of freedom and responsibility. Concerning the similarities between Heidegger’s ideas of authenticity and fallen-ness and those found in Dostoevsky’s chapter “The Grand Inquisitor,” Michael Gelven remarks that “both authors focus their remarkable acumen on the twofold characteristic of freedom: first, that it places a terrible burden on the free man, often forcing him to seek almost any means to avoid its full significance; and second, that it isolates the free man from the comfort and security of an ordered existence” (157). Furthermore, he continues, both Heidegger and Dostoevsky recognize that a loss of one’s freedom entails a loss of one’s authentic character: “the cardinal really thought that he was a Christian even at the moment when he was denying the true essence of Christianity; the inauthentic self is most confident of having solved all his problems when it covers up that which

it really is, something capable of choice” (Gelven 157). Thus, for both the they-self and the cardinal, there are no more choices to be made. What is left for the individual is just to live out the implications. Indeed, as Heidegger asserts, people tend to escape from the responsibility of making meaningful choices for themselves. By living as a they-self, they feel safe and secure, immune from the anxiety of freedom and responsibility. But at the same time, they also live an “unexamined life,” never questioning the meaning of their being. Just as Socrates asserts, “the unexamined life is not worth living.” Only by the individualizing effects of anxiety, they begin to see their essential freedom and then can take full responsibility for their being. The authentic life can then be a possibility in their life.

Except for this comparison between Heidegger’s ideas of authenticity and fallenness with that of Dostoevsky’s in his *The Brothers Karamazov*, I may still discuss Dostoevsky’s *Notes from Underground*. This novella, as Gary Saul Morson asserts, is an “anti-utopia” (117). And its Part One is regarded by Walter Kaufmann as “the best overture for existentialism ever written” (14). For “anti-utopia,” Krishan Kumar defines it as the “mirror-image of utopia” (100). He sees that “it is utopia that provides the positive content to which anti-utopia makes the negative response”; that is, “anti-utopia draws its material from utopia and reassembles it in a manner that denies the affirmation of utopia” (100). *Notes from Underground*, in fact, “parodies *What is to Be Done?* as a contemporary, and especially dangerous, example of a kind of literature and thinking extending back to *The Republic*” (Morson 116). As for *The Republic*, it “served not only as positive models for utopia but also as negative models for anti-utopia” (Morson 116). In Chapter Two, I will especially discuss *The Republic* and its influence on both Huxley’s and Orwell’s dystopias. In *Notes from Underground*, the protagonist refuses to be dehumanized: “Now, I am living out my life in my corner, taunting myself with the spiteful and useless consolation that an

intelligent man cannot become anything seriously, and it is only the fool who becomes anything” (*NFU* 55). He argues against the idea that human life can be regulated according to the principle of reason: “Then ‘the Palace of Crystal’ will be built. Then....In fact, those will be halcyon days. Of course there is no guaranteeing (this is my comment) that it will not be, for instance, frightfully dull then” (*NFU* 71). Here, the protagonist actually treats ‘the Palace of Crystal’ as a symbol representing all utopian dream of building an ideal human state according to the principle of reason. This utopian dream actually starts with Plato. By his criticism of such an ideal human existence as being essentially ‘dull’ and his refusal ‘to become anything,’ he actually expresses his essentially anti-utopian ideas that run counter to Plato’s utopian ideals, which I will discuss in Chapter II. Besides, the protagonist also asserts the value of the supremacy of man’s free will: “What man wants is simply *independent* choice, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead” (*NFU* 71-72). To him, rationalism seeks to deny the freedom of the individual: “...science itself will teach man that he has never really had any caprice or will of his own, and that he himself is something of the nature of a piano key or the stop of an organ” (*NFU* 70). Thus, only through stressing the transcendence of the individual in his freedom to take choices, the protagonist is assured of his essential freedom. By his assertion of the value of man’s free will, the protagonist actually influences later existentialists. In Sartre’s philosophy, the reader can see Sartre’s idea of man’s unconditional freedom to take free choices in his act of self-definition. Thus, by this work, we see the possible link between existentialism and dystopia, as both stress man’s freedom and fight against dehumanization.

Jean Paul Sartre also concerns himself with the state of human existence. Like Heidegger, his philosophy is centered on man himself. But as pointed out by Frances Bernard Kominkiewicz, while Heidegger views each individual as part of,

and a product of, his environment, “in Sartre’s conceptualization of existentialism, each person is viewed as an independent self” (2). In his philosophical work *Being and Nothingness*, he distinguishes two modes of being: Being-for-itself (conscious Being, i.e. man) and Being-in-itself (non-conscious Being, e.g. a table). Concerning the difference between the two modes of being, Alan D. Schrift elucidates that Being-in-itself--the being of objects, of things—can be defined in terms of the properties it has. In other words, being-in-itself is what it is, it has a predefined essence. But Being-for-itself--the being of human being, of consciousness, of subjects—cannot be defined in this way. While being-in-itself is what it is, being-for-itself is “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is; it is a lack of being, a project of acquiring being” (Schrift 33). Thus, in contrast to the non-conscious, massive and opaque Being-in-itself, the Being-for-itself is essentially free: “Man does not exist *first* in order to be free *subsequently*; there is no difference between the being of man and his *being free*” (BN 25). Sartre reaches this conclusion by his study of consciousness. He argues that since consciousness is always consciousness *of* something beyond itself, it cannot exist in isolation from the things of the world. And because consciousness can only appear through the existence of other things, it is perpetually aware of a distance between the world and itself. And because of its absolute dependence on things beyond itself, consciousness is never complete in itself, therefore experienced as a ‘lack’ of Being. Besides, because consciousness is always present to something it is *not*, and depend on what it is not in order to exist, negation is constitutive of consciousness. In a word, these two aspects, lack and negation, are definitional of consciousness.

The two characteristics of consciousness, therefore, determine the state of human existence, as William Barrett expresses: “Being-for-itself (pour-soi) is coextensive with the realm of consciousness, and the nature of consciousness is that it is

perpetually beyond itself” (Barrett 245). As Sartre contends, as a human being, we are always beyond ourselves. We never possess our existence as we possess a thing. Because of the nature of our consciousness, human existence is characteristic of self-transcendence.

As a human being, we are always projecting a future for ourselves. And it is only when we cease to exist that we are reduced to the being of a thing. Thus, what distinguishes us from the being of a thing is the nature of our consciousness.

Because of this nature of human consciousness, Sartre argues, man is therefore free. His freedom is not something which can be taken from him, but it is inborn with him: “What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of ‘human reality’” (BN 25). As a being essentially free, Sartre argues, we are free to make ourselves. As an atheistic existentialist, Sartre denies the existence of God. To him, denial of the existence of God endows his philosophy with greater consistency since the existence of God will no doubt collide with his idea of the absolute freedom of man. Indeed, if God does exist, there then must be a conception of man as conceived by God. In his *Existentialism and Humanism*, using the analogy of an artisan who creates an artifice according to a blueprint in his mind, Sartre sees God, if he does exist, as creating man according to a preconception in his mind. If God does exist, Sartre argues, man must then have an essence before his existence. In this condition, man can only be defined in God’s terms. He will then have no freedom of self-definition. Thus, treating the non-existence of God as the foundation of his philosophy, Sartre asserts that “man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself” and that is “the first principle of existentialism” (Ex 4). It seems that by his theory, Sartre has placed man upon the throne of God. He is his own master and owns the freedom of determining his own life course. And that is the reason why Sartre calls his philosophy “a humanism”.

Thus, to Sartre, Man is free in the sense that he has no God-determined human nature to be realized by his actions. Nor does he have divinely-sanctioned values to be the guidance for his actions, as Sartre contends: “Dostoevsky once wrote: ‘If God does not exist, everything would be permitted;’ and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. ...Man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself” (*Ex7*). Thus, by this idea, Sartre announces the total independence of man. As a being the meaning of whose existence is left for his own definition, man has to take the burden of his own existence totally upon his own shoulders. In his play *The Flies*, Sartre has his mouthpiece Orestes express this idea about human freedom. To Orestes, as to Sartre, man shoulders the responsibility of his own existence and is totally free from the dominance of God. Commenting on Sartre’s idea of man’s essential freedom, Stephen Priest asserts that to Sartre, “ethical values are invented, not discovered, he thinks there is no God so no divine authority on the distinction between right and wrong, and it is an act of bad faith to endorse a pre-established value system such as Christianity, humanism, or Communism” (200). Rather, “each person is radically free to create their own values through action” (Priest 200). As Alan D. Schrift asserts, “freedom refers to the fact that nothing is given to human beings, that a human being is a lack of being with no given essence” and “human beings must make themselves through their choices and actions, through their projects, their freely chosen plans of action” (34). Simply put, for Sartre, a man actually defines himself through his free-chosen actions. To Sartre, if a man acts cowardly, then he defines himself as a coward. If he stops acting cowardly, he is then no more a coward. Thus, from his theory of the essential self-transcendence of consciousness and his idea of God’s non-existence, Sartre sees the possibility of man’s total freedom to project himself toward a future of his own choice.

Because of man's essential freedom, he is free to create a future for himself: "Man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so" (EX 4). In his freedom to create his own future, he is always confronted with possibilities from among which he is obliged to choose, and, in choosing, he is conscious that he is denying all possibilities except the one he has chosen; and since freedom necessarily requires choices to be made about the direction of life, man is ineluctably responsible for himself. Thus, choice is always accompanied by a degree of anxiety in proportion to the importance of the decision, and it is this anxiety which pursues man throughout his life. And this anxiety intensifies when man finds himself always choosing in isolation. Robert Frost's poem "The Road Not Taken" clearly demonstrates the situation in which a man is confronted with the dilemma of making a momentous, life-altering resolution. In fact, the poem catches fully the human condition. Reading the poem, the reader can see that the poet, like all of us, is confronted with the dilemma of making a choice which will determine the direction of his life. Maybe in a desire to lead a life of authenticity, he chooses to be a nonconformist: "I took the road less traveled by" (19). Besides, he was fully aware of the essential limitation of life and the momentousness of his choice, saying that "Yet knowing how way leads on to way, /I doubted if I should ever come back." and that "I shall be telling this with a sigh /Somewhere ages and ages hence: /Two roads diverged in a wood, and I – /I took the one less traveled by, /And that has made all the difference" (14-20). Indeed, as I have just noted, by taking one possibility, one can't help losing other possibilities and by the choice one makes, the choice will determine what we make of ourselves.

But Frost's poem in fact does not express everything which Sartre has to say about existentialism. As a matter of fact, Sartre's existentialism has another dimension which goes beyond individualism. In *Existentialism and Humanism*,

Sartre contends that if existence is indeed prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. But, “when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men” (*EX 4*). Sartre asserts that in choosing for oneself, one indeed chooses for all men: “For in effect, of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be” (*EX 4*). As a humanist, in asserting the essential freedom of man, Sartre does not forget his responsibility to man. By this word, he expresses his great love for human beings. In his idea, man should not only take full responsibility for his own life but also care for the welfare of his fellow beings.

Thus, to Sartre, the concept of man’s unconditional freedom is essential to his philosophy. To him, man’s freedom knows no bounds and is free from all inner or outer limitations, such as a man’s inborn social, political, cultural conditions or his psychological state that may in some ways condition or limit his freedom of self-definition. As Sartre himself expresses, “there is no determinism – man is free, man is freedom” (*Ex 7*). Yet, Sigmund Freud’s study of our unconsciousness has suggested the possibility that at least we are to some extent influenced by our unconsciousness in our acts of choice. Thus, Sartre’s idea of human freedom seems not to be plausible. Furthermore, Sartre’s idea of the autonomy of self is actually derived from Descartes’ belief in the unbridgeable chasm between consciousness and the outer world. In Descartes’ philosophy, the subject is endowed with the ability to doubt the existence of the outer world and itself. Actually, the subject is assured of its own existence through its very act of doubting. But it does not doubt the existence of God. By eliminating the concept of God from his philosophy, Sartre only further endows man with the status of God that Descartes as a faithful Christian

does not dare to presume though it seems to be already implied in his own philosophy. Indeed, if the subject has the inborn ability to doubt anything, why does it not have the reason and right to doubt God's existence? In fact, in Descartes' philosophy, the existence of God can never be ascertained by human reason. By using reason, Sartre only reaches the conclusion of the inexistence of God. Here, a person may question his or her capability in applying human reason to ascertain anything beyond the realm of human experiences. It is from this standpoint that Heidegger finds objection in Sartre's philosophy and distances himself from Sartre by remarking that I am not "an existentialist" (Barrett 248). As William Barrett asserts, Sartre's philosophy "misses the very root of all of Heidegger's thinking, which is Being itself" (248). As a matter of fact, "there is, in Sartre, Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself but there is no Being" (Barrett 248). But "how can the For-itself and In-itself meet unless both stand out in the open space of Being?" (Barrett 248) Thus, Sartre's philosophy actually ignores this aspect and is in fact incomplete. As a "Cartesian rationalist," he remains "the only one existentialist philosopher who does not deal with the prime question that has been the central passion of all the Existentialists--the question, namely, of a truth for man that is more than a truth of the intellect" (Barrett 249). As I have noted, Heidegger contends that the unbridgeable chasm between the outer world and consciousness actually does not exist. In his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger asserts that "Man is rather 'thrown' from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being, come to presence and depart" (210). Here in this letter, he "writes *Existenz* as *Ek-sistenz* in order to stress man's 'standing out' into the 'truth of Being'" and he strongly criticizes "the tradition of subjectivity, which celebrates the 'I think' as the font of liberty" (Krell 191). The condition of man's existence is being-in-the world. Thus, we can not really make choices as

isolated beings in the world. We are, in fact, a product of our culture. As human beings, our freedom is always conditioned by our environment. Thus, Neil Levy contends that “human freedom, considered at the level of culture, will be absolute, but each individual will find their sphere of action limited by the very background that makes it possible” since, in truth, “our freedom will be concrete, precisely because it is situated: we are free, not to do anything whatsoever, but to make something of that which is given to us” (114). By stressing the freedom of the individual in his *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre seems to overlook the fact that an individual is conditioned and limited by his or her cultural arena in the free choice of actions. Indeed, an individual can only choose from the already-existing values to define himself or herself. As Neil Levy asserts, “I must find myself inhabiting an already meaningful world, if I am to be free, but I must be able to distance myself from these meanings, to evaluate them, to weight them up” (112). Only on this condition can an individual take the responsibility for his or her choices.

After the above explication of both Heidegger’s and Sartre’s ideas of existentialism, we may see that both of them are deeply concerned about modern man’s predicament of being lost in the nameless crowd. In the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard already pointed out this phenomenon in his *Journals and Notebooks*: “No one says ‘I.’ One person talks in the name of the century, one in the name of the public, one in the name of science, one on behalf of his official position, and everywhere their lives are guaranteed by the tradition that ‘others’, ‘the others,’ are doing the same thing” (*JN* 22). Both Heidegger’s idea of authentic life and Sartre’s idea of existence before essence and man’s freedom to define himself through conscious choices are not only originally derived from Kierkegaard’s ideas but are also out of their deep reflection and criticism of the spiritual crisis of the modern age. As William Barrett points out, Heidegger’s central theme is modern man’s

“estrangement from Being itself” (207). Approaching the problem as a systematic thinker, he sees the problem as deeply rooted in the way in which man thinks about the fundamental of all things, Being itself. With his philosophy, Heidegger thus strives to deal with the celebrated alienation of modern man “by subordinating it to something else, without which man can never regain its roots: to Being itself” (Barrett 208). It is actually an adjustment to the inadequacy of traditional philosophy to deal with human existence. Indeed, by putting over-emphasis on reason itself and ignoring other aspects of human nature, western traditional philosophy fails to offer man useful guidance to lead an authentic life. In the nineteenth century, Nietzsche has the same doubt about the western world of his time: “For Nietzsche the era of reason and science raises the question of what is to be done with the primitive instincts and passions of man; in pushing these latter aside the age threatens us with a decline in vitality for the whole species” (Barrett 207). Like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard also commented on traditional philosophy in his *Journals and Notebooks*:

In relation to their systems most systematizers are like a man who builds an enormous castle and lives in a shack close by; they do not live in their own enormous systematic buildings. But spiritually that is a decisive objection. Spiritually speaking a man must be the building in which he lives – otherwise everything is topsy-turvy. VII A82; 1846 (D)

Therefore, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche pointed out, in their prophetic messages, the truth that man is estranged from his own being; that is, because of their over-emphasis on reason and negligence of the instincts and passions that are parts of their nature, modern men might become the inhabitants of Laputa, the floating island found in Jonathan Swift’s novel *Gulliver’s Travels*. Heidegger’s philosophy is therefore an attempt to get these inhabitants “back to the earth,” to the very base of our being. As Michael Gelven pointed out, “the task of *Being and Time* is, after all,

to elucidate what it means to be” (102).

Like Heidegger, Sartre’s philosophy is also a reaction to his time. It is a philosophy of action, of creating personal and universal significance in a world of turbulence. His philosophical work *Being and Nothingness* was published in 1943, during which Germany occupied France in the Second World War. By defining Being-for-itself as free, Sartre indeed insists on human freedom, not to be conditioned by outward conditions. To him, a coward only becomes a coward by acting cowardly. By this philosophy, he indeed encourages his fellow countrymen to fight for their freedom. In his *The Republic of Silence*, Sartre describes the life of the French Resistance from 1940 to 1945. In his description, he narrates the life of the Frenchmen who suffered the enemy’s dehumanizing treatment during the German occupation. Under the enemy’s oppression, they lost their right to talk, suffered insults and had to take it in silence. Tagged as workers, Jews, or political prisoners, they were deported en masse. But as Sartre testifies, the Frenchmen remained spiritually independent. They would never bow to totalitarianism. Serving as their mouthpiece, Sartre reveals their mentality: “Because the Nazi venom seeped into our thoughts, every accurate thought was a conquest. Because an all-powerful police tried to force us to hold our tongues, every word took on the value of a declaration of principles. Because we were hunted down, every one of our gestures had the weight of a solemn commitment” (240). Interpreting their resistance in terms of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, he remarks: “At every instant we lived up to the full sense of this commonplace little phrase: “Man is mortal.” And the choice that each of us made of his life was an authentic choice because it was made face to face with death.” (240)

Sartre’s description of the Frenchmen’s mentality facing the occupation of Germany reminds one of George Orwell’s novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* which I’d

discuss in chapter IV. In fact, his words that describe the Frenchmen's spiritual independence in face of the enemy's dehumanizing oppression recalls the protagonist's dignified fight for authenticity in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In Huxley's *Brave New World*, we also see this fight in the protagonist. In the modern world, God is replaced by man-made idols. These idols may not be concrete and visible but they are false idol-like ideals that man adopts to take the place of God. By this replacement of God, human nature suffers all the horrors of hell. In this dissertation, I try to argue that in this modern world, where human nature may suffer the danger of being twisted, both writers strive to fight for authenticity. By endowing their protagonists with a spirit to fight, both writers try to save humanity from the fire pit of the modern trend toward impersonality, alienation and finally destruction of humanity.

After the first chapter that offers an explication of both Heidegger's concepts of fallenness and authenticity and Sartre's ideas of existentialism, Chapter two will first start with an introduction of the concepts of utopia and dystopia, their interrelationship, and development and then proceeds to compare three works, Plato's *The Republic*, Huxley's *Brave New World* and Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. By this comparison, I hope to point out both Huxley's and Orwell's implied criticism of Plato's utopian ideals, the similarities between the two dystopian works and their criticism of the modern world. Chapter III will first deal with Huxley's dystopia *Brave New World* as an anti-existential world where there exists no possibility for the individual to live a truly authentic life, and then point out Huxley's ideal of the authentic life by presenting the rebellion of several characters and their revival of humanity. Chapter IV is divided into three parts. The first part concerns the protagonist Winston Smith's observation of the people of Oceania in a general state of poverty and ignorance. In the second part, the discussions focus on the protagonist: on his determination to live a life of authenticity, and to fight for the salvation of

humans from this state of fallenness. In the third part, the focus is on his relationship with O'Brien, which leads to the destruction of his individuality and authenticity. From the protagonist's fight for the authentic life and his failure, the reader sees Orwell's ideal of the authentic life. In the conclusion, I give a summary of my previous chapters and point out the four author's ideal of the authentic life.

Chapter Two

Plato's Heirs: Orwell, Huxley, and Repressive Societies

In this chapter, I have two major concerns. First, I will introduce utopia and dystopia and their inter-relationship and development. Next, based on the knowledge of why dystopia becomes a subgenre in the twentieth century, I will give a comparison between three works, Plato's *The Republic*, Huxley's *Brave New World*, and Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*; to see Plato's influence on the two authors. By this comparison, I hope to see how Orwell and Huxley react to Plato's utopian ideals and also to point out the similarities between the two dystopian works *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Thus, I can set the stage for my later discussions in Chapter III and Chapter IV about the two authors' individual ideals of the authentic existence.

What is utopia? And what is dystopia? And how are they related to each other? Speaking of utopia, the reader may first think of an ideal state of human existence which is different from our own. Actually, throughout the history of western civilization, numerous ideal society types we can imagine have already appeared in the works of poets and writers. In their imaginary works, they conceive their ideal society as existing in an age that is long since past or in a rather remote future, or in a far-away place beyond our reach. In Christianity, for example, there is the idea of the lost Garden of Eden, a blessed place where man lived before the Fall, the Millennium, and also the idea of paradise regained, in some future time. And for ancient Greece, in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, of the early seventh century B.C., there is the canonical portrait of the Golden Age, the long vanished age of Kronos' reign when men "lived like gods and no sorrow of heart they felt," and "Nothing for toil or pitiful age they cared,/ but in strength of

hand and foot still unimpaired/ they feasted gaily, undarkened by sufferings” (Hesiod 111-113). In the Roman age, as the pastoral perfection of the Golden age is reworked by both Ovid and Virgil, there appears also the classic Arcadia, “a time and place of rustic simplicity and felicity” (Kumar 3). And this “long arm of the Arcadian idyll is apparent in the anti-urban (and later anti-industrial) fantasies of scores of later writers up to our own time” (Kumar 3). Besides, in contrast to the more moderate and simplistic ideal life of Arcadia or the Golden Age, there is also the happy land of the Cokaygne, “a land of abundance, idleness and instant and unrestrained gratification” (Kumar 8). As Krishan Kumar notes, “it is probably pre-classical and pre-Christian” and “of all the components of utopia, it contains the strongest element of pure fantasy and wish-fulfillment” (7).

Except for this idea of man’s harmonious existence with nature, there exists another antithetical classical tradition which is represented by Plato, and this is the utopian project of the ideal city, as Dragan Klaic points out: “At the other pole of the utopian imagination are rationalistic, mainly urban utopias, developed within the set model of the perfect state—the city on the hill, the new colony, the new settlement—where an innovative and presumably perfect model of collective organization is implemented and strongly guarded” (38). In *The Republic*, Plato first initiates the discussion of the ideal city state. In his idea, the ideal city state is governed by philosopher-kings according to the principles of reason. With his discussions, Plato actually inspired generations of writers on this subject. As Kumar points out, “it was of course through Plato’s *Republic*, rediscovered along with other Greek writings in the European Renaissance, that the Hellenic ideal city most influenced the western utopia” (5). Actually, Thomas More “saw his own *Utopia* as partly a continuation of the *Republic*” (Kumar 5). Concerning the great influence of Plato on later utopian and dystopian writers, Kumar remarks

that it is a pervasive view that “all utopias of the two and a half thousand years have been merely footnotes to Plato’s *Republic*” (2). Apparently, the Samurai in Well’s *A Modern Utopia*, the Controllers in Huxley’s *Brave New World* and the Inner Party in Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are “the recognizable and legitimate descendents of Plato’s Guardians” (2). Actually, in later utopias, the reader often sees the characteristic features of the Platonic utopia: “the reign of reason in the three fold hierarchy of philosopher-kings, executive agents, and ordinary producers and artisans; the elevation of public over private life, and the pervasive control and regulation of daily life ; the communism of property, wives and children, and the eugenic approach to reproduction; and even the noble lie” (2) Here, Kumar’s ideas of Plato’s influence on later utopian and dystopian writers are rather interesting and enlightening. Later, I will try to point out Plato’s influence on both Huxley and Orwell and compare their similarities and differences with Plato to set the stage for my discussions of the two novels *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in the following chapters. At this time, I will try to point out how the popularity of utopia turns to dystopia in later ages.

The term utopia was first invented by Sir Thomas More, who wrote a book of the same title in 1516, and it is a pun on the Greek words *eutopia*, meaning “good place,” and *outopia*, meaning “no place” (Barton and Hudson 199). By this title, More seems to mean that the place he describes is an “ideal” but “imaginary” state. Commenting on the significance of the term “utopia”, Alistair Fox remarks that as the interchange-ability of the prefix may suggest, there exists a fundamental paradox inherent in utopianism. That is, if human realities are taken into account, “the utopian vision actually contains seeds of its own subversion in the form of doubts as to whether the ideal it proffers is attainable or desirable” (13). With his fiction that fully “encompasses the paradoxical interrelationship between hope and

doubt and optimism and pessimism”, More indeed made a remarkable contribution to the intellectual heritage of the world by adumbrating all the problems inherent in the utopian vision itself. (13) By this pun, More’s intention in his *Utopia* seems quite clear; that is, he means to both satirize implicitly his society, its cultural and political conditions, and point out the possible ideal that people of his time may strive to realize by their efforts, although considering the realities of the human condition, he also questions the very attainability and desirability of his ideal. By this title, the very essence of utopia seems also to be hinted, as A. L. Morton remarks: “the essence of the classical utopias of the past was a belief that by satire, by criticism or by holding up an example to be followed, they could help to change the world” (110). Thus, “the genre More invented, now known as the literary utopia, may be defined as the representation of an ideal, non-existent society as if it actually existed, usually under the fiction of a distant country that is at some remove from that of the author or reader” (Fox 11).

But how is utopia related to dystopia? Commenting on the relationship between utopia and dystopia, Alistair Fox remarks that “the paradigm More created lends itself ideally to satire” (12). For, indeed, as the paradigm implies, by contrasting his/ her imaginary society and the society in which s/he lived, a writer can proffer either his/her favorable or unfavorable criticism of the present society. Thus, as a criticism of their present society, many writers after More have “seized the possibility of creating an imaginary society in which disturbing tendencies in actual society are brought to a frightening culmination” (12). Thus, “when satire works against an imaginary society, the utopia turns to its opposite, the dystopia” (12). Therefore, it really depends on the writer himself/herself what his/her actual motivation is when s/he constructs his/her imaginary world.

S/He can be either optimistic or pessimistic. In the imaginary state s/he depicts, s/he can either be proffering an ideal or a warning or s/he can be presenting both his/her ideal and warning at the same time. As Krishan Kumar maintains, “for a considerable time after More, utopia carried the function of anti-utopia as well” and it is only “from the late nineteenth century onwards” that “the negative and positive poles of the old satirical utopia were pulled apart and assigned to separate genres or subgenres” (124-5). Here, one may distinguish anti-utopia from dystopia. Some critics like Krishan Kumar do not try to make the differentiation. Actually, the differences between the two terms are not always clear. As Gary Saul Morson explicates, dystopia is “a type of anti-utopia”; that is, while dystopia “discredits utopia by portraying the likely effects of their realization, anti-utopia “discredits the possibility of their realization or exposes the folly and inadequacy of their proponents’ assumptions or logic” (116). As I have noted in Chapter I, Dostoevsky’s *Notes from Underground* can be defined as an anti-utopia since in this work, the author discredits the possibility of building an ideal human state according to the principles of reason. He sees the Palace of Crystal, which symbolizes the ideal human state as conceived by human reason, as “frightfully dull” (*NFU* 71). And both Huxley’s *Brave New World* and Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* can be treated as dystopias since in the two works, both authors actually depict a nightmarish world which embodies the utopian ideals of Plato. Later, for a better illustration of how both Huxley and Orwell respond to Plato’s utopian ideals by embodying Plato’s utopian ideals in their individual dystopia, I will give a comparison between three works.

From the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, owing to the development of science and technology, there arose the belief in the essential perfectibility of mankind. As Dragan Klaić maintains, in the Enlightenment,

people believe themselves “capable of achieving a harmonious and just society” by taking advantage of their reason to discover and then follow the inherent natural laws. For them, the ideal of a perfect human society is no longer an impossible dream but an aim attainable through human endeavor: “From an island lost on the edges of a known world, from a fanciful allegory, and philosophical fantasy, utopia became a temporal notion, a goal, an objective that was firmly believed to be reachable” (32). For example, in his *The New Atlantis*, Francis Bacon proffers his faith in man’s ability to dominate nature by reason and knowledge and create for himself a better world. His dictum “Knowledge is power” is indeed expressive of the characteristic sentiment of the Enlightenment, when man first sees the power of reason to reveal the secrets of nature and starts to regard nature as “merely an immense object, a spatiotemporal continuum whose only relationship with humanity was that of knowledge and mastery” (Baker 27). And in H. G. Wells’s utopias such as *Men like Gods* and *A Modern Utopia*, one sees the culmination of this faith in the essential perfectibility of mankind. As Robert S. Baker remarks, “In Wells’ utopia the ongoing dynamic of creative scientific research assumes the status of a secular religion” and “the supremacy of science and experimental empiricism is, for Wells, the best possible evidence of historical progress,” which is “a theory that regards men and women as slowly and indefinitely advancing in a desirable direction as determined by the psychological and social nature of humanity” (31).

However, as Krishan Kumar asserts, “one man’s dream of felicity may be another man’s nightmare” and “the more utopians urged the possibility of the realization of their dream, the more alarmed were those who were convinced that modern developments were leading to a new slavery and a new barbarism” (125). Thus, “the renewal of utopia in the late nineteenth century stimulated also its

counter-image and counter-force, anti-utopia” (Kumar 125).

In fact, in the nineteenth century, in Mary Shelly’s novel *Frankenstein*, there already appears a warning against the unconditional support of science and technology. As Krishan Kumar points out, in the novel, the fact that “the utopian promise of ‘the perfectibility of man’ ends in the nightmare of a malignant devil who ravages the world” suggests the very idea that “anti-utopia draws its energy from the failure of utopian hopes and aspirations” (12). And such a sequence, by no means contingent or accidental, “follows from the very logic of utopian attempt” (12).

This warning about the unconditional development of science and technology finds its echo in the twentieth century. In *Technology and Utopian Thought*, Mulford Q. Sibley asserts that “it is in part because the technological imperative is so ubiquitous and apparently brings with it so many seemingly inevitable undesirable consequences that utopian speculation since World War I has become so frequently disenchanted about the optimism often associated with the nineteenth century” and that “the wide spread acceptance of the idea that all technological progress can be reconciled with moral and social and political progress gives way at many points to a mounting dubiety about technology itself” (32). “During the last fifty years,” Mulford Q. Sibley continues, “technology has come under increasing attack from many sources; and the nineteenth century rivulet of thought reflected in the Frankenstein legend has turned into a torrent. (33)

In the twentieth century, there arose three representative dystopias; they are Yevgeny Zamyatin’s *We*, Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* and George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty- Four*. As Robert S. Baker asserts, “the dystopias of Zamyatin, Huxley, and Orwell are responses to, in Fredric Jameson’s phrase, ‘a concrete

historical situation,' one that includes the rise of totalitarian governments and the increasing power of science and technology" (39). Besides, Gorman Beauchamp also maintains that "the dream of social redemption through the State, dawning with such bright hopes in the decade of the French Revolution and growing ever brighter through the nineteenth century, became for many in the twentieth century a nightmare" and that "the reasons are historical: the rise of messianic totalitarian regimes, whose utopianistic schemas resulted not in man's salvation but in his damnation" (67). The utopianistic schemas of these tyrannical regimes, as Lewis Mumford asserts, in fact arose logically from the assumptions of such venerable utopian ideals as isolation, stratification, fixation, regimentation, standardization and militarism, which enter into the conception of the utopian city as expounded by the Greeks (Beauchamp 67). Gorman Beauchamp thus contends that such a realization of the cause of the birth of these regimes "underlies the emergence of a distinctly twentieth-century literary subgenre, the dystopian novel...whose purpose, clearly ideological, is to assert the ultimate value of man's instinctual freedom over the putatively melioristic repression of utopian civilization" (68).

As I have already noted, a writer expresses his concern or fear of a potentially dreadful future "by creating an imaginary society in which disturbing tendencies are brought to a frightening culmination" (Fox 12). Thus, the three writers, Zamyatin, Huxley and Orwell, all show their concern about man's future by reflecting the disturbing tendencies in their world. As E. J. Brown notes, "We draws on the experience of modern Europe with its rationalized production and great cities, and on the recent nightmare of war and civil war during which human beings had indeed become 'units'" and "its satire is directed also at the collectivist mystique present in the Russia in his own day" (74). And "Huxley's *Brave New World* is a bitterly satirical image of the mass culture of his own day, which he

sees as vulgarly triumphant in the future” and “the future world he offers to the imagination is one completely conquered by the popular journalism, literature, and music, and by the popular prejudices (including class prejudice) of the early twentieth century” (Brown 75). Worrying about the possibility that science and technology may be misapplied in the future, Huxley remarks of his own novel: “In *Brave New World* this standardization of the human product has been pushed to fantastic, though not perhaps impossible, extremes. Technologically and ideologically we are still a long way from bottled babies and Bokanovsky groups of semi-morons. But by A.F. 600, who knows what may be happening?” (32) Besides, feeling rather disturbed about the present sexual mores, he is worried about the degeneration of traditional family virtues into soulless hedonism and promiscuity: “Nor does the sexual promiscuity of *Brave New World* seem very distant. There are certain American cities in which the number of divorces is equal to the number of marriages. In a few years, no doubt, marriage licenses will be sold like dog licenses” (32). Furthermore, showing concern about the political reality of his time, he also considers the possibility that the loose social mores such as drug abuse and sexual promiscuity may be taken advantage of by dictators for the enslavement of people: “As political and economic freedom diminishes, sexual freedom tends to increase. And the dictator...will do well to encourage that freedom. In conjunction with the freedom to daydream under the influence of dope and movies and the radio, it will help to reconcile his subjects to the servitude which is their fate” (33).

As for Orwell’s novel, Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich maintain that “*Nineteen Eighty-Four* alerted people to certain dehumanizing trends--some of which still seem very threatening today--flowing partly from technological advances” (49). Remarking on his intention with regard to his novel, Orwell

asserts that his novel is “a show-up of the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable and which has already been partly realized in communism and Fascism” (30). Also, he remarks that as his novel is a satire, he is not saying that the society he describes in the novel will arrive but “something resembling it *could* arrive” (30). Believing that totalitarian ideas “have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere,” he deliberately laid the scene of his novel in Britain, implying that “the English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else,” and that “totalitarianism, *if not fought against*, could triumph anywhere” (30). Thus, the three novelists try to offer their warnings to their contemporaries by their individual observations of the modern world. It is true that their prophecies may be different, as evidenced by Huxley’s comments on Orwell: “a really efficient totalitarian state would be one in which the all-powerful executive of political bosses and their army of managers control a population of slaves who do not have to be coerced, because they love their servitude” (32). But one must take note that they all share a fear of the distortion of humanity by the totalitarian control of science and technology in this modern world. Concerning the distortion of humanity in both *We* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Almeda King comments that “*We*, like Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, is among other things the story of a man resuming his humanity, taking political responsibility for his life, and finally, failing when confronted with the power of the state and his own fearful complicity with it” (Baker 44). And commenting on *Brave New World*, Almeda King asserts that “in his *Brave New World*, Aldous Huxley presents a prophetic and dystopian view of where industrial civilization’s ultimate goal will lead—namely, to the attainment of “universal happiness,” which keeps the wheels of mass production turning but divests man of his humanity” (50).

Following this introduction of utopia and dystopia and their inter-relationship

and development, next I will give a comparison between the three works *The Republic*, *Brave New World*, and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* to see how Huxley and Orwell respond to Plato's *The Republic*. By this comparison, I hope to point out Plato's influence on the two novelists, their implied comments on Plato, and their reflections on the modern world. Also by introducing the different or similar mechanism of dominance in the two novelists' individual fictional worlds, I hope to set the stage for the later discussions about the authentic life they both may proffer. My following discussion includes an introduction of each work and a presentation of their similarities and differences.

In *the Republic*, Plato argues that for the efficient government of a state, it is necessary that every citizen practices a particular trade and that the citizens be divided into three social groups: craftsmen, auxiliaries, and rulers. The craftsmen include all those citizens who do not participate in governing or protecting the state; doctors, farmers, and bricklayers are all craftsmen who form the state's economic foundation. They have their own private properties and the freedom of a private life.

The guardians of the state, on the other hand, include both the rulers who take charge of governing the state and the auxiliaries who assist the rulers and execute their decisions. Unlike the craftsmen, they have no private possessions beyond the barest essentials. And they must live and eat together like soldiers. By this, Plato actually denies the guardians of the state the freedom to have their own families. Indeed, Plato maintains that since a public life leads a guardian away from private considerations, the guardians of the state, men and women alike, must live together and form a social group: "Well, I think another law follows this one and all that we've said: that these women shall be common to all of those men, and none shall live privately with any. Children too shall be

common, and a parent shall not know his children, nor a child his parents” (*The Republic* 122).

Besides, for the effective protection and efficient government of the state, the auxiliaries and the rulers should possess some virtues: the auxiliaries should be adventurous, strong and brave, while the rulers should be highly intelligent, rational, self-disciplined, and capable. They should be older men who are wise and well-experienced, always mindful of the welfare of the community.

Plato especially stresses the importance of the role that the rulers play in his ideal state. He makes an analogy that if the rulers correspond to the “reason” part of the soul, the auxiliaries and the craftsmen then correspond to the “spirit” and “desire” parts of the soul respectively, and as “reason, desire and spirit, or passion are balanced within the man who is in a state of justice,” so the justice of the state is achieved by the harmony and cooperation of the three classes of citizens (Sargisson 103). To achieve this harmony, Plato will have all the citizens of his state believe in a myth, a “grand and noble lie” that will make all of them content with their respective positions in life. This grand lie is called the Myth of the Metals. By this myth, Plato asserts the essential difference in nature between the three classes of people: “All of you in the city are brothers,’ we will tell them, ‘but the most precious are the ones fit to rule, because when the gods formed you at birth he mixed gold into them, silver into the auxiliaries, and iron and bronze into the farmers and craftsmen” (*The Republic* 84). And encouraging people of true talent and ability to be the ruler of the state, Plato asserts his belief that so long as a person is fit to rule, it really does not matter which class he comes from: “Therefore the god commands that the offspring, to determine which metal is mixed in their souls and show him not pity but the honor befitting his nature and demote him to a farmer or craftsman; and if a child of gold or silver

should spring from the workers, he must be honored and elevated to the rank of guardian or auxiliary ” (*The Republic* 84). Here, it seems that by this “Myth of the Metals,” Plato suggests that man has an “essence” before his “existence”. And the purpose of man’s life, so to say, is just to realize this “essence”. From Sartre’s viewpoint, this idea of man’s existence is completely topsy-turvy. As I have noted in Chapter I, to Sartre, man’s existence is actually prior to his essence. In both Huxley’s *Brave New World* and Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the reader can see how the totalitarian government reflects Plato’s concept of man’s essence before his existence in its class consciousness and social hierarchy. As for this point, I will discuss later.

As his ideal state is a class society, Plato is well aware that to assure its harmonious functioning, he should prevent conflicts that may arise from class difference. Except for trying to balance the advantages and disadvantages of different classes, he also gives a sacred authority to the unequal status of the three classes. As the Myth of the Metals makes clear, it is possible to move from one class to another. A craftsman’s son, for example, may be gifted with the abilities to be a ruler. In this case, he can actually become a guardian of the state if he accepts the conditions required. Likewise, a guardian’s son may become a craftsman if he resents the lack of personal freedom and private wealth and if he does not possess the abilities and virtues required to be a ruler or auxiliary.

Since the guardians play such an important role in the political life of the state, Plato is therefore deeply concerned about their education. He asserts that for the efficient government of the state, the guardians should undergo a process of education that leads to the comprehension of eternal truth, which, for Plato, means the knowledge of the eternal Forms, especially, of the Form of Goodness.

Then, by the guidance of this knowledge, the enlightened guardians can govern the state well. For an illustration of this process and his political ideology, Plato tells the parable of a prisoner set free from a deep cave of darkness which represents our visible world to see the realm of eternal truth and then returning to guide his fellow prisoners. By this parable, Plato actually suggests four things. The first is the existence of two realms. In the parable, the cave actually corresponds to the realm of belief, which is our physical world that is subject to change and decay, while the sun-lit world corresponds to the realm of absolute knowledge, of the other eternal Forms like Justice and Beauty, except Goodness, which, in turn, is symbolized by the sun, and is the origin of all other forms. Secondly, he suggests that there are two degrees of knowledge and two degrees of belief. The highest and best kind of knowledge is knowledge of Goodness itself, while the second level of knowledge is of the other Forms. And the first degree of belief is present when we see physical objects like trees and stones etc, while the second and lower kind of belief is our mental state when we see only shadows and images of physical objects. Thirdly, Plato suggests that the process of discovering eternal truth is a dialectic process, like the long and arduous journey of the emancipated man from the cave of ignorance and evil to the sun-lit world of eternal truth. Finally, Plato asserts that only the enlightened men, men who have a vision of goodness, are qualified to govern the state.

In the last book of *The Republic*, Plato especially discusses the status of art in his ideal state and his belief in the immortality of the soul. Let's see his doctrine of the immortality of the soul first. In the last part of *The Republic*, by the Myth of Er, Plato suggests the possibility of an afterlife and expounds his belief in the essential moral nature of the universe. Plato argues that the gods, who are themselves just and omniscient, will not leave a just man unrewarded and

an evil man unpunished after all. In the afterlife, all rewards and punishments will be meted out justly. The significance of the myth is therefore that each man should answer for the life he chooses to lead and that he has no one but himself to blame for the life he has chosen.

In *The Republic*, Plato especially discusses the status of art in his ideal state. In Book Three of *The Republic*, concerning the education of his guardians, he especially discusses the moral influence of literature. He considers that Homer and the other poets are not irreproachable for representing in their individual works the gods as deceptive and cruel, committing murder and other terrible crimes: “We’ll admire Homer for many things, but not for making Zeus send a false dream to Agamemnon....When a poet writes things like that we’ll indignantly prevent him from producing his play and forbid teachers to use it with children, so our guardians may grow up reverent and as nearly divine as humans can be” (*The Republic* 54-5). Thus, Plato will not have his young future Guardians corrupted by such stories which may encourage people to commit immoral deeds themselves. Even though such stories may have deeper implications, the young Guardians are not yet mature enough to see them; therefore, they should be rejected. Instead, only such stories which have a good moral effect can be told to the Guardian-children: “A child can’t distinguish allegory from fact, and early impressions are hard to wash out. For this reason, perhaps, we must make sure that the first stories he hears are well composed for the purpose of teaching excellence” (*The Republic* 50). It is for this reason that Plato suggests that the works of the storytellers should be examined before guardian-children read them: “Then it seems that our first task is to supervise the story-tellers and separate those who make good stories from those who make bad. We’ll persuade mothers and nurses to tell the good stories to their children, to

shape their souls with them even more than their bodies with their hands” (*The Republic* 49).

In Huxley’s *Brave New World*, society is rigidly divided into five castes – Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon (with each caste further split into Plus and Minus members). And the reason for this division and its method can be very clearly seen from the following:

Just to give you a general idea, he would explain to them. For of course some sort of general idea they must have, if they were to do their work intelligently – though as little of one, if they were to be good and happy members of society, as possible. For particulars, as every one knows, make for virtue and happiness; generalities are intellectually necessary evils. Not philosophers, but fret-lawyers and stamp collectors compose the backbone of society. (2)

‘We also predestine and condition. We decant our babies as socialized human beings, as Alphas or Epsilons, as future sewage workers or future...’ He was going to say ‘future World Controllers,’ but correcting himself, said ‘future Directors of Hatcheries’ instead. (9-10)

The idea that “particulars make for virtue and happiness; generalities are intellectually necessary evils” seems to be derived from Plato’s contention that to achieve an efficient and well-ordered society, each citizen of the state can be truly happy if only he performs the job for which he is best suited: “You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practice one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;--now justice is this principle, or a part of it” (*The Republic* 99-100). And this concept of a man’s practicing one trade and being defined by this trade is actually what the protagonist in Dostoevsky’s *Notes from*

Underground finds most objectionable. As I have noted in Chapter I, in his anger against the modern trend toward dehumanization, he asserts: “an intelligent man cannot become anything seriously, and it is only the fool who becomes anything. Yes, a man in the nineteenth century must and morally ought to be pre-eminently a characterless creature; a man of character, an active man is pre-eminently a limited creature” (*NFU* 55). Thus, in Plato’s concept of man’s practicing one trade and being defined by it, there actually lies the danger of dehumanization. And as Huxley suggests here, it can be taken advantage of by the dictators.

But what is predestination and conditioning as the second quotation indicates the way the lives of the people in the new world are “predestined” even before their birth? As for predestination, the following description of the process by which lives are “produced” in the new world can serve as an illustration. Besides, it seems to echo Plato’s Myth of the Metals, though in a rather ironic and twisted fashion:

‘Bokanovsky’s Process,’ repeated the Director....One egg, one embryo, one adult—normally. But a bokanovskified egg will bud, will proliferate, will divide. From eight to ninety-six buds, and every bud will grow into a perfectly formed embryo, and every embryo into a full-sized adult. Making ninety-six human beings grow where only one grew before. Progress....‘if we could bokanovskify indefinitely the whole problem will be solved. Solved by standard gammas, unvarying delta, uniform Epsilons. Millions of identical twins. The principle of mass production at last applied to biology (4-5)

Here, this so-called Bokanovsky’s process reflects “the German Nobel Prize winner Hans Spemann’s controversial science of experimental embryology, manipulating

the experience of a human fetus in the womb in order to influence it” (Napierkowski and Stanley 63). Besides, the eugenic movement, popular in the 1920s, seems also to have inspired Huxley’s idea of this process here. Or rather, it seems to be a distant echo of Plato’s eugenic idea. In *The Republic*, Plato argues that “to develop a prime herd our best men must come together with the best women as often as possible, the worst with the worst as seldom as possible, that the offspring of the best may be reared, the others not” (*The Republic* 124). To “keep the guardian class pure” or to assure a race of guardians with good physical and mental qualities, Plato thus considers the necessity of having the best men possessing the best genes, in the modern sense, to mate with the best women, even if the guardians have to play tricks or tell lies to achieve this aim: “Then we must rig an ingenious lottery so our worthless fellow will blame his luck and not the rulers every time he misses out on a get-together” (*The Republic* 124).

As for how the Bokanosky’s process echoes Plato’s myth, one can see that like Plato, the World Controllers also seek harmony between different classes of citizens. But while Plato will have social harmony accomplished by having all the citizens believe in a myth, the World Controllers of *Brave New World* actually achieve more by creating a near-mythical reality; that is, by creating and classifying dozens of identical lives through technological means, the so-called Bokanovsky’s process. It seems that by this “Bokanovsky’s process,” the noble idea that men are created equal is severely challenged. For the citizens of the new world are actually deprived of their opportunity to develop themselves freely. As products produced from a factory, they are, in fact, materialized and thus dehumanized. And this is in fact anti-existentialist. As for this point, I will discuss in the chapter III.

To further the harmony between different classes, the World Controllers have different classes of citizens “educated,” building their ingrained class

consciousness:

‘Elementary class consciousness, did you say? Let’s have it repeated a little louder by the trumpet.’

‘...all wear green,’ said a soft but very distinct voice, beginning in the middle of a sentence, ‘and Delta children wear khaki. Oh no, I don’t want to play with Delta children. And Epsilons are still worse. They’re too stupid to be able to read and write. Besides, they wear black, which is such a beastly color. I am so glad I am a Beta.’ ... ‘Alpha children wear grey. They work much harder than we do, because they are so frightfully clever. I’m really awfully glad I’m a Beta, because I don’t work so hard. ...’ The Director pushed back the switch. The voice was silent. (20-1)

Here, by having different classes of people dress differently, Huxley seems to reflect the class consciousness and prejudice of his time. As Napierkowski and Stanley remarked, “Huxley points out the shallowness in our society: members of different social classes dress differently in order to be associated with their own class” (60). And through making the Alphas tall, fair and highly intelligent and the Epsilons dark-skinned and mentally deficient, he also “reflected the common prejudices at the time the novel was written” (Napierkowski and Stanley 59). As for why the World Controllers apply hypnopaedia to inculcate class consciousness, it reminds us of Plato’s idea of having his citizens believe in the “noble lie” to help make all citizens content with their respective positions in life. The difference between them is only that while Plato’s myth still allows a capable person to move from the lower to the higher social position, by this method of hypnopaedia, the Controllers actually tries to prevent the possibility.

Besides being applied to inculcate class consciousness, this so-called hypnopaedia is also adopted in the new world to indoctrinate their ideal

heterosexual relationship, promiscuity, and their bias against family. For example, when the World Controller Mustapha Mond expresses his bias against family, monogamy, and romance as “a focusing of interests, a narrow channeling of impulse and energy,” he wins the students’ unanimous agreement by citing the hypnopaedic slogan that “Everyone belongs to everyone else” (31-32). Here it is not because of the very reasonableness of his idea that Mond wins the students’ acceptance of his assertion but merely out of the hypnotic effect of hypnopaedia: “The students nodded, emphatically agreeing with a statement which upwards of sixty-two thousand repetitions in the dark had made them accept, not merely as true, but as axiomatic, self-evident, utterly indisputable” (32). Here, this so-called “hypnopaedia” certainly is not education but simply a kind of brainwashing. As Leonard Alfred George Strong remarks, it serves to “standardize all emotional reactions” of the new world citizens (206). Besides, it has the effect of “idle talk” and helps to form a standard personality which recalls Heidegger’s concept of the “they-self”. As for this point, we will discuss in Chapter III. Sharply contrasted with Plato’s idea that true knowledge is gained in a dialectic process, in which the both sides engaged in a dialogue are frank and open in testing and discovering truths by discussion and logical argument, hypnopaedia completely denies people the freedom of independent thought, and the freedom to form their own ideas and values. As judged from the quotation above, it is because of its effectiveness and very secrecy that the World Controllers adopt hypnopaedia for the purpose of secretly manipulating the new world citizens to achieve their social purposes; in this case, to maintain social stability by eliminating personal commitments like romantic love and family relationship. Sensing the danger of the misuse of hypnopaedia, in *Brave New World Revisited*, Huxley again comments that “under proper conditions, hypnopaedia actually works—works, it would seem, about as

well as hypnosis” and the would-be dictator will no doubt take full advantage of the fact that “children are better hypnopaedic subjects than adults” (74-5). As Marie Rose Napierkowski and Deborah A. Stanley point out, the fad of hypnopaedia, or sleep teaching, was popular in the 1920s and 1930s. By this method, people hoped to teach themselves passively by listening to instrumental tapes while they were sleeping. Although the electroencephalograph, a device invented in 1929 that measures brain waves, would prove that people have a limited ability to learn information while asleep, it also proved that hypnopaedia can influence emotions and beliefs (Napierkowski and Stanley 63-4).

By this method of hypnopaedia, citizens in *Brave New World* are actually manipulated by the World Controllers. In fact, the World Controllers apply other scientific methods like conditioning to regulate human behavior to achieve their social purposes. For example, in explicating the social effects of conditioning, the Director of Hatchery and Conditioning states:

If the children were made to scream at the sight of a rose, that was on the grounds of high economic policy. Not so very long ago (a century or thereabouts) Gammas, Deltas, even Epsilons, had been conditioned to like flowers--flowers in particular and wild nature in general. The idea was to make them want to be going out into the country at every available opportunity, and so compel them to consume transport. (16-7)

As one can see clearly, to regulate the citizens in accordance with whatever social purposes as they choose, the World Controllers actually apply in the early “education” of the citizens both Freud’s idea that “childhood experiences shape adult perceptions, feelings, and behaviors” and B. Watson’s Behaviorist School’s belief that “human beings could be reduced to a network of stimuli and responses, which could be controlled by whoever experimented on them” (Napierkowski and

Stanley 63). These scientific discoveries and psychological theories were actually popular in Huxley's time. By incorporating these technological discoveries into his novel, Huxley "aims to make contemporary citizens question the ethics of using technology for social purposes and to realize the dangers of misuse of technology by totalitarian governments" (Napierkowski and Stanley 60). As for this point, Jenni Calder also comments that it is "the morality of science" that Huxley found himself most concerned about. He is worried about the fact that "science could mean the power for evil, as well as the power for good" and about the fact that "the more a small body of highly trained men found the way human beings function, the more easily could human beings be controlled" (12). And what especially alarmed him was the fact that "dangers could come inadvertently, from the best intentions" (12). The Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning actually resembles the immoral scientist in Nathaniel Hawthorne's "Rappachini's Daughter," who "tampers with Nature and therefore, even though his intentions may be good or socially acceptable, wreaks terrible havoc upon innocent people" (Day 106). Or he is "a kind of Victor Frankenstein supervising the production of a wholly transformed and monstrous race" (Baker 81). Besides, the Director, together with the World Controllers, also takes after the Benefactor in Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We* when he tries to build a perfectly ordered world by sacrificing humanity:

You are perfect, you are the equal of the machine, the path to 100 percent happiness is free. Hurry, then, all of you, young and old, hurry to undergo the Great Operation. Hurry to the auditoriums where the Great Operation is performed. Long live the Great Operation! Long live OneState! Long live the Benefactor! (*We* 173)

The operation the protagonist D-503 refers to is the operation to remove fancy and imagination, which makes love, the appreciation of beauty and art possible.

Without love, man is reduced to a “lifeless” machine. In *Brave New World*, human love is indeed sacrificed to the great machine of the industrial world. From the above quotation, one can see that the New World Controllers treat the new world citizens as if they were machines to consume the products of the industrial society. In their design of the human machine through psychological means, they lose their love and respect for the dignity of man. In *The Republic*, by the parable of the balance of reason, desire and spirit within a man who is in a state of justice, Plato stresses the importance of justice in a state. Here in *Brave New World*, as in Zamyatin’s *We*, in the construction of an ideal state, human reason apparently seems to be over-emphasized, as K. Bhaskara Ramamurty comments: “Huxley presents with masterly skill the consequences of Reason stretched to extremes, and going awry. The state is evolved for the people, but the people are not created for the state” (71). In the new world, people have forgotten what makes us human and what makes human life worthy of living. The result, it follows, is an inhuman world without love.

As for the status of art and science in the new world, both artistic creation and scientific research are strictly censored by the World Controllers, as the reader can see from the two quotations:

‘A new Theory of Biology’ was the title of the paper which Mustapha Mond had just finished reading. He sat for some time, meditatively frowning, then picked up his pen and wrote across the title page. ‘The author’s mathematical treatment of the conception of purpose is novel and highly ingenious, but heretical and, and so far as the present social order is concerned, dangerous and potentially subversive. *Not to be published.*’ He underlined the words. ‘The author will be kept under supervision. His transference to the Marine Biological Station of St. Helena may become

necessary.’ (144-5)

This time I [Helmholtz Watson] thought I’d give them one I’d just written myself. Pure madness, of course; but I couldn’t resist it.’ He laughed. ‘I was curious to see what their reactions would be. Besides,’ He added more gravely, ‘I wanted to do a bit of propaganda; I was trying to engineer them into feeling them as I’d felt when I wrote the rhymes. Ford!’ He laughed again. ‘What an outcry there was! The Principle had me up and threatened to hand me the immediate sack. I’m a marked man.’ ‘But what were your rhymes?’ Bernard asked. ‘They were about being alone.’ (147-8)

As one see from the quotations above, if any scientific discovery or artistic creation threatens to disrupt the stability of the new world, the World Controllers will always be ready to persecute the scientist and the artist. Like Plato, Mustapha Mond, a member of the World Controllers, also stands for strict censorship in his new world. The difference is that although both emphasize social stability, Mond seems more willing to sacrifice genuine artistic beauty and scientific truth once they threaten the stability of his world. As John Atkins remarks, in the new world, “happiness was given precedence over truth” and “the paradox was that science, which had made this civilization possible, had to be carefully controlled and only applied to immediate problems” for “to allow science to be used as a weapon in a never-ending search for truth would be to pass the death-sentence on stability” (35). As for artistic creation, no literature which contains subversive ideas will be tolerated to exist in the new world. As the second quotation above may indicate, just because he sings about “being alone,” Helmholtz Watson has to suffer the danger of being persecuted. It seems if he should harbor any unorthodox ideas, he had better keep

them to himself. As for ancient literature, it simply disappears in the new world. Even if it is found or brought from another world, it can hardly be appreciated. As Gary Saul Morson remarks, in a dystopia, as a measure of its inhumanity, “no one would appreciate the values or understand the presuppositions of traditional literature” (141). In the new world, for example, such a great writer as William Shakespeare is never heard of and his great plays such as *Romeo and Juliet*, *King Lear*, and *Othello*, when brought from another world by chance and recited for appreciation, become ridiculous and incomprehensible to the new world citizens. When the Savage recites the scene of Juliet’s dejection in face of her father’s enforced marriage, Helmholtz broke out into uncontrollable guffawing. To him, the overall scene seems ridiculous, rather than pathetic:

The mother and father (grotesque obscenity) forcing the daughter to have someone she didn’t want! And the idiotic girl not saying that she was having someone else whom (for the moment, at any rate) she preferred! In its smutty absurdity the situation was irresistibly comical. He had managed, with a heroic effort, to hold down the mounting pressure of his hilarity but ‘sweet mother’ (in the Savage’s tremulous tone of anguish) and the reference to Tybalt lying dead, but evidently uncremated and wasting his phosphorus on a dim monument, were too much for him. (151)

From the quotation above, one can see that Helmholtz cannot really appreciate the intense emotions involved in this scene of Juliet’s anguish in face of her father’s enforcement of marriage. The fact is that being conditioned by the World Controllers to regard family as obscene and promiscuity as normal, Helmholtz can never understand the true love that Juliet feels for Romeo and her anguish in this predicament: “...But fathers and mothers!” he shook his head, ‘You can’t expect me to keep a straight face about fathers and mothers. And who’s going to get excited

about a boy having a girl or not having her?” (152). In the new world, Shakespeare seems obsolete. As Henry Hazlitt remarks of the new world, “not only is there no place in it for love, for romance, for fidelity, for parental affection; there is no suffering in it, and hence absolutely no need of nobility and heroism” and therefore “in such a society the tragedies of Shakespeare become not merely irrelevant, but literally meaningless” (29). Only the soul-less feelies are accepted as works of art. In fact, just as Plato recognizes the moral influence of artistic creations, the World Controllers utilize the feelies as a means of brainwashing. In the novel, for example, both Lenina and John come to see a feelie which enacts a story of a black man who, having lost his conditioning, falls madly in love with a Beta blonde. In his struggle to get his love, he is finally defeated by three “handsome young Alphas” who then enjoy the Beta blonde as their mistress. This feelie only repeats what hypnopaedia tries to inculcate about promiscuity, the new world citizens’ “normal” heterosexual relationship. Unlike hypnopaedia, it tries to indoctrinate the new world’s values in a more picturesque way, by getting the audience involved in the emotions of the characters. Thus, it could be more effective. After seeing this feelie, Lenina discusses it with John the Savage. Appreciating its message of promiscuity, like most brainwashed new world citizens, she regards it as rather “lovely,” while her escort John, an outsider of the new world, sees its horrible message and shows his great dislike of it. Back to his lodging, the Savage starts to read Shakespeare’s *Othello*. Thus, it is quite apparent that Huxley means to contrast the constant love as found in *Othello* with the promiscuity in the feelie. By having his protagonist John criticize the sexual attitudes of the new world citizens, Huxley certainly expresses his repulsion for the sexual attitudes of his time. As Huxley shows, “people can only maintain their loose sexual mores by sacrificing intimacy and commitment” (Napierkowski and Stanley 60).

The final aspect of particular interest about the new world is its religion. In the new world, traditional religion is out of place. There is no longer the necessity for its existence. In his argument against the superfluity of religion, Mond asserts that the new world inhabitants can indeed be independent of God since they have “got youth and prosperity right up to the end” (192). To the World Controllers, all desires can be fulfilled in the new world: “Why should we go hunting for a substitute for youthful desires, when we go on enjoying all the old fooleries to the very last? What need have we of repose when our minds and bodies continue to delight in activity? Of consolation, when we have soma? Of something immovable, when there is the social order?” (192) Thus, there is no necessity to look for their fulfillment in another world. Religion, therefore, is superfluous. Actually, they see religious belief as essentially subversive to the stability of their world: “Call it the fault of civilization. God isn’t compatible with machinery and scientific medicine and universal happiness. You must make your choice. Our civilization has chosen machinery and medicine and happiness” (192). Their religion is actually Fordism: “Our Ford himself did a great deal to shift the emphasis from truth and beauty to comfort and happiness. Mass production demanded the shift. Universal happiness keeps the wheels steadily turning; truth and beauty can’t” (187). Thus, there is the reason to sacrifice true beauty in literature and truth in science, when they threaten the stability of the world. As a contrast to the philosopher king in *The Republic* who loves truth and sees truth as existing in an eternal realm beyond our own, the World Controllers care nothing about eternal truth. God, to them, is indeed dead: “All crosses had their tops cut and became T’s. There was also a thing called God” (44). To their utilitarian mind, religion is no longer necessary since soma has replaced its social function. In his compliment of the moral effect of Soma, for example, Mond says:

In the past you could only accomplish these things by making a great effort and after years of hard moral training. Now, you swallow two or three half-gramme tablets, and there you are. Anybody can be virtuous by now. You can carry at least half your morality about in a bottle. Christianity without tears--that's what *soma* is" (195)

Seeing the horror of the new world as suggested in Huxley's descriptions, the reader may not fail to see Huxley's warning that once science and capitalism fail to respect humanity, the result is the spiritual death of civilization. It is therefore no wonder that he should begin his novel *Brave New World* with so many death images:

A squat *grey* building of only thirty four stories. Over the main entrance the words, CENTRAL LONDON HATCHERY AND CONDITIONING CENTER, and, in a shield, the world state's motto, COMMUNITY, IDENTITY, STABILITY. The enormous room on the ground floor faced towards the north. *Cold* for all the *summer* beyond the panes, for all the *tropical heat* of the room itself, a harsh thin light glared through the widows, hungrily seeking some *draped lay figure*, some *pallid* shape of academic *goose-flesh*, but finding only the glass and nickel and *bleakly* shining porcelain of a laboratory. *Wintriness* responded to *wintriness*. The overalls of the workers were *white*, their hands gloved with a *pale frozen, dead, a ghost*. Only from the yellow barrels of the microscopes did it borrow a certain *rich and living substance*, lying along the polished tubes like buffer, streak after luscious streak in long recession down the work tables. (1, italics added)

The place is Central London Hatchery and Conditioning Centre where the lives of the new world citizens start. Meaning to be ironic, Huxley infuses his description

of the place with sharp contrasts between images of life and those of death. Summer, for instance, is suggestive of life and growth. But in the place, there is only winter and death. Life is deprived of its hope and possibilities before it begins. Why is it so? It is because of the blind acceptance of the false ideal, “community, identity and stability.” By describing the place with death images, Huxley suggests the spiritual death of the new world citizens. The so-called “Brave New World” is a modern “wasteland,” the people in it being merely spiritually dead automatons.

In George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, society is divided into three distinct classes: Inner party, Outer Party, and the proles. And the theory behind this division of classes is as follows:

Throughout recorded time, and probably since the end of the Neolithic Age, there have been three kinds of people in the world, the High, the Middle, and the Low. ...Even after enormous upheavals and seemingly irrevocable changes, the same pattern has always reasserted itself, just as a gyroscope will always return to equilibrium, however far it is pushed one way or the other. (89)

This theory recalls Plato’s Myth of the Metals. The difference is only that while Plato only treats his myth as merely a fiction, a “grand and noble” lie, the Inner Party members regard their class theory as a solid historical truth. The Inner Party members, like Plato’s rulers, stand on top of the social hierarchy and are responsible for regulating the society, while the Outer Party members, on the other hand, resemble Plato’s auxiliaries in executing the orders of the Inner Party. But unlike Plato’s rulers who have no private property and personal freedom, the Inner Party members enjoy a quality of life that is much better than that of the proles or Outer Party members. For instance, the telescreens (two-way televisions used for the

purpose of surveillance and propaganda) in their domiciles can be turned off. They also have the privileges of the spacious living quarters, personal servants, convenient transportation and relatively pleasant food and drink (in contrast to the proles' beer and the Outer Party's low quality Gin). As for the government of the state, in contrast to Plato's rulers who are deeply concerned about the interest of the people, the Inner Party members actually exploit the proles as a source of cheap labor. They don't actually regard them as human beings. To the Inner Party, since the proles can pose no threat to its status, they are therefore left free: as the party's slogan indicates: 'Proles and animals are free' (32-3). The Proles in this novel resemble the animals like Boxer, Benjamin and Clover in Orwell's *Animal Farm*. They are only regarded as subhuman and can be easily manipulated by the sentiment of patriotism. The Inner Party actually takes no pains to seek their welfare. Instead, it deliberately wages wars against its own people for the consolidation of its own status: "In our own day they [the three superstates Oceania, Eurasia, Eastasia] are not fighting against each other at all. The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society intact" (88). To the Inner Party, war destroys the materials that help improve the living conditions of the people: "War is a way of shattering to pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, or sinking into the depth of the sea, materials which might otherwise be used to make the masses too comfortable, and hence, in the long run, too intelligent" (84). By waging wars, the Inner Party prevents people who are normally stupefied by poverty from becoming literate and thus from thinking for themselves. Kept in the state of poverty and ignorance, the people of Oceania will never develop the ability to question the Party's rule. Thus, the Party keeps the social structure intact and secures its authority and position: "In the long run, a hierarchical society was only

possible on a basis of poverty and ignorance” (86). As Issac Deutscher points out, “in Oceania technological development has reached so high a level that society could well satisfy all its material needs and establish equality in the midst” but “inequality and poverty are maintained in order to keep Big Brother in power” (33). Actually, this idea of maintaining social stability through destroying materials that may help better the living condition of the Proles somewhat recalls the idea of conceiving science as a latent enemy to disrupt stability in *Brave New World*. In the novel, as the World Controller Mustapha Mond admits, in the new world it is undoubtedly possible to synthesize every morsel of food, yet by such doing the stability of the new world society would be threatened. Thus, he prefers to keep a third of the population on the land. For it actually takes longer to get food out of the land than out of a factory. Revealing his motivation, he tells his audience:

Besides, we have our stability to think of. We don't want to change. Every change is a menace to stability. That's another reason why we're so chary of applying new inventions. Every discovery in pure science is potentially subversive; even science must sometimes be treated as a possible enemy. Yes, even science.' (183-4)

Here the means for the maintenance of social stability in the two novels seem rather interestingly contrasted with each other but they are nevertheless related. For while the Inner Party of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* maintains stability by keeping the Proles in a state of deprivation, the World Controllers such as Mustapha Mond would rather maintain social stability by keeping the workers busy. Except for this method, in *Brave New World*, the maintenance of the social hierarchy is through conditioning, hypnopaedia, and the so-called “Bokanovsky's process.” As I have noted, this causes brutal destruction of humanity. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the way of maintaining the social structure through war is no less horrible. As Jenni Calder

points out, “Orwell sees the dangerous potential of science only in terms of overt power, not in terms of the kind of subtle influences in life that Huxley saw as the germs of the control of humanity in the future” (13). In the two novels, science and technology are not employed to promote public welfare but instead are abused by the dictators to secure their status.

As for how the Inner Party deals with the Outer Party, it is rather different from how it deals with the Proles. To prevent the Outer Party from replacing its privileged status, the Inner Party takes all possible measures against the Outer Party’s possible rebellion. Actually, the Inner Party’s fear of being overthrown originates from its theory of class conflict: “The aims of these three groups are entirely irreconcilable. The aim of the High is to remain where they are. The aim of the Middle is to change places with the High. The aim of the low... is to abolish all distinctions and create a society in which all men shall be equal” (89). The Inner Party members are afraid that members of the Outer Party will enlist the Proles on their side to overthrow them in the name of fighting for liberty and justice. Thus, it is the Outer Party members that are more under the supervision of the Inner Party than the Proles. The Inner Party adopts several ways to control them. The first is surveillance. By surveillance, “a party member lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police” (*NEF* 3). Moreover, furthering this surveillance, the Inner Party undermines the family structure by enlisting children into an organization called the Junior Spies, which brainwashes and encourages them to monitor their parents and report any instance of disloyalty to the party. As pointed out by Marie Rose Napierkowski and Debroah A. Stanley, Orwell was here inspired by a real organization called the Hitler Youth that thrived in Nazi Germany: “As in real totalitarian regimes, the children of Oceania play a large part in maintaining the loyalty and patriotism of the citizens. Just as German children joined the scout-like

and militaristic Hitler Youth organization, the children of Oceania enjoy wearing their junior spies costumes, marching around, and singing patriotic songs” (240).

Not only trying to control the Outer Party members physically, the Inner Party also seeks to manipulate the Outer Party psychologically. For fear that the sexual instinct may lead to the unity of individuals and thus undermines the Party’s rule, the Party forces individuals to suppress their sexual instincts and induces their pent-up frustration and emotion into violent and hysterical displays of hatred against the Party’s political enemies. In *Brave New World*, we see that through hypnopaedia and feelies the citizens are brainwashed by the World Controllers so that they see promiscuity as normal and parenthood as obscene. As we have already noted, why the Controllers should try to inculcate in the citizens these warped values is because of their desire to maintain social stability. Afraid of the possibility that familial love and heterosexual love may engender such personal commitments that may disrupt social harmony, the Controllers thus try to suppress these natural human instincts in the citizens. Instead, they encourage promiscuity: “But chastity means neurasthenia. And passion and neurasthenia mean instability. And instability means the end of civilization” (194). To the World Controllers in *Brave New World*, the motivation for keeping social stability, in a word, is to make sure that the great machine of the industrial society can function normally. As Mari Rose Napierkowski and Deborah A. Stanley point out, “strong loyalties created by committed relationships can cause conflicts between people” and eventually “upset productivity and harmony” (60). But in *Nineteen Eighty Four*, the Inner Party is also afraid that personal commitments like familial and romantic love can slack the Party’s control of the society and even lead to disloyalty of the Party. Therefore, it is natural that the Inner Party seeks to disrupt family ties by alienating children from their parents, asking the children to serve as spies against their parents for any sign

of disloyalty to the Party. As for romantic love, as a contrast to the World Controllers in *Brave New World*, the Inner Party encourages sexual abstinence and even seeks to remove orgasm. To consolidate its rule, it even takes advantage of the frustrated sexual energy of the Outer Party members to propagandize its political beliefs. It brainwashes the Outer Party members to such an extent that sexual consummation is regarded as a crime and sex, to them, becomes merely an obligation to the Party, to generate more Party members. By the regulation of marriages between Party members, the Inner Party assures that the Party members are not united because of love but merely for the purpose of procreation. It thus resembles the deliberate destruction of familial and romantic love by World Controllers in *Brave New World*. Commenting on the difference of attitude to sex, Peter Bowering asserts that in contrast to the society in *Brave New World*, the society of Orwell's fable is constantly at war; therefore, "a puritanical approach to sex is a major instrument of policy" (53-54). In *Brave New World*, however, the first aim of its rulers is "to keep its subjects from making trouble"; therefore, "together with Soma, sexual license ... is one of the chief means of guaranteeing the inhabitants against any kind of destructive or creative emotional tension" (53-54). Here, it appears that in both dystopias, man's sexual energy is regarded as a disruptive power that may breach social stability and thus must be taken advantage of as a means of domination. Here, Plato's idea of regulating marriage seems to come to the fore. As I have already noted, Plato suggests that the guardian men and women live together so that their children shall never know their parents. By this regulation, Plato assures that without the personal allegiances generated by familial love to influence the guardians, the guardians will be able to govern the state well. Here, the World Controllers in *Brave New World* and the Inner Party in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* adopt either this regulation of marriage or abolition of marriage and

family simply to keep social structure and stability intact. But their motivations are so different from Plato's: as I have already noted, the World Controllers seek to ensure the well-functioning of the social machine, while the Inner Party only aims to secure its privileged status.

Except for this regulation of marriage, the Inner Party also devises other ways to manipulate the Outer Party members psychologically: language manipulation such as Newspeak, the distortion of history, the exercise of doublethink, and finally the blind worship of Big Brother. By the distortion of history, the Inner Party creates for the Outer Party and the Proles the illusion that it can never be wrong in all its decisions, predictions and policies, thus justifying the righteousness of its rule: "By far the most important reason for the readjustment of the past is the need to safeguard the infallibility of the Party" (*NEF* 94). By this falsification of historical documents, the Inner Party actually prevents both the Outer Party members and the Proles from questioning its competence to rule and thus challenging its authority. Without former history to serve as standards of comparison, the Outer party and the Proles will have no evidence to prove the Inner Party's incompetence. By the illusion the Inner Party creates for them, the Outer Party members and the Proles may even believe that they are living in a relatively better time than it used to be. Thus, by its faith that "who controls the past controls the future" and "who controls the present controls the past," the Inner Party has one institution set up, the Ministry of Truth, which is responsible for the falsification of the past. As pointed out by Irving Howe, "the destruction of social memory becomes a major industry in Oceania, and here of course Orwell was borrowing directly from Stalinism which, as the most advanced form of totalitarianism, was infinitely more adept at his job than was fascism (Hitler burned books; Stalin had them rewritten)" (48). In fact, in his *Animal Farm*, Orwell satirized Stalinism in this respect. Besides, Orwell also

means to satirize London's wartime ministry of Information as his Ministry of Truth is "a transparent caricature" of it (Deutscher35).

To make sure that this falsification of historical documents will leave no unnecessary consequences, the Inner Party members have the Outer Party members practice doublethink. By *doublethink*, the Party wants members of the Outer Party to "tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed, to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take account of the reality which one denies" (95). In fact, both the falsification of history and the practice of doublethink remind us of Plato's concept of "the noble lie". In *The Republic*, Plato argues that for the interest of the state, it is sometimes necessary for the rulers to be dishonest. For example, he suggests that to make the citizens content with their respective positions in life, the rulers can create the Myth of Metals. And to have a better generation of guardians, the rulers can play tricks so that the better guardians get more chances for mating. Here in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, one can see that to secure their privileged status instead of caring for the public interest, the Inner Party members actually do more than Plato's rulers. They try to condition the Outer Party members and themselves to tell lies consciously while believing wholeheartedly in the truth of the lies. In fact, they desire the Outer Party members to submit completely to their will, to execute their orders like automatic machines, devoid of any sense of morality.

To achieve the aim of making the Outer Party members completely submissive and to annihilate the possibility of their rebellion, the Inner Party tries to reform language itself, hoping to uproot from consciousness any unorthodox thoughts. Syme, Winston's colleague, expresses the aim of Newspeak as the attempt "to narrow the range of thought so that in the end "thoughtcrime" will be made "literally

impossible,” because “there will no words in which to express it” (24). Rightly surmising the aim of the Party, he remarks that the Party’s “revolution will be complete when the language is perfect. At that time, he concludes, “Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is Newspeak” (24). In fact, this way of preventing any unorthodox thoughts from burgeoning seems to be more complete than the censorship found in *The Republic* or *Brave New World*. In *Brave New World*, the reader sees that all publications of science and literature have to be supervised by the World Controllers before appearing before the audience or reading public. The purpose is to ensure that no unorthodox thoughts or ideas will exist to breach social stability. But in fact, some characters still do have unorthodox thoughts and they can still understand the unorthodox thoughts found in old forbidden books. For example, in the novel, Helmholtz Watson can still understand or appreciate Shakespeare. When John the Savage recites Shakespeare’s poem “Phoenix and Turtle” to him, he actually feels emotionally touched by the poem: “Helmholtz listened with a growing excitement. At ‘sole Arabian tree’ he started; at ‘thou shrieking harbinger’ he smiled with sudden pleasure; at ‘every fowl of tyrant wing’ the blood rushed up into his cheeks; but at ‘defunctive music’ he turned pale and trembled with an unprecedented emotion” (150). But in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, if Newspeak works, all literature of the past will become obsolete and incomprehensible, and all unorthodox thoughts will exist no more. What is more, there will be no possibility of independent thought:

“...The whole literature of the past will have been destroyed. Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Byron--they’ll exist only in Newspeak versions, not merely changed into something different, but actually changed into something contradictory of what they used to be. ...In fact there will *be* no thought, as we understand it now. Orthodoxy means not thinking--not

necessary to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness.” (24-5)

In *Brave New World*, the reader sees that the World Controllers apply such means as hypnopaedia, conditioning, and feelies to deprive the citizens of the freedom of independent thought. Here in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, one sees the same attempt. Hearing these words about Newspeak, about orthodoxy becoming the unconsciousness of the citizens, the reader may recall the proud words of the Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning in *Brave New World*:

‘Till at last the child’s mind is these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions is the child’s mind. And not the child’s mind only. The adult’s mind too--all his life long. The mind that judges and desires and decides--made up of these suggestions. But all these suggestions are our suggestions!’ The Director almost shouted in his triumph. ‘Suggestions from the State.’ (22)

Apparently, Newspeak resembles hypnopaedia in its attempt of depriving the individual of his or her ability of independent thinking. Like hypnopaedia, it also recalls us of Plato’s idea of censorship. The difference is only that while by censorship, Plato only prevents his philosopher rulers from possible moral corruption, both Newspeak and hypnopaedia only try to prevent individuals from harboring ideas unwelcome to the authorities. A final means of domination of the Outer Party by the Inner Party is the leader worship. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the worship of Big Brother becomes completely irrational. Worshiped as God, Big Brother is regarded as “infallible” and “all-powerful”. Like God, he is regarded as immortal, and it is held that “every success, every achievement, every victory, every scientific discovery, all knowledge, all wisdom, all happiness, all virtue” issue “directly from his leadership and inspiration” (92). Yet, like God, nobody “has ever seen Big Brother” (92). Actually, “he is a face on the hordings, a voice on the

telescreen” (92). He is “the guise in which the Party chooses to exhibit itself to the world” (92). And “his function is to act as a focusing point for love, fear and reverence, emotions which are more easily felt toward an individual than toward an organization” (92). Commenting on Orwell’s Big Brother, Marie Rose Napierkowski and Deborah A. Stanley remarks that “Orwell meant for Big Brother to be representative of dictators everywhere, and the character was undoubtedly inspired by Adolf Hitler, Francisco Franco, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung, all of whom were fanatically worshipped by many of their followers” (236). In the novel, the very image of Big Brother can serve as a symbol for the Party itself. By this symbol of authority, the Party has actually made itself into God. In fact, the very image of Big Brother also represents the Party’s worship for absolute power. And this absolute power, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Four, not only includes power over a person’s body but also over his mind. As Stephen Spender points out, “although there is no Christ in Orwell’s world, Big Brother is really anti-Christ. He wills that the whole society shall will nothing except his will, he demands the love of his victims, in their lives and in the manner of their deaths” (34). And “the tragedy of Orwell’s novel is that man--Big Brother--turns himself into God, but there is no God” (34).

Judging from all the above discussions, the reader can see that both the citizens of *Brave New World* and the Outer Party members of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are all subject to the various mechanisms of dominance devised by the leaders of the country to deprive them of their sense of individuality. It therefore seems that the people in the two novels are actually dehumanized, becoming only the cogs of a great political and social machine. Here, one can see that in the two novels, Plato’s ideas of the elevation of public over private life, the pervasive control and regulation of daily life, family and heterosexual relationship, and the noble lie are

all utilized to the utmost by the dictators with the help of modern technological means. In this condition, then, where is the meaning of human existence to be found? In their individual novels, both Huxley and Orwell offer their critiques through some rebellious characters. Their fights for the meaning of personal existence are indeed central to the significances of the two novels. And this fight for the authentic human existence is, therefore, the focus of my following discussions in both chapter three and four.

Chapter III Brave New World: A “Bland” New World and its Discontents

In this chapter, my argument is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on Huxley’s dystopia *Brave New World* as essentially an “anti-existential” world where there exists no possibility for individual growth. Under the total dominance of the government, the citizens of the new world live in complete “fallen-ness,” with no right of self-definition. In the second part, my concern will be on how through his portrayal of several rebellious characters in this novel, Huxley criticizes the new world’s inhumanity, with its stranglehold of the quest for love, beauty and truth, and on how he suggests to the reader the ideal of the individual authentic life through the characters’ rebellion and their revival of humanity.

After reading *Brave New World*, the reader may ask himself or herself the question: “Is this really the ideal world that humans can have or just a nightmare from which one may desperately try to wake up?” Probably most of the readers will consider the later is truer to his or her response to the novel. Thus, the title of the book, taken from Shakespeare’s play *The Tempest*, seems to be profoundly ironical. Commenting on the title of the novel, Jhan Hochman remarks that this dystopia strikes the reader as neither brave nor new. In fact, the society in the dystopia is so controlled and safe that there is really no need nor opportunity for bravery. And as for being “new,” its “unrelenting drives toward management and development” and “its obsessions with predicable order and consumption” only remind the reader of our society ever since the Industrial Revolution (65). Coupling horror with irony, *Brave new world* is thus actually “a stinging critique of twentieth-century industrial society” (64-5). Indeed, in the novel, by his choice of character names, Huxley very wittily suggests his criticism of both the socialist Left and the capitalist Right in the modern

industrial world. Both of the two economic schools, as we have noted in the first chapter, reduce man to “an abstract fragment.” Commenting on the significance of Huxley’s naming of his characters, Rafeeq O. McGiveron observes that one level of Huxley’s irony, that of incompatibilities, occurs when his World State invokes the names of leftist “such as Marx, Engels, Trotsky, and Bakunin” as well as the names of prominent historical supporters of capitalism such as “the deified Ford, Benito Mussolini, Diesel, Rothschild, Hoover, and ‘the important industrialist-politician’ Alfred Mond” (27). Besides, what seems rather ironical is that forgoing the best aspects of both the capitalist Right and socialist Left, Huxley’s World State has taken the worst: “from the former the subordination of the individual to the supremacy of the collective State and from the latter the reduction of the individual to compulsive consumer” (27). Thus, it is clear that in the novel Huxley means to satirize both the socialist reduction of the individual to merely a “unit” or a nameless “number” in the social organism such as we find in Zamiatin’s *We* and the capitalist treatment of man as nothing but a “hedonistic” consumer. As pointed out by Krishan Kumar, “for Huxley, Socialism and Marxism, as the latest variants of scientific rationalism, differed from other varieties only in their greater arrogance and fanaticism, a judgment the Russian revolution and the new Soviet State had done nothing to shake” (243). Besides, “he naturally had no greater faith in right-wing dictators or large capitalists, who are rebuffed in *Benito Hoover* and *Primo Mellon*, the last also doubling for capitalists along with Morgana *Rothschild*” (Kumar 243). In his article “Aldous Huxley’s Americanization of the Brave New World Typescript,” Jerome Meckier sees Huxley as satirizing the American way of life. He asserts that “few explicit references to our Ford or America can be found in the 27 pages of the *Brave New World* typescript” and “this suggests that the first chapter of the novel was completed before Huxley fused Henry Ford’s America with H. G. Wells’s worldwide

utopia as his novel's target" (3). And Fordism, as Kumar maintains, "was the principle of the modern world *tout court*" and "for Huxley, Fordism was the latest and most destructive of the rationalizing impulse in western civilization that had begun with Plato" (244-246). In explicating Fordism, Kumar asserts:

Fordism is a compound of the scientific management of men linked to the fullest mechanization of tasks. It carries to a logical end the basic impulse of industrialism, to reduce the human being to the status of an appendage of the machine and to empty his work of all skill and significance. It employs modern science and technology to mass produce, cheaply and efficiently, standardized items--whether of material or non-material culture. It is equally applicable to works of art and literature as to motor cars or the production of food. (244)

In his brief visit to America in 1926, Huxley got an unforgettable impression that "the new civilization was in the making" but he saw no hope "that had inspired earlier visitors" (Kumar 246). He visited Los Angeles, 'the great Joy City of the West,' 'the City of Dreadful Joy.' And there he saw "a world totally given over to hedonism, a world where the movies, jazz, cocktails, automobiles and having a Good Time had become equated with life itself" (Kumar 246). And he witnessed also "the fatigue and boredom that was the other side of the 'Good Time' and the deadness that lay at its center" (Kumar 246).

It is against this background that Huxley wrote the novel *Brave New World*. To Huxley, "practically the whole of modern western development has been a steady descent into nightmare" (Kumar 242). As Kumar maintains, "the most characteristic and vaunted achievements of the West--the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century and the industrial revolution of the nineteenth-- have been the building blocks of the sterile graveyard of twentieth-century civilization" (242-3).

In the novel, the reader can see that to safeguard social stability and assure the regular economic working of the new World State, some scientific means of conditioning humanity are taken advantage of by the arbitrary totalitarian government. By such conditioning methods as hypnopaedia and genetic control, humanity suffers such a great sacrifice that the sense of individuality disappears from the individual. Man no longer feels the need for self-realization and loses completely the desire to look for a transcendent God. Under the totalitarian rule of the world state, “No-one,” as John Atkins asserts, “was allowed to consider the purpose of existence--nor would any properly conditioned person think of doing so” (36). Religion, history, science and art, which offer humans means for transcendence, knowledge and self-understanding, are thus either on the decline or completely out of place. Richard H. Beckham points out that after perusing the early chapters of the novel, the sensitive reader gets the impression that one of its recurrent themes is reduction, which actually involves “those attributes of life which make us most human” (68). To make all existence subservient to the state, the reductions insure such basic institutions of human civilization as religion and art to be “sapped of their vital force” (68). In fact, all that remains for the individual is the satisfaction of shallow pleasures. The pursuit of happiness has indeed become the sole aim of living. And just as John Atkins asserts, once there was a loss of faith in happiness as the “Sovereign Good,” society would be shaken to its very foundations (36). Under such a condition, humans can never have the possibility of spiritual growth. Indeed, as John Attarian asserts, “Without struggle, without a demanding moral call to self-transcendence, without pain and ecstasy, all vivid interior life disappears” (337). Reading the novel, the reader will probably get the chilling impression that he or she enters a modern wasteland, in which there exist no characters with a rich inner life. Actually, in the novel, except for John the Savage and others like Helmholtz Watson,

Linda, Lenina Crowne, and Bernard Marx, we do not find many characters that deserve our sympathy. It seems that some characters like the Gammas, Deltas and Epsilons are merely twisted shadows of humans or soulless puppets. Commenting on the characterization of the novel, Peter Edgerly Firchow maintains that *Brave New World* is “not a novel of character but a relatively short satirical tale, a ‘fable,’ much like Voltaire’s *Candide*” (70). And “one hardly demands fully developed and ‘round’ characters of *Candide*, nor should one of *Brave New World*” (70). Commenting on the nature of the world in the novel which determines its inhabitants’ depth of character, he further asserts that the very nature of the new world state in fact precludes the existence of fully developed characters. As he contends, since “character, after all, is shaped by suffering, and the new world state has abolished suffering in favor of a continuous, soma-stupefied, infantile happiness,” it is plain that “in such an environment it is difficult to have characters who grow and develop and are alive” (70). Thus, it is the very existence of sufferings which cause the characters to grow spiritually. In a world where sufferings are gotten rid of by artificial means, humans can only be reduced to lifeless robots. As John Attarian maintains, “a corollary theme of *Brave New World* is that suffering and mortification are the price of transcendence, of fulfillment, of anything worthwhile, and that when life is purged of all occasion for paying this price, attaining these things become impossible” (337). In *Brave New World*, few characters are allowed to be confronted with sufferings. In fact, their sufferings are either self-inflicted or caused by accidents. With their sufferings, their character begins to grow, even to the extent of being consciously or unconsciously deviant from the social norms of the new world. Yet they are actually the characters that evoke the readers’ sympathy. In their act of rebellion, they impress us as being human. Commenting on the rebellion in *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Jenni Calder maintains that both

Huxley and Orwell “use rebellion as a means both of exposing the society they describe and of generating characters that have an interest beyond the individualistic and with whom the reader can feel some kinds of identification” and that both of them “were concerned to demonstrate the dangers of the destruction of individualism, and set out to describe what the absence of individualism could really mean” (17). Thus, in the novel, it is through their rebellion that Huxley suggests his criticism of the dystopian world and allows the readers to consider what it means to lead a life of authenticity, a life where the individual existence has its own significance.

In the first two chapters of the novel, we see the Director of Hatchery and Conditioning leading a group of students for an introduction of both the process by which lives are “created” and how the children are “educated” in the new world. From his introduction, the reader can see clearly the new world’s “biological foundation” and also “the psychological super-structure erected on that foundation” (Schmerl 38). Hearing the Director’s explanations, the reader receives the repulsive impression that the new world totalitarian regime has absolutely no respect for life itself or for the individual as the sole authority in determining his or her own life orientation. Like products produced from a factory, lives of the lower class people are created on an assembly line. And their future place in the new world society has already been determined:

Standard men and women; in uniform batches. The whole of a small factory staffed with the products of a single bokanovskified egg.

‘Ninety-six identical twins working ninety-six identical machines!’ The voice was almost tremulous with enthusiasm. ‘You really know where you are. ‘If we could bokanovskify indefinitely the whole problem would be solved.’

Solved by standard Gammas, unvarying Deltas, uniform Epsilons. (4-5)

From the above quotation, we can see that the Gammas, Deltas, and Epsilons are created to serve the industrial or economic needs of the new world state. Created through the Bokanovsky process, they have lost their own individual identity. Their sole purpose for being is just to operate the machine or to work under extreme conditions:

‘Heat conditioning,’ said Mr. Foster.

Hot tunnels alternated with cool tunnels. Coolness was wedded to discomfort in the form of hard X-rays. By the time they were decanted the embryos had a horror of cold. They were predestined to emigrate to the tropics, to be miners and acetate silk spinners and steel workers. Later on their minds would be made to endorse the judgment of their bodies. ‘We condition them to thrive on heat,’ concluded Mr. Forster. ‘Our colleagues upstairs will teach them to love it’

‘And that,’ put in the Director sententiously, ‘that is the secret of happiness and virtue--liking what you’ve *got* to do. All conditioning aims at that: making people like their un-escapable social destiny.’ (12)

By operating the machine and working under extreme conditions, the bokanovskified twins seem to become part of the machine itself. In fact, as demanded by their “un-escapable social destiny,” they are conceived to function like machine or at least to have its efficiency. In the process of their making, they are actually dehumanized:

‘But in Epsilons,’ said Mr. Foster very justly, ‘we don’t need human intelligence.’

Didn’t need and didn’t get it. But though the Epsilon mind was mature at ten, the Epsilon body was not fit to work till eighteen. Long years of superfluous and wasted immaturity. If the physical development could be

speeded up till it was as quick, say, as a cow's, what an enormous saving to the community! (11)

From the above quotation, the reader can see that except for serving as a working machine, the Epsilons have no other reason for being. And not only is this the case with the Epsilons but the Gammas, and Deltas are created from the same motive. Thus, their dignity as human being seems to be deliberately and outrageously disregarded. The new world regime actually cares nothing about their inborn human rights. But what is the case with the Alphas and Betas? Working in managerial and executive positions, they are apparently more privileged than the other classes. But these privileges are limited to the requirements of their work. And for the efficient execution of their work, they in fact need better intelligence and therefore receive different conditioning. For example, as the Controller says, Alphas are 'separate and unrelated individuals of good heredity and conditioned so as to be capable (within limits) of making a free choice and assuming responsibilities' (182). And if they happen to abuse their freedom, they will be severely chastised and punished--even to suffer the consequence of exile from the new world. In the novel, for instance, Bernard Marx is reproved and threatened with exile by the Director of Hatchery and Conditioning because of his "not-to-be-tolerated" unorthodoxy: "Alphas are so conditioned that they do not *have* to be infantile in their emotional behavior. But that is all the more reason for their making a special effort to conform. It is their duty to be infantile, even against their inclination. And so, Mr. Marx, I give you fair warning" (80-81). Thus, if there is any purpose for their existence, it can be no other than the efficient governance of the other classes. In a word, the new world seems to be designed according to the principle of an efficient working machine, with each caste of citizens playing their allotted role. It is just as Jenni Calder puts it: "the Deltas and Epsilons are necessary, not only to provide a section of the population that will

contentedly perform the necessary menial tasks, but to balance the Alphas. Without Alphas, Epsilons would be meaningless, and vice versa” (33). In the new world, as Almeda King asserts, man is only “a cog in the intricate machinery of mass production” (50). Or as Hermann Hesse maintains, in the novel, “with perspicuity and irony a completely mechanized world is depicted, in which the human beings themselves have long since ceased to be human but are only ‘standardized’ machines” (2). In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger sees that “the essence of modern technology lies in Enframing” (23) and that “Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is” (27). In other words, technology “arranges the world into an aggregate of raw materials or resources, both natural resources and human resources” (Foltz 102). By this “enframing,” nature can only be treated as “the chief storehouse of the standing energy reserve” (Heidegger 21). In *Brave New World*, this “enframing” of modern technology comes to regulate human relationships and dehumanize humanity. Under this “enframing,” the citizens are dehumanized, being treated as “human resources” and classified into different social classes according to their social function.

As citizen in the new world, they have absolutely no right to choose their own identity, to define themselves. In *Existentialism and Humanism*, Sartre sees man’s existence as prior to his essence. He states that “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterwards” (4). That is, to Sartre, man is free in the sense that with no God-ordained nature to condition his actions, he can therefore act freely to create himself. But in the absolute freedom of his choice of actions, he actually defines himself and takes the full responsibility for his being. In *Brave New World*, however, the case with the new world citizens seems to be exactly the opposite. Indeed, to them, man’s essence is prior to his existence. And the sole aim of their existence is simply to fulfill their un-escapable

state-ordained “social destiny”. In *Existentialism and Humanism*, Sartre states:

When we think of God as the creator, we are thinking of him, most of the time, as a supernal artisan....Thus, the conception of man in the mind of God is comparable to that of the paper-knife in the mind of the artisan: God makes man according to a procedure and a conception, exactly as the artisan manufactures a paperknife, following a definition and formula. Thus, each individual man is the realization of a certain conception which dwells in the divine understanding. (3)

In *Brave New World*, the totalitarian government actually takes the place of God. For each caste of citizens in the new world is made according to a preconceived conception. And to consolidate the hierarchical social system and keep the wheel of the industrial society turning, the citizens of the new world have to receive hypnopædia and psychological conditioning in childhood. And this continual and subtle brainwashing and conditioning directly influence their modes of behavior and value judgment. It takes away “stealthily” their freedom of making meaningful choices for themselves. Concerning the effect of conditioning to the economic working of the world state, the Director of Hatchery and Conditioning remarks:

‘We condition the masses to hate the country,’ concluded the Director. ‘But simultaneously we condition them to love all country sports. At the same time, we see to it that all country sports shall entail the use of elaborate apparatus. So that they consume manufactured articles as well as transport. Hence those electric shocks.’ (17)

Thus, unawares, the new world citizens are in fact deprived of the freedom of living their everyday life according to their own will. In consideration of the effective economic working of the world state, the totalitarian government actually turns the citizens into compulsory consumers by building ingrained responses in their mind,

through conditioning. With this conditioning, they actually become automatic machines, without the freedom of making choices for themselves and taking full responsibilities for their lives. And for the more efficient control of the citizens, the totalitarian government applies hypnopaedia, which is a far more subtle way of psychological manipulation: “But wordless conditioning is crude and wholesale; cannot bring home the finer distinctions, cannot inculcate the more complex courses of behavior. For that there must be words, but words without reason. In brief, hypnopaedia” (21). In the Director’s judgment, hypnopaedia is “the greatest moralizing and socializing force of all time” (21). For hypnopaedia, as he considers, has the effect of complete dominance of the consciousness of the new world citizens and hence their value judgment: “Till at last the child’s mind *is* these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions *is* the child’s mind. And not the child’s mind only. The adult’s mind too--all his life long. The mind that judges and desires and decides--made up of these suggestions. But all these suggestions are *our* suggestions....Suggestions from the State” (22). Here, as I have noted in Chapter II, hypnopaedia completely denies the new world citizens the freedom of independent thought. Thus, in following the dictates of hypnopaedia, the citizens are actually enslaved by the new world regime without their knowledge of this truth. In *Brave New World Revisited*, Huxley especially notes the dictators’ method of manipulating people. He remarks that ‘in their propaganda today’s dictators rely for the most part on repetition, suppression and rationalization—the repetition of catchwords which they wish to be accepted as true, the suppression of facts which they wish to be ignored, the arousal and rationalization of passions which may be used in the interests of the Party and the State” (30-31). In *Brave New World*, hypnopaedia is such a way of manipulating the people. By forcing children to listen to the continuous repetition of catchwords in sleep, the new world totalitarian regime successfully brainwashes the

citizens. In consequence, every child's and adult's mind is full of the State-infused suggestions which accordingly shape their modes of behavior. But these catchwords, in fact, convey no truths since, as the Director himself confesses, they are merely "words without reason." They are not accepted as undoubted truths by the new world regime but are used as a means to manipulate its citizens to achieve whatever social ends as the World Controllers propose. In fact, they are adopted by the World State for achieving its purpose as expressed in its motto "Community, Identity and Stability."

For an illustration of the idea, we can pick up three hypnopaedic slogans: "The more stitches, the less riches," "Science is everything," and "Everyone belongs to everyone else." As a matter of fact, the first slogan serves to regulate the new world's material life, while the second to stabilize its social order, and the third to influence its citizens' emotional life.

To begin with the first slogan "The more stitches, the less riches," we can see that it is contrived for assuring the smooth functioning of the new world industrial society which is "founded on the concept of the 'goods-consuming citizen,' that is, on carefully regulated over-consumption and materialism" (Baker 101). And apparently the slogan plays upon the citizens' irrational fear of getting poor. With its continual repetition in the ears of the new world citizens through hypnopaedia, it becomes accepted as an undoubted truth. Yet whether the slogan is indeed reasonable is still questionable. For instance, in the novel, when Linda is left in the Indian reservation, she feels quite amazed by the Indians' style of living:

'And look at these clothes. This beastly wool isn't like acetate. It lasts and lasts. And you are supposed to mend it if it gets torn. But I am a Beta; I work in the fertilizing room; nobody ever taught me to do anything like that. It wasn't my business. Besides, it never used to be right to mend clothes.

Throw them away when they have got holes in them and buy new. “The more stitches, the less riches.” Isn’t that right? Mending is anti-social. But it’s all different here. It’s like living with lunatics. Everything they do is mad.’ (99)

Thus, Linda does not really see that the society she now lives in is a primitive, pre-industrial one with no such necessity to create a balance between production and consumption. In a society where production is relatively scarce, to be able to treasure resources is a social virtue rather than an evil. Therefore, in the society of Malpais, mending is never “anti-social,” nor are the people there “lunatics.” From her comments, we can see that as a typical Brave New Worlder, she is indeed brainwashed by the hypnopædic slogan. In a word, the slogan “The more stitches, the less riches” is merely contrived for the economic stability of the new world society. In such a primitive society as Malpais, it can never be accepted as a reasonable truth.

Another slogan is that “science is everything.” In the new world, though science is taken advantage of by the New World regime as a means for domination, nevertheless it is regarded as a potentially dangerous enemy to disrupt the stability of the new world, as the World Controller Mustapha Mond states: “Besides, we have our stability to think of. We don’t want to change. Every change is a menace to stability. That’s another reason why we are so chary of applying new inventions. Every discovery in pure science is potentially subversive; even science must be treated as a possible enemy. Yes, even science” (184). Yet, in its propaganda through hypnopædia, the New World regime propagates the idea that science is everything:

‘What?’ said Helmholtz, in astonishment. ‘But we are always saying that science is everything. It’s a hypnopædic platitude.’

‘Three times a week between thirteen and seventeen,’ put in Bernard.

‘And all the science propaganda we do at the college...’

‘Yes; but what sort of science?’ asked Mustapha Mond sarcastically.

‘You have had no scientific training, so you can’t judge. I was a pretty good physicist in my time. Too good—good enough to realize that all our science is just a cookery book, with an orthodox theory of cooking that nobody is allowed to question, and a list of recipes that must not be added to except by special permission from the head cook. I am the head cook now. (85)

Thus, to the World Controllers, hypnopaedia only serves as a way of “manipulating” the people rather than a means for their “education.” For actually, what they try to instill in the people through hypnopaedia is not what they themselves hold to be true but whatever they consider is useful for safeguarding social stability. As we see, even the World Controller Mustapha Mond does not believe in the truthfulness of the hypnopaedic slogan that ‘science is everything.’ For as he himself confesses, as a young scientist devoted to science, he was once nearly sent to an island because of his unorthodoxy: “I started doing a bit of cooking on my own. Unorthodox cooking, illicit cooking. A bit of real science, in fact...I was on the verge of being sent to an island” (185). And it is because of his withdrawal from such an attempt that he is pardoned by the authorities and later becomes a World Controller: “I was given the choice: to be sent to an island, where I could have got on with my pure science, or to be taken on to the Controllers’ Council with the prospect of succeeding in due course to an actual Controllership. I chose this and let the science go” (186). Now as a World Controller, he is responsible for supervising the publication of all scientific theories and discoveries. And if he finds any scientific theory or discovery which may be subversive to the stability of the new world, he will be ready to persecute the scientist. Commenting on a new theory of biology, for example, he orders the scientist’s expulsion from the new world because of the potential subversiveness of his theory:

‘The author’s mathematical treatment of the concept of purpose is novel and

highly ingenious, but heretical, and so far as the social order is concerned, dangerous and potentially subversive. *Not to be published.*' He underlined the words. 'The author will be kept under supervision. His transference to the marine biological station of St. Helena may become necessary.'

(145)

Thus, he hides from the citizens the truth that in the new world, science is regarded as potentially subversive to social stability and therefore has to be kept "most carefully chained and muffled" (184). Yet, through hypnopaedia, he propounds the idea that science is everything, and it seems to be accepted as an undoubted truth with its continual repetition. Yet the truth is that he will only support the publication of such scientific theories and discoveries that may be useful in enhancing the stability of the new world. But then why does Mustapha Mond try to give the new world citizens the false impression that he supports the unbounded development of science with his hypnopaedic slogan that "science is everything?" The truth may be that by supporting such scientific theories and discoveries that help consolidate the stability of his new world and by secretly rejecting those that may do otherwise, he is trying to enhance the citizens' essential enslavement while creating for them the illusion of freedom. In a word, the hypnopaedic slogan that "science is everything" is just a device for the new world regime to rationalize its world order and suppress its essentially anti-scientific attitude.

Finally, among the catchwords of hypnopaedia, there is such a proverb as "Every one belongs to every one else." When Mustapha Mond uses this phrase to justify his antipathy to family relationships, the students that are listening to his lecture all show unanimous agreement: "the students nodded, emphatically agreeing with a statement which upwards of sixty-two thousand repetitions in the dark had made them accept, not merely as true, but as axiomatic, self-evident, utterly

indisputable” (32). Apparently, the reason why the students should accept the idea of the catchword as self-evident is not because of its very reasonableness but merely for its continuous repetition in their ears which brings about their mechanical acceptance. And in his argument against family relationships, Mustapha Mond states that in family, monogamy, romance, there is only “exclusiveness,” only “a focusing of interest,” and “a narrow channeling of impulse and energy” (31). It is evident that he denounces both family love and romantic love in favor of promiscuity. And as for his purpose, he tells the students: ‘Fortunate boys’ said the Controller. ‘No pains have been spared to make your lives emotionally easy—to preserve you, so far as that is possible, from having any emotions at all’ (35). Yet, the reader knows that his true motivation is just to keep the wheel of industrial society turning: “Wheels must turn steadily, but cannot turn untended. There must be men to tend them, men as steady as the wheels upon their axles, sane men, obedient men, stable in contentment” (34). For this purpose, he covers from the students the truth of the great joy and contentment that one may experience from family and romantic love. He rationalizes further his argument by arousing the students’ disgust against family relationship:

And home was as squalid psychically as physically. Psychically, it was a rabbit hole, a midden, hot with the frictions of tightly packed life, reeking with emotion. What suffocating intimacies, what dangerous, insane, obscene relationships between the members of the family group! Maniacally, the mother brooded over her children (her children)...brood over them like a cat over its kittens; but a cat that could talk, a cat that could say, ‘my baby, my baby,’ over and over again. ‘My baby, and oh, oh, at my breast, the little hands, the hunger, and that unspeakable agonizing pleasure! Till at last my baby sleeps, my baby sleeps with a bubble of white milk at the corner of his

mouth. My little baby sleeps...”

‘Yes,’ said Mustapha Mond, nodding his head, ‘you may well shudder.’

(29)

To arouse the students’ antipathy against family relationships, especially the love a mother feels for her child, Mustapha Mond depicts family love as essentially sordid and therefore repulsive. Yet despite his effort to give the students this impression, he unwittingly reveals the tenderness, joy and love that a mother can experience from the relationship with her child. And this experience is exactly what Bernard suggests to Lenina:

‘What a wonderfully intimate relationship,’ he said, deliberately outrageous.

‘And what an intensity of feeling it must generate! I often think one may have missed something in not having had a mother. And perhaps you’ve missed something in not *being* a mother, Lenina. Imagine yourself sitting there with a little baby of your own...’ (91)

Like Lenina, the women of the new world are deprived of the chance to experience the love a mother feels for her child. And that, as Bernard remarks, may be regrettable for a woman since she misses the chance to experience this “wonderfully intimate relationship.” And like Bernard, the people of the new world never experience motherly love, and that, as Bernard suggests, is equally regrettable, since they miss the chance to experience the warmth that a mother can give to a child. In the novel, Linda seems to be the only one in the new world who really experiences motherhood. And her experiences as a mother do reveal some truths that Mustapha Mond tries to hide from the students, as she confesses to the Director:

‘Yes, a baby-and I was its mother.’ She flung the obscenity like a challenge into the outrageous silence; then suddenly breaking away from him, ashamed, ashamed, covered her face with her hands, sobbing. ‘It wasn’t my

fault, Tomakin. Because I always did my drill, didn't I? Didn't I? Always...

But he was a comfort to me, all the same.' (124).

To the students and to all the other Brave New Worlders, the very experiences of maternity and motherly love are out of the question. Besides, nor can they experience the exultation and contentment of a lover in the experience of true love. In their automatic acceptance of the truth of the catch-word "Every one belongs to everyone else," they are forever kept away from such experiences. And by lack of such experiences, they can only believe in the truthfulness of what Mustapha Mond tells them about romance, motherhood and family relationships.

As a matter of fact, both hypnopædia and Mustapha Mond's words about family, motherhood and romance carry the nature and effect of idle talk. And such idle talk characterizes the "fallen-ness" of the everyday life of the new world citizens. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger especially notes on idle talk. He asserts:

Being-with-one-another takes place in talking with one another and in concern with what is said-in-the-talk...The Being-said, the dictum, the pronouncement--all these now stand surety for the genuineness of the discourse and of the understanding which belongs to it, and for its appropriateness to facts. And because this discoursing has lost primary relationship-of-Being towards the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of *gossiping* and *passing the word along*. What is said in the talk as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. (212)

Here Heidegger means that "conventional discourse is idle because it is un-genuine discourse, leaving those who engage in it un-rooted in a meaningfully shared world"

(Gelven 112). As I have noted, the students never personally experience maternity and motherly love. Therefore, they can never have genuine knowledge about family relationships and romantic love. In Heidegger's terms, they actually lose "the primary relationship-of-Being" with family relationship and romantic love. Besides, in the novel, apparently most hypnopaedic slogans such as "Ending is better than mending," "A gramme in time saves nine" and "A gramme is always better than a damn" are by nature dictums. With their continual repetition in the ears of the hearer either by machine or other authorities, they gradually take on an authoritative character. Thus, things are so because the World Controller Mustapha Mond or the public opinion (here as represented by hypnopaedia) thinks so. Just as Heidegger expresses, "idle talk is constituted by just such gossiping and passing the word along—a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness" (*BT* 212). In "Synthetic Myths in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*," Peter M. Larsen notes on such statements: "In *BNW*, the synthetic myths can be divided into five groups: jingles, rewritten nursery rhymes, rewritten proverbs, new proverbs and pseudostatements. All are types of discourse designed for parroting, i. e. meaningless rhythmic repetition, and so in keeping with the infantile emotionalism" (507). That the citizens of the new world should take these hypnopaedic words as reasonable truths indeed mark their life as essentially inauthentic. They are kept in the state of "fallen-ness" and are thus incapable of any spiritual growth. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger especially elaborates on the concept of "fallen-ness." He asserts: "Dasein, as everyday being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These others are not *definite* Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them" (164). Concerning this state of fallen-ness, Calvin O. Schrag elucidates that "man 'opens'

himself to the public, conforms to its demands and opinions, accepts its criteria or standards, and retreats from personal commitment and responsible decision” and “as Kierkegaard points out, the public becomes my decision maker. I think what the public thinks, I feel what the public feels, and I do what the public does” (46-47). In *Brave New World*, in Heidegger’s terms, apparently the “Being” of the new world citizens has been taken by the arbitrary totalitarian government. For playing the role of the ‘Others,’ the regime has actually deprived the citizens of the possibilities to love and to be loved. And by defining them in its own terms, it has also robbed them of the right of self-definition. By genetic conditioning and hypnopaedia, each citizen is assigned by the State a role in the new world which can never suffer to be changed. For life, they play the role assigned to them contentedly without the possibility of any spiritual growth:

‘An Alpha-decanted, Alpha-conditioned man would go mad if he had to do Epsilon Semi-Moron work--go mad or start smashing things up. Alphas can be completely socialized--but only on condition that you make them do Alpha work. Only an Epsilon can be expected to make Epsilon sacrifices, for the good reason that for him they aren’t sacrifices; they’re the line of least resistance. His conditioning has laid down rails along which he’s got to run. He can’t help himself; he is foredoomed. (182).

Apparently, the new world citizens are deprived of the chance to live a life of their own choice. Born to fit a preordained role in the new world, they live a life without any challenge. Here, as the above quotation serves to indicate, like the other classes of citizens, the Alphas’ and Epsilons’ life course is actually pre-determined by the state. Being “foredoomed,” they can’t help themselves in doing what they have to do. Under the invisible and total domination of the

totalitarian government, they live a “stunted life”, a life of living death: “Even after decanting, he is still inside a bottle—an invisible bottle of infantile and embryonic fixations” and each of us ‘goes through life inside a bottle’ (182). Commenting on the fallen-ness of the citizens in Orwell’s novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Michael Carter contends that as a being-for-IngsoC, a citizen of Oceania has actually no sense of choice. Distanced from himself, he no longer feels decisions to be his. Rather, he becomes “the spectator of a predetermined process” (198). Thus, to the reader, “the overwhelming sensation is that of vicariousness, of someone else doing the living for him and, through Newspeak someone else doing the speaking” (198). Indeed, like the citizens of Oceania, “the citizens of Mond’s utopia are clearly not their own masters” for “they have no selves to speak of and belong...to the collective community” (Baker 130). As with Orwell’s Newspeak, it is hypnopaedia that is “doing the speaking.” And, like the IngsoC in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, it is the State that is actually “doing the living” for the citizens themselves. Just as June Deery observes in “Technology and Gender in Aldous Huxley’s *Alternative (?) Worlds*”, the new world embodies “the Procrustean determination to fit the individual into the State’s requirements” (104). Jenni Calder also observes that “Huxley was very much concerned with ends and means” (23). In a number of essays as well as in *Island*, he argues that “individuals were ends in themselves, not means to ends, nationalistic, militaristic, commercial, or whatever” (23). In fact, in *Brave New World*, “people are means, not ends; their only real value is in their function” (23). Moreover, K. Bhaskara Ramamurty also comments that “it is an irony of life that human beings have first evolved the ‘State’ for their own good, and now, for the good of the State, human beings are systematically dehumanized, a reversal of nature’s evolutionary process” (72). Thus, the ideal which lies behind the new world motto “community, identity and

stability” is clearly anti-humanistic and anti-existentialist. For under this principle, there exists no possibility for any individual expression and self-realization. As Ramamurty forcefully asserts, “true happiness consists in becoming fully human, and realizing the utmost possibilities of human achievement” (72). Therefore, it is the authentic human life that one should strive after. In the novel, as I have noted, several characters do grow out of this domination and regain their humanity and individuality, either by accident or by instinct. And it is through these characters’ rebellion that the reader can gather Huxley’s ideal of the authentic human life.

The first character to be discussed is Bernard Marx. From the beginning of the novel, Bernard is distinguished from the other characters as a “misfit” to the new world. Relatively shorter and thinner in stature than other Alpha characters, he is rumored to be improperly conditioned—that “alcohol” has been wrongly put into his blood-surrogate. This physical inadequacy, as a result, renders Bernard rather self-conscious, and his very self-consciousness then endows him with a deep sense of separation from others. As a matter of fact, his physical inferiority actually victimizes him as a laughing-stock of his peers and inferiors. And their laughter intensifies his sense of alienation and influences his mode of behavior, which increases their prejudices against him:

Indeed, a faint hypnopaedic prejudice in favor of size was universal. Hence the laughter of the women to whom he made proposals, the practical joking of his equals among the men. The mockery made him feel an outsider; and feeling an outsider he behaved like one, which increased the prejudice against him and intensified the contempt and hostility aroused by his physical defects. Which in turn increased his sense of being alien and alone.

(54)

As a specialist in hypnopaedia, Bernard is well familiar with the means of

domination in the new world. With this knowledge, together with his sense of separation and inferiority which makes him uncomfortable in his interaction with others, Bernard develops little sense of identity with other fellow new world citizens. In fact, as pointed out by Robert S. Baker, “as an object of others’ derision, his experience of ‘being slighted and alone’ feeds directly into his increasing awareness of individual autonomy” (102). In the novel, he bolsters his ego by distinguishing himself as a sharp critic of the new world and by his nonconformist behavior. It seems that this sense of “individual autonomy” and his very knowledge of the means of domination enable him to stand apart from the new world society and become a rather keen critic of its social norms. For example, while others in the new world are conditioned by hypnopaedia to regard promiscuity as normal, Bernard considers rather differently:

‘Lenina Crowne?’ said Henry Foster, echoing the Assistant Predestinator’s question as he zipped his trousers. ‘Oh, she’s a splendid girl. Wonderfully pneumatic. I’m surprised you haven’t had her.’

‘I can’t think how it is I haven’t,’ said the Assistant Predestinator. ‘I certainly will. At the first opportunity.’

From his place on the opposite side of the changing-room aisle, Bernard Marx overheard what they were saying and turned pale.

.....

‘Talking about her as though she were a bit of meat.’ Bernard ground his teeth. ‘Have her here, have her there. Like mutton. Degrading her to so much mutton.... (35-36)

Thus, with his ability of independent thinking, Bernard indeed differs from the other characters in the new world. While others in the new world uncritically accept the new world value of promiscuity, Bernard never blindly follows this value. With a

sensible mind, he sees in the practice of promiscuity the evil of dehumanization. As the above quotation indicates, when Henry Foster and the Assistant Predestinator are talking about Lenina's sexual appeal, her body or sexual movement being "pneumatic," Bernard sees the two as dehumanizing Lenina, reducing her individual existence to that of a sex doll: "Have her here, have her there. Like mutton. Degrading her to so much mutton." Later, when he is alone with Lenina, and learns of her satisfaction in being regarded as sexually-appealing, he does not seem to agree with her self-degradation and her denial of her own worth as human being:

'Every one says I'm awfully pneumatic,' said Lenina reflectively, patting her own legs.

'Awfully.' But there was an expression of pain in Bernard's eyes. 'Like meat,' he was thinking.

She looked up with a certain anxiety. 'But you don't think I'm *too* plump, do you?'

He shook his head. Like so much meat.

'You think I'm all right.' Another nod. 'In every way?'

'Perfect,' he said aloud. And inwardly, 'She thinks of herself that way. She doesn't mind being meat.'

Lenina smiled triumphantly. But her satisfaction was premature.

(76-77)

Here, in contrast to Lenina, Bernard sees the evil of dehumanization in treating oneself or others as a sexual object. For Bernard, it is to degrade one's very existence and deny one's essential worth and dignity as human being. In Sartre's terms, it is to live as a "Being-for-others," which is, by definition, "contingent, as one's Being has been surrendered to arbitrary control" (Carter 197). For in this condition of being, "man, having already transformed from a being-for-itself, lives,

as a for-others, in a permanent condition of flux: he will be whatever he is instructed to be” (Carter 197). In other words, it is the evil of not seeing oneself as a free “Being-for-itself,” with the right of self-definition. And in Heidegger’s terms, it is “fallen-ness,” allowing the “Others” to take control of one’s very “Being,” to dispose of oneself as they please. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger especially notes on the state of “fallen-ness.” First, he sees fallen-ness as caused by our immersion in the world of being-with-others:

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This-being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the “they” is unfolded. (164)

In other words, our immersion in the world of being-with-others causes the effect of “leveling down.” Just as Charles Guignon maintains, “the everyday practical life world is also always a shared, social world” and “as we are engaged in our ordinary involvements, we act according to the norms and conventions of the common world in such a way that there is no sharp distinction to be made between ourselves and others” (123). People living in the state of “fallen-ness” thus never come to form a value of their own. Instead, they follow the public opinion and allow it to take control of their evaluation of everything in their life. Thus, “it follows that in our day-to-day lives we are not so much ‘centers of experience and action’ as we are the ‘They’ or the ‘one’ (das man) as this is defined by our culture” and “we find ourselves first and foremost as crossing-points or placeholders in familiar public contexts” (Guignon 123-4). It is just as Heidegger expresses:

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; like we shrink back from the great mass as they shrink back; we find shocking what they find shocking. The “they,” which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (164)

In *Brave New World*, Lenina accepts the public value of promiscuity and does not care about being dehumanized as a sexually-attractive doll. In criticizing Lenina’s dehumanization of herself, Bernard certainly means that if one is to achieve true independence, in the aspect of one’s sexuality, it is not to follow the State’s dictum that ‘Everyone belongs to everyone else’ but to follow one’s own heart: “‘I want to know what passion is,’ she heard him saying. ‘I want to feel something strongly’” (77). Sex, to Bernard, is the natural consummation of true love, not the innocent sport of two children:

Ignoring the interruption, ‘it suddenly struck me the other day,’ continued Bernard, ‘that it might be possible to be an adult all the time.’

‘I don’t understand.’ Lenina’s tone was firm.

‘I know you don’t. and that’s why we went to bed together yesterday--like infants--instead of being adults and waiting.’

‘But it was fun,’ Lenina insisted. ‘Wasn’t it?’

‘Oh, the greatest fun,’ he answered, but in a voice so mournful, with an expression so profoundly miserable, that Lenina felt all her triumph suddenly evaporate. Perhaps he had found her too plump, after all.

(78)

Here, Bernard implicitly criticizes the sexual attitude of the new world citizens as immature and childish. For by regarding sexuality as nothing but a satisfaction of carnal appetites, it totally denies the spiritual and emotional aspect of true

heterosexual love which develops only with patience and time. Besides, it appears Lenina does not see what Bernard actually means. That is, while Bernard is impliedly criticizing the sexual attitude of the new world and wishing both of them to develop a more mature attitude to sex, Lenina can only see their sexual union as nothing but “fun.” And while Bernard seems to feel depressed about their loveless sex, Lenina can only interpret his depression in terms of her possible lack of sex appeal to him. It seems that with her new world sexual attitude, she can never truly understand Bernard. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger asserts: “The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has always been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood--that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world “matter” to it. The “they” prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one ‘sees’” (BT 213). The public value put on sex has determined how Lenina looks on it and how she evaluates every sexual act of her with others. Regarding sex as merely a satisfaction of carnal appetites, Lenina can never see that it is not with her sexual appeal that Bernard is dissatisfied but with their loveless sex. Conditioned by the State on what to look at and how to feel about things, Lenina can never have true communication with Bernard.

In his dialogue with Lenina, Bernard also shows his independence from the new world social norms and his willingness to lead a life of his own:

‘I want to look at the sea in peace,’ he said. ‘One can’t even look with that beastly noise going on.

‘But it’s lovely. And I don’t want to look.’

‘But I do,’ he insisted. ‘it makes me feel as though...’he hesitated, searching for words with which to express himself,’ as though I were more *me*, if you see what I mean. More on my own, not so completely a part of something else. Not just a cell in the social body. Doesn’t it make you feel like that,

Lenina?’

But Lenina was crying. ‘It’s horrible, it’s horrible,’ she kept repeating. ‘and how can you talk like that about not wanting to be a part of the social body ? After all, every one works for everyone else. We can’t do without anyone. ““Even Epsilons...”’

‘Yes, I know,’ said Bernard derisively. ““Even Epsilons are useful”! So am I. And I damned well wish I weren’t!’

Lenina was shocked by his blasphemy. ‘Bernard! She protested in a voice of amazed distress. ‘How can you?’

‘In a different key, ‘How can I?’ he repeated meditatively. ‘No, the real problem is: How is it that I can’t , or rather—because, after all, I know quite well why I can’t –what would it be like if I could, if I were free—not enslaved by my conditioning.’

‘But, Bernard, you are saying the most awful things.’

‘Don’t you wish you were free, Lenina?’

‘I don’t know what you mean. I am free. Free to have the most wonderful time. Everybody’s happy nowadays.’

He laughed, ‘Yes, “Everybody’s happy nowadays.” We begin giving the children that at five. But wouldn’t you like to be free to be happy in some other way, Lenina? In your own way, for example: not in everybody else’s way.’ (74-75)

Here, Bernard seems to claim his very “Being” as independent of the society of the new world. Refusing to be merely “a cell in the social body” and a spiritually dead automaton, enslaved and conditioned by the State, he sees his possibility to live according to his will: “No, the real problem is: How is it that I can’t—what would it be like if I could, if I were free--not enslaved by my conditioning.” In

Heidegger's terms, he will not live a life of "fallen-ness," allowing the State to take control of his "Being," to dispose of his Being as it pleases. In his converse with nature, here by looking at the sea, he sees his essentially independent, unique, and irreplaceable "Being": "It makes me feel as though I were more *me*, if you see what I mean. More on my own, not so completely a part of something else." And, defining himself as distinct from others, he expresses his will to get away from the life of the new world and live a life of his own: "Even Epsilons are useful. So am I. And I damned well wish I weren't" and "But wouldn't you like to be happy in some other way, Lenina? In your own way, for example: not in everybody else's way." In other words, he seems to perceive the possibility of living a life of authenticity, a life in which the individual can realize his or her own possibilities and be happy.

As for Lenina, by contrast, she does not seem to have an independent "Being" or the sense of herself as distinct from the society of the new world. From her dialogues with Bernard, the reader can see that she has completely assimilated the values of the new world. From the above quotation, the reader can see that every word she says in response to Bernard is out of hypnopaedia. It appears that her values are completely shaped by it without her awareness of this fact. In response to her mechanic repetition of such hypnopaedic words as "Never put off till tomorrow the fun you can have today" and "Everybody's happy nowadays," Bernard answers rather ironically: "Two hundred repetitions, twice a week from fourteen to sixteen and a half" and "Yes, 'Everybody's happy nowadays.' We begin giving the children that at five" (74-75). It seems that he is quite impatient with these mechanic responses and implying that Lenina is actually dominated by the State in her value judgment and views of things. Rejecting the Soma which Lenina offers him, he tells her, "I'd rather be myself. ...Myself and nasty. Not somebody else, however jolly" (74). It is apparent that he is suggesting to Lenina that she

should develop values of her own, rather than live as a “somebody else,” a “they-self” in Heidegger’s terms. However, Lenina never understands what Bernard actually means. To her, it only seems that Bernard is rather “odd.” She can never truly understand him. Here, as pointed out by Krishan Kumar, Lenina is “presented as the most complete embodiment of Brave New World philosophy” since “her attitudes, expressed largely in hypnopædic maxims, and her responses are copy-book examples of proper Brave New World behavior” (286). And Huxley, through Bernard’s words about soma and sex, is also “attacking the opiates of his own contemporary society, instant entertainment, easy escapism, the things that keep people mindlessly happy” (Calder38). In fact, at this stage of the novel, as a mouthpiece of Huxley, he can be regarded as “the conscience of the society,” who, from his isolation and loneliness, calls to people who are willing to listen to him the possibility of a life of authenticity.

But from her attitude to Bernard, it is not fair to say that Lenina is completely dominated by the State and is thus without the potentiality to develop her sense of “individuality.” In fact, that she should agree to have a date with Bernard strongly indicates her possibility for inner development. Before Lenina’s going out with Bernard, her colleague Fanny Crowne actually tries to dissuade her from having anything to do with Bernard:

‘Do you know Bernard Marx?’ she asked in a tone whose excessive casualness was evidently forced.

Fanny looked startled. ‘You don’t really mean to say ...?’

‘Why not? Bernard’s an Alpha-Plus. Besides, he asked me to go to one of the Savage Reservations with him. I’ve always wanted to see a Savage reservation.’

‘But his reputation?’

‘What do I care about his reputation?’

‘They say he doesn’t like Obstacle Golf.’

‘They say, they say,’ mocked Lenina.

‘And then he spends most of his time by himself –*alone*.’ There was horror in Fanny’s voice.

‘Well, he won’t be alone when he’s with me. And anyhow, why are people so beastly to him? I think he’s rather sweet.’ (36)

Here there apparently exists a contrast of character between Fanny and Lenina. For unlike Fanny who is easily affected by idle talk in her judgment of Bernard, Lenina shows more independence in her judgment of him. When Fanny criticizes Bernard’s looks and stature as being ugly and small, which is characteristic of people of lower caste, Lenina shows her non-Brave New World taste with her indulgent remark: “One feels one would like to pet him. You know. Like a cat” (37). After her date with Bernard, for all his oddity, she still likes him, as she tells Fanny: “All the same, I do like him. He has such awfully nice hands. And the way he moves his shoulders—that’s very attractive” (78). Just as Krishan Kumar observes, Lenina’s “very liking for Bernard, with his queer appearance and reputation for unorthodoxy, already betrays a distinctly non-Brave New World preference” (286). And this quality of her in fact sharply contrasts with Fanny who, like all brave new worlders, actually lives in complete “fallen-ness” with her judgment of everything according to hearsay and convention. For example, after a date with Bernard, Lenina tells her that Bernard seems to be a rather “odd” person. Without asking Lenina’s reason, she simply attributes his oddity to his being wrongly conditioned: “I told you so. ...It’s the alcohol they put in his surrogate” (78). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger expounds this state of understanding:

The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed

along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing into an act of closing off. For what is said is always understood as proximally as 'saying' something--that is, an uncovering something. Thus, by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it *leaves undone*. (213)

Fanny, as a matter of fact, never takes pains to see the actual character of Bernard. Instead, as all brave new worlders tend to do, she interprets every unorthodox demeanor of Bernard as the natural result of his being wrongly conditioned. By contrast, Lenina never blindly believes this rumor. In fact, with her sole reliance on instinct for judgment rather on convention and hearsay, she does possess the potentiality for individual growth. And her inner development does start with her acquaintance with John the Savage. As for this point, I will discuss it later.

From all the above discussions, it indeed appears that Bernard seems to be a rather sensible person in the new world. In his nonconformity, he seems to create an image of a rebellious hero who is misunderstood and even ridiculed at. As a matter of fact, in his imagination, he harbors the desire to be "a hero," a hero who can patiently endure his sufferings. After the appointment with the Director of Hatchery and Conditioning in his office, Bernard is threatened by the Director with exile to Iceland because of his unorthodox behavior. In his imagination, he thinks he has the patience to endure such a challenge and suffering:

'That'll teach him,' he said to himself. But he was mistaken. For Bernard left the room with a swagger, exulting, as he banged the door behind him, in the thought that he stood alone, embattled against the order of things; elated by the intoxicating consciousness of his individual significance and importance. Even the thought of persecution left him undismayed, was rather tonic than depressing. He felt strong enough to face even Iceland.

And this confidence was the greater for his not for a moment really believing that he would be called upon to face anything at all. (81)

Thus, Bernard does not really believe that he will be exiled because of his unorthodoxy. To his self-congratulatory mind, the Director's warnings only prove his "individual significance and importance." They do not intimidate him but only serve to inflate his self-esteem. Flattering his own ego, he deems himself a hero "embattled against the order of things": "Heroic was the account he gave that evening of the interview with the D. H. C." (81). Commenting on Bernard's assessment of himself, Jenni Calder maintains: "Until now he has been aware of himself as odd, as considered peculiar by others, but has not been able to give a name to his vague feelings of maladjustment. What he wants is an experience that will give this to him, an experience that will transform his oddity into genius, or heroism, or some other anachronistic quality" (36). To Bernard, then, to imagine himself to be a hero somewhat salvages his sense of inferiority. For if in reality he can really make himself worthy of others' worship and attention, he can then be accepted as part of the new world society. Thus, Calder considers that "Bernard's motivation throughout the book is an urge to transform his miserable separateness into heroic individualism" (37). Yet the truth is that his dream to be a hero stays only in his imagination. It never becomes a reality. As a matter of fact, though desiring to be a hero, he does not have the actual courage to face real sufferings. As for the anti-heroic aspects of his character, his friend Helmholtz Watson sees very clearly: "He liked Bernard. ...Nevertheless, there were things in Bernard which he hated.... This boasting, for example. And the outbursts of an abject self-pity with which it alternated. And his deplorable habit of being bold after the event, and full, in absence, of the most extraordinary presence of mind" (81). Bernard's image as a would-be hero in *Brave New World* suffers decline after he meets John the Savage

and Linda. As Donald Watt points out, “Huxley first seems to have thought of making Bernard Marx the rebellious hero of the novel but then changed his mind and deliberately played him down into a kind of anti-hero” (80). And Stephen Jay Greenblatt also observes that “Bernard Marx is an unusual characterization in Huxley, for he is not a typed and static figure” and that “gradually, Huxley induces a shift in the reader’s attitude toward Marx, from a thorough sympathy at the beginning of the novel to a scornful disdain at the close” (43).

Bernard’s actual character comes to the fore when he sees his chance to fulfill his selfish desires for fame, power and women by taking advantage of both John the Savage and Linda. As Stephen Jay Greenblatt observes, “Marx appears to the reader at first because he does not fit into the Brave New World, but Bernard himself would very much like to be part of his society—to have the most pneumatic women, to be admired by the other alphas and feared by the lower castes” (43). By having both Linda and John appear before the crowd and the Director, he successfully defeats his enemy the Director by ruining his reputation with the news that he fathered a child. And then by showing off John as a novelty, he attracts the attention of the Brave New Worlders and wins his acceptance into the new world society:

It was John, then, they were all after. And it was only through Bernard, his accredited guardian, that John could be seen, Bernard found himself, for the first time in his life, treated not merely normally, but as a person of outstanding importance. There was no more talk of the alcohol in his blood-surrogate, no gibes at his personal appearance....As for the women, Bernard had only to hint at the possibility of an invitation, and he could have whichever of them he liked. (127)

Apparently, the Savage’s very presence and companionship offers Bernard the ticket

to enter his utopia which formerly rejected him as a freak. The new world citizens' unbounded curiosity for the Savage to a large extent assuages their prejudices against Bernard. To gain direct access to the Savage, now they have to admit Bernard as a member of their society. Bernard thus becomes a popular figure. Yet he does not seem to recognize the fact that his success and acceptance by the new world society is only owing to the Savage's very companionship. In him alone, people actually can have no interest. Deluded by his self-importance, he enhances his criticism of the new world society, only to win people's spite of him:

Success went fizzily to Bernard's head, and in the process completely reconciled him...to a world which, up till then, he had found very unsatisfactory. In so far as it recognized him as important, the order of things was good. But, reconciled by his success, he yet refused to forgo the privilege of criticizing this order. For the act of criticizing heightened his sense of importance, made him feel larger....He was politely listened to. But behind his back people shook their heads. (128)

As the above quotation indicates, Bernard actually harbors no wish for a revolution. So long as the new world society accepts him as a member and can fulfill his selfish desires, he can accept the established order of things. Thus, his criticism of the new world is not out of a genuine wish to improve it, to guide it in a new direction, but only to satisfy his ego. Formerly, because of his sense of inferiority, he felt alienated from the new world society and behaved as a nonconformist. Now, with his newly-gained power, he feels his superiority and behaves as though he were a man of power and influence: "Intoxicated, he was behaving as though, at the very least, he were a visiting World Controller" (129). This essentially egoistic character makes Bernard a potential threat to the stability of the new world. Concerning this point, Peter Edgerly Firchow maintains that because of his physical

inferiority, Bernard “has developed a compulsive need to assert his superiority” (72). And “it is this incapacity which, paradoxically, makes Bernard the dangerous threat, for it compels him to rise to a position of power in his society; he wants to be accepted by his society, but only on his own terms, terms that are not acceptable in the long run if stability is to be maintained” (Firchow 72).

Bernard’s essentially egoistic character is later regarded by Mustapha Mond as a potential threat to the stability of the new world. Reading Bernard’s report of the Savage’s comments on the new world civilization, he perceives Bernard’s true character and decides to “give him a lesson”:

‘...though I must admit,’ he read, ‘that I agree with the Savage in finding civilized infantility too easy or, as he puts it, not expensive enough; and I would like to take this opportunity of drawing your lordship’s attention to...’

Mustapha Mond’s anger gave place almost at once to mirth. The idea of this creature solemnly lecturing him—him—about the social order was really too grotesque. The man must have gone mad. ‘I ought to give him a lesson,’ he said to himself; then threw back his head and laugh aloud.
(129-130)

Here, being able to find consensus in the Savage’s criticism of the new world, Bernard does indeed have the potentiality to get beyond the static social system of the new world. And this characteristic of him is considered as potentially dangerous by the World Controller Mustapha Mond who firmly believes that the wheel of the industrial Fordian society must be tended by “sane, obedient” men stable in contentment with their position and the present social order. To him, a man like Bernard who has the audacity to challenge his superior position and better judgment with his self-righteous criticism of the present social order must be “mad.”

And this “madness” must not be ignored, lest it causes unnecessary disturbances for his new world. Mond thus quickly takes his action. After the Savage’s rebellion, Bernard has to be exiled from the new world. The way he reacts to his banishment plainly exhibits his love of the new world and his fear of facing the unknown. In a pleading tone, he asks Mond, “Oh, please don’t send me to Iceland. I promise I will do what I ought to do. Give me another chance. Please give me another chance” (185). It is plain that his rebellion is only halfhearted. Just as Robert S. Baker maintains, “after his climatic encounter with the Savage, he slips back into the euphoric present of the World State and its collective ideology” (105). And “his flickering perceptions of something deeper and finer than the organized apathy of World State culture never develop” and “he never grows into his desired perpetual adulthood and, by the end of the novel, actually regresses” (Baker 105). Peter Edgerly Firchow also asserts: “Bernard is weak and cowardly and vain...Nevertheless, Bernard is undoubtedly capable of seeing the better, even if in the end he follows the worse” (71). Retaining his humanity, he indeed has the sensitivity not to lead a life of “fallen-ness.” Just as Jenni Calder asserts, he feels “an urge to get beyond the system” (37). Yet, he lacks the courage to look for a life of his own, a life where he may realize his private ideals. In fact, in the new world, the truth is that he “cannot even be allowed a choice” for “the possibility of choice is something that has been all but removed from life” (Calder 37). The place he is exiled to may be exactly what he desires, as Mond privately reveals to Watson and John the Savage: “He’s being sent to an island. That’s to say, he’s being sent to a place where he will meet the most interesting set of men and women to be found anywhere in the world. All the people who aren’t satisfied with orthodoxy, who’ve got independent ideas of their own” (186). There he may possibly lead a life of authenticity and be happy “in his own way.”

In the novel, Helmholtz Watson serves as a foil to Bernard. First, in outward appearance, Helmholtz's stature and look sharply contrast with that of Bernard: "He was a powerfully built man, deep-chested, broad-shouldered, massive, and yet quick in his movements, springy and agile. The round strong pillar of his neck supported a beautifully shaped head. ..In a forcible emphatic way, he was handsome and looked...every centimetre an Alpha-Plus" (55). It seems that with this portrait of Helmholtz, Huxley hints at his essentially heroic character. Besides, in his description of Helmholtz, Huxley directly contrasts him with Bernard:

A mental excess had produced in Helmholtz Watson effects very similar to those which, in Bernard Marx, were the results of physical defect. Too little bone and brawn had isolated Bernard from his fellow men, and the sense of this apartness, being by all the current standards, a mental excess, became in its turn a cause of wider separation. That which had made Helmholtz so uncomfortably and all alone was too much ability. What the two men shared was the knowledge that they were individuals. (56)

Thus, both Bernard and Helmholtz share a sense of their separateness from others of the new world and their being individuals. But unlike Bernard who suffers from this consciousness of his separateness and seeks to become an integrated member of the new world society, Helmholtz gradually feels a sense of detachment from his fellow citizens. Though well-adapted to the new world, yet deep in his heart he feels a certain discontent owing to his impulse to do something more meaningful for himself:

This Escalator-Squash champion, this indefatigable lover (it was said that he had had six hundred and forty different girls in under four years), this admirable committee man and best mixer had realized quite suddenly that sport, women, communal activities were only, so far as he was concerned,

second bests. Really, and at the bottom, he was interested in something else.

But in what? In what? (56)

Thus, gradually Helmholtz seems to lose interest in the life of the new world. To him, this life seems no longer attractive in comparison with the goal that he sets for himself. Treating Bernard as his confidant, he confesses to Bernard his desire to make use of his seemingly not yet fully-discovered potentiality to better his art, both in form and content: "...I am thinking of a queer feeling I sometimes get, a feeling that I've got something important to say and the power to say it--only I don't know what it is, and I can't make use of that power. If there was some different way of writing ... Or else something else to write about..." (58). Yet, living in the new world, he feels a deep sense of confinement in artistic creation with his limited realm of experiences: "I feel I could do something much more important. Yes, and more intense, more violent. But what? What is there more important to say? And how can one be violent about the sort of things one's expected to write about?" (58). It seems that with his limited experiences, he can not reach a breakthrough in his art.

With his poem about "being alone", Helmholtz believes to have attained a new realm in his art, and at the same time, he also discovers his potentiality to write about what he thinks to be meaningful: "I feel...as though I were just beginning to have something to write about. As though I were beginning to be able to use that power I feel I've got inside me--that extra, latent power. Something seems to be coming to me" (149). But from the Brave New Worlders' response to his poem, the reader can see that with their conditioning, his art fails to be appreciated, yet with his experience of being alone and his courage to express it, it also appears that Helmholtz has indeed developed the potentiality to transcend the new world's conditioning and live a truly authentic life:

'...Well, I gave them that as an example, and they reported me to the

Principle.'

'I'm not surprised,' said Bernard. 'It's flatly against all their sleep-teaching. Remember, they've had at least a quarter of a million warnings against solitude.'

'I know. But I thought I'd like to see what the effect would be.'

'Well, you've seen it now.' (149)

In the new world, except Bernard, apparently Helmholtz can find no one to appreciate his new experience and his attempt to create new art. With his acquaintance of John the Savage, however, his range of experience seems to widen. The Savage can not only appreciate his art but also requites him with a poem of Shakespeare 'Phoenix and Turtle', in the content of which Helmholtz seems to find sympathy and consensus. Though not able to appreciate Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, he does perceive that to appreciate Shakespeare, one really needs such experiences that are not to be found in the new world:

'And yet,' said Helmholtz... 'I know quite well that one needs ridiculous, mad situations like that; one can't write really well about anything else. Why was that old fellow such a marvelous propaganda technician? Because he had so many insane, excruciating things to get excited about. You have got to be hurt and upset; otherwise you can't think of the really good, penetrating, X-rayish phrases. ...' (151-2)

Thus, with this idea of his, it is understandable that he is later willing to be exiled from the new world and experience new experiences. As a devoted artist, he actually reaches authenticity with both his willingness to help John the Savage in his aborted revolution, and his courage and desire to embrace sufferings to create better art. To him, the new world is imperfect with its limited freedom for artistic creation. With a true devotion to beauty, he willingly forsakes the new world to

experience the unknown even if such a choice implies accepting the possibility of enduring what is insufferable. “I should like a thoroughly bad climate,” he answers Mustapha Mond laconically when asked where he’d choose for his exile. “I believe one would write better if the climate is bad. If there were a lot of wind and storms, for example....” (187-8). Explicating Heidegger’s authenticity, Charles Guignon asserts:

Authenticity is a matter of living in such a way that your life has cumulateness, purposiveness, and wholeheartedness. By achieving “a sober understanding of what are factually the basic possibilities for Dasein,” you can focus on what is truly worth pursuing in your life. Only through such a decisive appropriation of possibilities does Dasein first become “individuated” and so a true “Self.” (130)

As a matter of fact, such definitive characteristics of authenticity as “purposiveness, wholeheartedness and cumulateness” are all essentially characteristic of Helmholtz’s character and choice. Concerning Helmholtz’s character, Krishan Kumar asserts that “from the first time that we encounter Helmholtz to his final departure for the island, he remains frozen in his development” (279). And he also maintains that “Huxley shows us little meaning or significance in his revolt” (279). Besides, Stephen Jay Greenblatt also contends that “Watson is apparently introduced into the novel only to point out the decline of art into ‘emotional engineering’ and the impossibility of free expression in the new world” (43). Yet, here I contend that in the novel, he indeed develops into a true individual with a definite direction for his life. In contrast to Bernard who, for all his discontent with the new world, cowardly begs for his stay, Helmholtz may symbolize the awakened dignified humans willing to lead a truly authentic life. As Donald Watt points out, in Helmholtz Watson, Huxley presents “a vague adumbration of a hero”

(80).

Formerly, in discussing the hypnopædic slogan that “Everyone belongs to everyone else,” I asserted that it totally denies the new world inhabitants the possibility to love and to be loved. But in the novel, with their continual relationship to John the Savage, both Linda and Lenina do break through their conditioning and develop such a possibility. Let’s look at Linda first. As a Brave New Worlder, Linda gradually matures into a responsible mother with her care of John the Savage. Deserted by the Director in the Indian reservation, Linda is totally rejected by the Indian society because of her promiscuity. With her former hypnopædic conditioning, she can neither see the reason for her rejection nor at first accept her new identity as a mother. Actually, suffering insult and rejection from the Indian women’s society because of her promiscuity, she vents her frustration and anger on John, slapping him and calling him “little idiot.” “Turned into a savage,” she shouts and complains to him, “Having young ones like an animal.... If it had not been for you, I might have gone to the Inspector, I might have got away. But not with a baby. That would have been too shameful” (104). But after this fit of anger, against her conditioning, she shows him great affection:

He saw that she was going to hit her again, and lifted his arm to guard his face. ‘Oh, don’t Linda, please don’t.’

‘Little beast!’ she pulled down his arm; his face was uncovered.

‘Don’t Linda.’ He shut his eyes, expecting the blow.

But she didn’t hit him. After a little time, he opened his eyes again and saw that she was looking at him. He tried to smile at her. Suddenly she put her arms round him and kissed him again and again. (104)

From the above quotation, the reader can see that there occurs a dramatic turn in Linda’s attitude to John, from repulsive abhorrence to uncontrollable affection. It

seems that with her kissing and embracing John, the natural human maternal instinct in Linda does revive and conquer her imposed conditioning. With the revival of such an instinct, Linda is able to take the responsibility for John's education. She tries to teach him to read and tells him everything she knows about the new world. Later, to provide John more reading material, she also procures from Pope *The Complete Works of William Shakespeare*. Besides, she tenderly teaches him to sing many songs and often lulls him to sleep by singing. In the natural environment of the Indian reservation, with her child John, it seems she does grow into a loving, responsible mother.

As for Lenina, formerly in discussing her relationship with Bernard, I assert that with her non-brave-new-world penchant, she does have the potentiality to develop her character. As a matter of fact, before dating Bernard, Lenina has already maintained a four-month affair with Henry Foster, and this sexual relationship, according to the new world social norms, is rather atypical and arouses her friend Fanny Crown's disapproving astonishment. Cautioning her against the Director's displeasure, she tells her, "I really do think you ought to be more careful. It's such horribly bad form to go on and on like this with one man...And you know how strongly the D.H.C. objects to anything intense or long-drawn" (32). But facing Fanny's disapproval of her long affair with Henry Foster, Lenina reveals her thoughts and doubts about the new world's social norm of promiscuity: "No, there hasn't been anyone else...And I jolly well don't see why there should have been" and "Somehow, I hadn't been feeling very keen on promiscuity lately. There are times when one doesn't" (32-34). In a gesture of compromise, however, she promises Fanny that she will be doing what society asks of her: "Yes, everyone belongs to everyone else...You are quite right, Fanny. As usual. I'll make the effort" (34). Subconsciously, it thus appears she harbors a

certain discontent with the new world's social practice of promiscuity.

With her gradual acquaintance with John the Savage, Lenina seems to gain a certain extent of emotional growth with her knowledge of what she really loves and her courage to express and get her love. In her encounter with the Savage, she feels the experience of passionate love: "Her cheeks were flushed, her eyes dewily bright, her breath came deeply. She caught hold of the Savage's arm and pressed it, limp against her side" (138). Suffering the Savage's slight and rejection together with others who come to see him, she feels melancholic: "Pale, her blue eyes clouded with an unwonted melancholy, she sat in a corner, cut off from those who surrounded her by an emotion which they did not share" (142). She feels "wholly insensible of the honor done to her" by the Arch-Community Songster and, as is rather atypical of her usual ways, lingers "for a moment to look at the moon." It seems that with her passionate love growing in her, she becomes more and more like "an individual." Finally, she confesses to Fanny her love for the Savage:

'But he's the one I want.'

'As though there weren't millions of other men in the world.'

'But I don't want them.'

'How can you know till you've tried?'

'I have tried.' (154)

This confession of love is in fact unorthodox in the new world. But it is a sign of her maturation into a true individual. Concerning her characterization, Robert S. Baker asserts that she is a "genetically designed commodity for erotic consumption" (101). Besides, Jenni Calder also maintains that Lenina's "most useful function is to demonstrate the female sex role in the stability system" (27). And Stephen Jay Greenblatt also contends that "the ability to experience passion lies dormant within Lenina, but she has been trained to experience only mechanical, 'rational' responses

and does not have the imagination to transcend them” (43). Yet, from the discussions above, one can see that the relationship with John the Savage does allow her to experience passionate love, and with this experience she does more or less break her imposed conditioning. Indeed, as Krishan Kumar suggests, “any further progression in her attachment to the Savage could very well lead to trouble and even exile for her” since “such demonstrations of feeling for one person are in the highest degree subversive” (287). As a matter of fact, were it not for the Savage’s violent repudiation of her and his subsequent suicide, it is quite possible that she would have willingly forsaken the new world and followed him to lead a genuinely authentic life. With her courage to look for her true love, she actually comes to gain a certain awareness of what genuine love means. And this awareness, in fact, brings about her growth into a true individual like Helmholtz Watson.

Finally, we come to discuss the character of John the Savage. Concerning the importance of the role the Savage plays in the novel, Robert S. Baker maintains that “Bernard’s expedition to the Mexico Reservation is an uncomprehending journey into the cultural past that culminates not in a deeper apprehension of who and what he is, but rather in his displacement by the ostensibly more authentic voice of the Savage” (105). Besides, Krishan Kumar also asserts that “the Savage, who in the second half of the book increasingly takes over from Bernard and Helmholtz the role of principle critic of the society, is an import, a force of opposition artificially thrust into the structure” and that thus “Huxley seems concerned to stress that the most serious resistance to Brave New World will never come from within but, if at all, only from without” (285). Obviously, in the second half of the novel, the very character of the Savage becomes the focus of the novel. Through the Savage’s rebellious words and actions, Huxley conveys his criticism of the dystopia.

For the Savage to serve as a more forceful critic of the new world society than

both Helmholtz and Bernard, there are at least two reasons. First, born outside the new world society, the Savage is actually immune from the state-imposed brainwashing nurture and is thus more open to such experiences that a typical Brave New Worlder can never experience. As contrasted with the new world, the Indian reservation is a natural environment in which governmental dominance and conditioning does not exist. In this environment, the Savage actually undergoes such experiences as both Bernard and Helmholtz can never imagine or realize. For example, he experiences Linda's maternal love, a love that Bernard as a Brave New Worlder once regrets of missing. In the Indian reservation, he also suffers from his unrequited love for Kiakime and learns the sacredness of matrimony: "Old Mitsima's words repeated themselves in his mind. Finished, finished...In silence and from a long way off, but violently, desperately, hopelessly, he had loved Kiakime. And now it was finished" (112). And this experience of his can never be understood by Helmholtz who fails to appreciate such passionate love as found in *Romeo and Juliet*. Finally, in his loneliness and isolation from the Indian children's ostracism, he has discovered time, death, and God: "At the edge of the precipice he sat down...he looked down into the black shadow of the mesa, into the black shadow of death...From the cut on his wrist the blood was still oozing....Drop, drop, drop. Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow....he had discovered time and death and God" (113). And such an experience can never be imagined by people in the Fordian society where time, death and God do not actually exist or mean anything. Thus, with such non-brave-new-world experiences, together with his reading of Shakespeare which offers him an immense knowledge of what it means to be human, he is indeed furnished with a richer perspective than the two rebellious figures.

Comparing the difference of character between Bernard and the Savage, Robert

S. Baker asserts that “Bernard is the new romantic struggling to transcend collectivist and technological values,” while “intent upon a life of individual self-expression and freedom, the Savage, a product of a society mired in superstition and ignorance, is a lover of art and Shakespeare and functions thematically as the representative of Huxley’s old romantic liberalism” (106). Here, as judged from my discussions above, it is apparent that the Savage is not just “a product of a society mired in superstition and ignorance.” Besides, nor is the Indian reservation simply a place of ignorance and superstition since it still preserves the old spiritual values. Concerning the Savage’s character, except for his assimilation of the Indian and Christian value of the sacredness of matrimony and his intuitive grasp of time, death and God, there is one characteristic which is worth mentioning; that is, his Christ-like spirit, his willingness to offer himself as a sacrifice for the salvation of mankind. And this noble spiritual value as the Savage assimilates from his life is still a heritage of the old past that the Indian reservation preserves. In their first acquaintance at the village religious ritual, he confesses to Bernard and Lenina his willingness to suffer for the welfare of the village: “For the sake of the pueblo--to make the rain come and the corn grow. And to please Pookong and Jesus. And then to show that I can bear pain without crying out” (96). Besides, to taste the agony of Jesus on the cross, he imitates his crucifixion: “I wanted to know what it was like being crucified. Hanging there in the sun...” (113). It may be that he does not know the true meaning of Christ’s crucifixion but from his willingness to suffer for the welfare of the village, he does indeed possess the spirit of Christ. And this spirit of him is exerted fully in his undaunted act of revolution in the new world:

‘But do you like being slaves?’ the Savage was saying as they entered the Hospital. His face was flushed, his eyes bright with ardor and indignation. ‘Do you like being babies? Yes, babies. Mewling and

puking,' he added, exasperated by their bestial stupidity into throwing insults at those he had come to save....Grief and remorse, compassion and duty--all were forgotten now and as it were, absorbed into an intense overpowering hatred of these less than human monsters. 'Don't you want to be free and men? Don't you even understand what manhood and freedom are?' ... 'Very well, then,' he went on grimly. 'I'll teach you; I'll make you be free whether you want to or not.' (174)

The Savage's revolutionary act in the Hospital is in fact instigated by his indignation at the new world's inhuman attitude to death. To him, the children that surround Linda's death-bed clearly indicate the new world regime's deliberate prevention of its inhabitants from forming an individual understanding of the significance of death by distracting them from a direct confrontation with it. In a moment of understanding, the Savage perceives that because of her allowance of *soma* and other distractions to enslave her free spirit, Linda, like all new world citizens, lives in a condition of total enslavement and dies in a total ignorance of death. And this blindness to the reality and significance of death is what actually prevents the new world citizens from living a life of authenticity. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger maintains:

Death is Dasein's *ownmost* possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its *ownmost* potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue. Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has wrenched away from the "they." This means that in anticipation any Dasein can have wrenched itself away from the "they" already. But when one understands that this is something which Dasein 'can' have done, this only reveals its factual lostness in the everydayness of the they-self. (307)

As Charles Guignon asserts, “confronting death can lead you to see the weightiness of your own existence” and “to take a stand on your own death, then, is to live in such a way that, in each of your actions, you express a lucid understanding of where your life is going--of how things are adding up as a whole” (130). It is by lack of this attitude to death that the new world citizens live a life of fallen-ness and enslavement. In the scene of the children’s surrounding Linda’s deathbed, Huxley portrays the new world’s horrible disrespect to death:

Twin after twin, twin after twin, they came—a nightmare. Their faces, their repeated face—for there was only one between the lot of them--puggishly stared, all nostrils and pale goggling eyes. Their uniform was khaki. All their mouths hung open. Squealing and chattering they entered. In a moment, it seemed, the ward was maggoty with them. They swarmed between the beds, clambered over, crawled under, peeped into the television boxes, made faces at the patients. (166)

In “Brave New World and the flight from God,” John Attarian asserts that these visiting children are the personification of this unawareness to death and God which the very experience of others’ death may bring one to the thought of (336). Here, it seems Huxley also presages the terrifying image of humanity that this unawareness and deliberate disrespect to the significance of death may reduce humanity to; that is, humans may degenerate to the debased state of the worm, losing its God-like image, its individuality and inborn dignity.

In his transference of love from the deceased Linda to her living fellowmen and in a spirit of devotion to their salvation, the Savage sees his responsibility for their spiritual liberation: “Linda had been a slave, Linda had died; others should live in freedom, and the world be made beautiful. A reparation, a duty. And suddenly it was luminously clear to the Savage what he must do; it was as though a shutter

had been opened, a curtain drawn back” (173). “Don’t take that horrible stuff. It’s poison, it’s poison,” he says to the uncomprehending crowd. “Poison to soul as well as body” (173). In Sartre’s terms, these words of the Savage indicate his choosing for mankind. By this choosing, he indeed creates an image of man. For by his following significant gesture of throwing away the tablets of *soma* and announcing the coming of the freedom of men, the Savage is in fact calling for an awakening from a life of fallen-ness or enslavement. In truth, this act of him much resembles Christ’s entering the Temple of Jerusalem and driving out all those who are buying and selling there, since like Him, the Savage is also asking for a spiritual regeneration: “‘Free, free!’ the Savage shouted, and with one hand continued to throw the *soma* into the area while, with the other, he punched the indistinguishable faces of his assailants” (175). In Heidegger’s terms, this is the moment of Dasein’s being “resolute.” In such a condition of resolution, Dasein is not detached from its world. Instead, “Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates” (*BT* 344). In other words, being in itself free, this resolute Dasein helps others to free themselves. When Dasein is resolute, it thus becomes the ‘conscience’ of the others. In his act of revolution, the Savage indeed becomes the ‘conscience’ of the new world society.

Following this aborted revolution comes the dialogue between the Savage and Mustapha Mond, one of the ten World Controllers of the Fordian state. As Jenni Calder asserts, ‘unlike the other characters, the Controller is aware of what has been lost’ (33). Indeed, having a panoramic knowledge of both the spiritual heritage of the past and the present social order, Mond is possessed with sufficient perspectives to justify to his opponent his idea why the Fordian society should be constructed the

way it is now. In his converse with the Savage, he presents himself as a selfless defender of the present social order and the guardian for its well-functioning. Actually, his debate with the Savage resembles the Grand Inquisitor scene in Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*. In Dostoevsky's novel, the Inquisitor admits the existence of a transcendent God yet denies people the freedom of taking free choices and assuming responsibilities for themselves in the belief that humans are by nature weak facing such a great burden of freedom. In his disbelief, he says to the reincarnated Christ, "I swear, man is weaker and baser by nature than Thou hast believed in Him! Can he, can he do what Thou didst?" (256) To achieve the universal happiness of men, he thus replaces Christ's freedom of choice with three powers that can hold captive their consciences: miracle, mystery and authority: "We have corrected Thy work and founded it upon miracle, mystery and authority" (257). To him, Christ's reappearance will only destroy the present happiness of men as achieved by the Church's adoption of the three powers. He thus decides to put Christ to death. As he considers, by taking the role of a new savior, he is unhappy for keeping the secret of freedom from his people: "For only we, we who guard the mystery, shall be unhappy. There will be thousands of millions of happy babes, and a hundred thousand sufferers who have taken the curse of the knowledge of good and evil" (259). In *Brave New World*, like the Inquisitor, Mond also denies the new world citizens the freedom of taking choices and assuming responsibilities for themselves and instead offers material satisfaction for the universal happiness of men. As James Sexton points out, the Grand Inquisitor's materialist vision of man is congruent with that of Henry Ford, whose *My Life and Work* is the bible of *Brave New World*" (88). Deducing his idea of human nature as quarrelsome, competitive, aggressive and selfish from the "Cyprus experiment," instead of mystery, miracle and authority, Mond offers soma, promiscuity, and conditioning for the universal

happiness of men. He says:

‘...you are so conditioned that you can’t help doing what you ought to do. And what you ought to do is on the whole so pleasant, so many of the natural impulses are allowed free play, that there aren’t any temptations to resist. And if ever, by some unlucky chance, anything unpleasant should somehow happen, why, there is always *soma* to give you a holiday from the facts. (195).

As he tells the Savage, he does believe in the existence of a transcendent God. Yet, he considers that God is incompatible with the Fordian society: “God isn’t compatible with machinery and scientific medicine and universal happiness” (192). Thus, any scientific theory that may awaken an interest beyond the present and so disrupt the process of production and consumption is considered heretic and therefore has to be suppressed. As John Attarian points out, “preventing awareness of God motivates Mond’s suppression of ‘A New Theory of Biology,’ which addresses ‘the conception of purpose as heretical and...dangerous and potentially disruptive’” (335). Mond muses:

...once you began admitting explanations in terms of purpose—well, you didn’t know what the result might be. It...might make intelligent people lose their faith in happiness as the Sovereign good and take to believing, instead, that the goal was somewhere beyond, somewhere outside the present human sphere; that the purpose of life was not the maintenance of well-being, but some intensification and refining of consciousness, some enlargement of knowledge. (145)

Indeed, Mond’s motivation to suppress this scientific theory, and exile its author from the new world resembles that of the Inquisitor’s in his plan to put to death the reincarnated Christ. For both of them harbor a fear of their opponent’s disturbance

of the established order. Like the Inquisitor who feels unhappiness for withholding the knowledge of good and evil, Mond performs his mission with a certain degree of regret in his heart. For like the scientist, he has also developed an interest in pure science in the past. Yet, in his early age, he is forced to make a choice between exile and taking the role as World Controller. He chooses the latter not without regret in his heart. "Sometimes," he tells his listeners, "I rather regret the science. Happiness is a harder master—particularly other people's happiness" (186). Like the Inquisitor, he indeed takes the role of a new savior. But this savior, like the Inquisitor, is essentially an anti-existentialist for by denying others the freedom of taking choices and assuming responsibilities for themselves, Mond is indeed denying the new world citizens the possibility of living a truly authentic life.

As for the Savage, his argument with Mond centers on the belief in God which, as he considers, originates all humanistic values and noble deeds. In his defense, he says to the Controller: "But God's the reason for everything noble and fine and heroic" and "If you allow yourselves to think of God, you wouldn't allow yourselves to be degraded by pleasant vices. You'd have a reason for bearing things patiently, for doing things with courage" (197). Clearly, his faith in God resembles that of Christ's in his rejection of the Devil's three offers which the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky's novel accepts for the universal happiness of the human race. "...Thou wouldst not enslave man by a miracle, and didst crave faith given freely, not based on miracle. Thou didst crave for free love and not the base raptures of the slave before the might that has overawed him for ever," the Grand Inquisitor thus says to the reincarnated Christ (256). Indeed, for both Christ and the Savage, true faith consists in the unconditional faith in God and His ways, which demands the absolute self-discipline of the believer. And it is this faith in God which excuses both the Savage's rejection of Mond's offer for his conversion to the new world's

ideal of happiness and his act of leaving the populated London to create a world of his own. In the face of Mond's defense, the Savage says: "But I don't want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want sin" (197). Again, in Sartre's terms, with these words, the Savage is making a choice for mankind. By this choice, he rejects Mond's ideal of happiness and asks for a truly authentic human life in which the individual accepts all the possible sufferings in his quest for a meaningful life. But it seems that like the Grand Inquisitor who refutes Christ's true religious faith, Mond refuses the Savage's choice for the human race. To him, whether the Savage will finally convert to the values of the new world remains a scientific interest. Unlike both Bernard and Helmholtz who are exiled from the new world, the Savage is thus made to stay to serve as an "experiment."

The Savage's subsequent act of leaving London to live in seclusion is in fact motivated by his quest for God: "It was to escape further contamination by the filth of civilized life; it was to be purified and made good; it was actively to make amends" (203). In his seclusion, he repents to God his lust for Lenina by practicing self-flagellation. But it seems that despite his effort to repent, he can not conquer his desire for Lenina. For actually, in his self-punishment, he keeps on thinking of her lascivious beauty and thus his act of self-punishment is rather an expression of his sexual frustration and anger at his weakness:

'Strumpet! Strumpet!' he shouted at every blow as though it were Lenina (and how frantically, without knowing it, he wished it were!), white, warm, scented, infamous Lenina that he was flogging thus. "Strumpet!" and then, in a voice of despair, 'Oh, Linda forgive me. Forgive me, God. I'm bad. I'm wicked. I'm...No, no, you strumpet, you strumpet!' (207)

To the Brave New Worlders, this act of inflicting pain on oneself can be nothing but

“fun.” Without seeking to understand the true meaning of the Savage’s act of self-punishment, just as what they did in London, they swarm to him out of thoughtless curiosity. And this act of them is in fact an indication of their fallen-ness and spiritual death. As Heidegger says, “when curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but *just* in order to see” and “curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein--a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself” (BT 216-7). The Savage, in his anger, at first tries to drive them away, but with the coming of Lenina to see him, he lashes out at her as a symbol of sin and punishes himself for his weakness. But finally he gives in to his desire for her and in an orgy-porgian climax, they consummate their love. Waking up the next day and recalling what has happened, the Savage seems to see that with his sexual aberration, he has betrayed his belief that he holds so dear. Besides, as he may think, his joining the orgy-porgy ritual of the Brave New Worlders seems a sign of his conversion to their values. In deep repentance, he therefore kills himself. As John Attarian observes, “his last words are a remorseful ‘Oh, my God, my God’-his last act an atonement-by-suicide, on which, fittingly, the novel ends” (337). Actually, the Savage’s suicide seems to be the most powerful scene of the novel, for it is an act of will, a way of protest and also a sign of his repentance—all of these being qualities that do not exist in the new world. Besides, his suicide may also serve as his quest for the transcendent God. In “Aldous Huxley’s Quest for Values: a Study in Religious Syncretism,” Milton Birbaum sees that “in *Brave New World*, Huxley is more against the tendency of the world to drift into a technological ‘utopia’ than he is for mysticism; but in this book, also, we detect unmistakable signs of his eventual conversion to mysticism” (56). In “Aldous Huxley’s

Philosophy,” Ronald Hope also asserts that “Granted the underlying unity in all things, Huxley argued that it was possible for human beings to love, know and become identified with the Godhead, to become one with God, and to achieve this identity with God is the purpose and end of the human life” (102-103). A fervent believer of the existence of the soul, the Savage may not kill himself out of despair. “The Savage shows surprisingly little astonishment at, or awe of civilized inventions...partly on his interest being focused on what he calls “the soul,” which he persists as regarding as an entity independent of the physical environment,” Bernard thus writes to Mond (129). Thus, the Savage’s last word “Oh, my God, my God” may also resemble Christ’s last words on the cross: “Father! In your hands I place my spirit” (Luke 23.44-45). It seems by his suicide he regains his independence from the values of the new world and “brings to the people of the brave new world something of the quality of ‘the way’ to salvation (King 52). Through his death, Huxley criticizes the inhumanity of the new world. As Almeda King rightly observes, the death of the Savage is “both heroic and futile: he has established his humanity in a world that cannot understand what it has witnessed in his death” for “it is a world without tears and therefore, it is a world without humanity” (52).

As a conclusion to this chapter, one can see that the dominance of the World State on its citizens through science and technology seems almost complete and invincible. Through this dominance, humanity suffers such a great twist and sacrifice that the individual authentic life seems to lose its possibility. Commenting on the shallow happiness of the new world, Jenni Calder asserts:

Where would poetry and painting be without love and death? It is not a simplistic equation, suffering equals the production of great art, but a question of the value of experience, and the value of life without

experience. Even the happiness that the Controller claims as the great achievement can have no intensity. To imagine human nature flourishing in this bland and sterile context is impossible. (33)

In the novel, by the rebellious quest for a “non-Brave New World happiness” of such characters as Bernard, Lenina, Linda, Helmholtz and the Savage, Huxley suggests what it means for humans to lead a life of authenticity; that is, the true authentic human life means to accept our humanity together with all its possibilities. Through Bernard, we see the value of being happy in one’s own way. Through Linda and Lenina, we see and learn to treasure our ability to love. And through Helmholtz, we see the value of our quest for true artistic beauty. Finally through the Savage, we learn the value of our quest for the eternal truth which is the base of our earthly life. Indeed, the true authentic human life means the quest for love, beauty and truth.

Chapter Four

Nineteen Eighty-Four: The Fight for an Authentic Life

In Chapter II, I elaborated the various ways of dominance as devised by the Inner Party in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* for the purpose of staying in power. And in Chapter I, I introduce the existentialism of both Heidegger and Sartre. In this chapter, my focus will be on how their theories can be applied in the interpretation of Orwell's novel. In this chapter, my focus will be on Orwell's assertion of the intrinsic value of the individual authentic life over the collective inauthentic life in his novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. For the discussion of this thesis, my argument is divided into three parts. The first part concerns the protagonist's observation of the people of Oceania in a general state of poverty and ignorance. In the second part, my discussion focuses on the protagonist Winston Smith: on his determination to live a life of authenticity, and to fight for the salvation of mankind from this state of "fallen-ness." In the third part, the focus is on his relationship with O'Brien, which leads to the destruction of his individuality and "authenticity."

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, what may deeply impress the reader is the protagonist Winston Smith's fight for the authentic existence of the individual. As the reader may see, his fight is heroic in the sense that his purpose is not just that of gaining a meaningful personal life but the very survival of humanity in a world "gone mad." Concerning the character of the protagonist, Raymond Williams maintains that "Winston Smith is not like a man at all--in consciousness, in relationships, in the capacity for love and protection and endurance and loyalty" and "he is the last of the cut down figures--less experienced, less intelligent, less

loyal, less courageous than his creator through whom rejection and defeat can be mediated” (82). Yet one must know that from the beginning to the end of the novel, the reader is invited to identify to a certain extent with the protagonist himself. In fact, Orwell’s original title for the novel is *The Last Man in Europe* and as Kathleen Fitzpatrick asserts, “in comparison to the totalitarian regime which destroys him, Winston is, in fact, the last embodiment of the human” (245). Besides, Orwell may indeed suggest the protagonist’s common humanity by naming his protagonist “Winston Smith.” As Marie Rose Napierkowski and Deborah A. Stanley assert, “Orwell named his central character Winston Smith after Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of England during World War II” and “he also gave him the most common British last name, Smith” (238). As we know, Winston Churchill was the heroic figure who led England against Hitler’s invasion during World War II. In the novel, Winston Smith also fights against the totalitarian rule of Ingsoc. Though his fight is unsuccessful and even foolhardy, nevertheless it represents the dignity of common humanity under great stress and wins the reader’s approval and sympathy.

Throughout the novel, from the very beginning to the end, Orwell actually focuses the reader’s attention on the protagonist alone. As pointed out by Roger Fowler, “everything that Orwell wants to say about totalitarianism is communicated through the sensations and thoughts of Winston Smith, without any authorial commentary” and although “there is an ‘omniscient narrator’ who knows everything about Winston, “there is no claim to know *more* than Winston could have known” (186-7). Actually, in the process of reading the novel, the reader is allowed to see the protagonist’s innermost thoughts, his love, his hate, his fear, his remorse, his memories, his dreams and hallucinations. Thus, entering the inner world of the protagonist, the reader seems to experience personally what Winston

experiences. As Lynette Hunter maintains, “an index to the reader’s identification with Winston is our hope for his success, and regret and frustration at his failure” (202). Therefore, the protagonist’s fight and final failure inevitably arouses our pity and fear. Orwell’s warning for the reader against the danger of totalitarianism can therefore fully take effect. Commenting on the moral influence that Orwell’s novel can have on its readers, Patrick Reilly asserts that despite its depiction of the destruction of the last man alive, the novel paradoxically “continues to fight for man” (63). Even in the pit of its pessimism, it is summoning the reader to “a struggle that is not yet lost” (63). That is, though Winston is doomed, and man within him, yet “we are not yet Winston” and “it is we, here and now, who will decide that outcome” (63). Thus, it is indeed through the very experiences of the protagonist under the totalitarian rule of Ingsoc that we readers understand the horror and true nature of totalitarianism and can therefore seek to avoid it. As John David Frodsham points out, Orwell’s method in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is to “make the tragedy of totalitarianism comprehensible” by reducing “the scale of the drama” and “demonstrate, through the crushing of one man, the extinction of millions” and “to make of Winston Smith and Julia an Everyman and Everywoman; to shadow forth through their destruction by the state the annihilation of so many anonymous others” (141). The protagonist’s every psychological process, his sufferings and struggles can then offer us knowledge and strength for the better guidance of the authentic life we should lead and treasure. In “Selfhood, Language, and Reality: George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*,” Lillian Feder sees that the novels’ “continuous prophetic meaning lies in its revelation of the individual’s biological and psychological resistance to its own adaptation to political and social constraints” (47). Actually, the focus of the novel is on “the struggle over unconscious and

conscious mental processes between a solitary man and the united forces of international oppression” (47). Thus, it is indeed through entering the inner world of the protagonist that we can fully grasp the significances of the novel. In the novel, through the very experiences of Winston, the depiction of the society under totalitarian rule, its social and political life, and the traumas and terrors that totalitarianism can work on the individual are rendered in all its explicitness. And it is from the protagonist’s reactions to his experiences that the reader can see very clearly his character and Orwell’s ideas of authenticity.

In the first part of the novel, through the very eyes of the protagonist the reader sees several aspects of the society under the totalitarian rule of Ingsoc. First we see that Oceania is kept in a state of poverty and deprivation. Under the totalitarian rule of Ingsoc, London, the third most populous of the provinces of Oceania, become a desolate place. Looking from where he lives at the vista of the city and wondering if it had always been like this since his childhood, Winston thinks to himself:

Were there always these vistas of rotting nineteenth-century houses, their sides shored up with balks of timber, their windows patched with cardboard and their roofs with corrugated iron, their crazy garden walls sagging in all directions? And the bombed sites where the plaster dust swirled in the air and the willow herb straggled over the heaps of rubble; and the places where the bombs had cleared a larger patch and there had sprung up sordid colonies of wooden dwellings like chicken houses? But it was no use, he could not remember.... (3)

As Roger Fowler points out, “ the deprivations and discomforts of urban England in the late 1940s appeared to be the result of the damage to the economy and to manpower exacted by six years of war; but Orwell blames these same conditions,

occurring in the fictional year 1984, on the cynicism and self-interest of a totalitarian regime” (196). Indeed, as I have pointed out in the second chapter, the Inner party deliberately wages wars against its own people to keep them in a state of deprivation in the belief that power is based on the “poverty and ignorance” of the people.

Second, people are kept in a general state of ignorance by the deliberate manipulation of Ingsoc on all public means of communication and information, such as broadcasting and journalism. And as means of brainwashing, forging the content of history, and reforming language itself are taken advantage of by the Party. Through these ways of manipulation, the people of Oceania are kept in a state of “fallen-ness.” That is, “Dasein as Dasein is generally occupied with its daily inauthentic events” (Carter 121). In this condition of being, “man, having already transformed from a being-for-itself, lives, as a for-others, in a permanent condition of flux: he will be what he is instructed to be” (Carter 197). In other words, people have lost their power of true understanding and knowledge.

To look at broadcasting and journalism first, each day the citizens of Oceania are bombarded with all kinds of false news of increasing economic output. This kind of false news is aimed to create a false impression that life is getting better in the country and so to justify the rule of the Party, as the following quotation may serve to indicate:

“Comrades,” cried an eager young voice. “Attention, comrades! We have glorious news for you. We have won the battle for production! Returns now completed the output of all classes of consumption goods show that the standard of living has risen by no less than twenty percent over the past year. All over Oceania this morning there were irrepressible spontaneous demonstrations when workers marched out of factories and offices and

paraded through the streets with banners voicing their gratitude to Big Brother for the new, happy life which his wise leadership has bestowed on us. ” (27)

Yet Winston clearly knows that this kind of news is false as he compares what is reported to his own life condition: “Always in your stomach and in your skin there was a sort of protest, a feeling that you had been cheated of something that you had a right to. [...] In any time you could accurately remember, there had never been quite enough to eat” (27). Under Winston’s observation, his colleagues are living in the condition of “fallen-ness” for they seem to be easily manipulated by such false news that smacks of “idle talk”:

Parsons swallowed it easily, with the stupidity of an animal. The eyeless creature at the other table swallowed it fanatically, passionately, with a furious desire to track down, denounce and vaporize anyone who should suggest that last week the ration had been thirty grams. Syme, too--in some more complex way, involving double-think--Syme swallowed it. Was he, then, *alone* in the possession of a memory? (27)

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines idle talk as “the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own” (213). As I have noted in the introduction, people in the state of fallen-ness never take the burden of discovering the truth since to them “what is said is always understood proximally as ‘saying’ something—that is, an uncovering something” (BT213). In the novel, in his description, Winston especially mentions an “eyeless” person who “swallows” this news “fanatically” and “passionately.” It seems that through this person he suggests the “blindness” of the citizens of Oceania who have allowed themselves to be deceived by what is groundlessly said. To them things are so because “Big Brother” or “the Party” says so. Unlike Winston, they never compare

what is reported with what they themselves do experience and know. And if they do sense something amiss, like Syme, they apply “doublethink” to deceive themselves.

Beside being “blind” to their everyday realities and completely “receptive” of whatever the broadcasting tells them, the reader can also see that the citizens of Oceania are actually living in the state of fallen-ness from their reactions to the war propaganda. Before the “Hate Week,” there appeared all over London a new poster of the monstrous figure of a Eurasian soldier with the muzzle of his gun “pointed straight at you” (66). This poster aroused the patriotic sentiments of the people: “The proles, normally apathetic about the war, were being lashed into one of their periodic frenzies of patriotism” (66). At this time, “as though to harmonize with the general mood, the rocket bombs had been killing larger numbers of people than usual” (66). During the “Hate Week,” what is absurd is that the crowd does not seem to be much effected by the news that Oceania is actually not at war with Eurasia but with Eastasia: “The Hate continued exactly as before, except that the target had been changed” (80). Winston observes that in his speech, the speaker did not change his manner or attitude: “Nothing altered in his voice or manner, or in the content of what he is saying, but suddenly the names were different” (80). The whole event of mistaking Eurasia as enemy instead of Eastasia is then attributed to the sabotage of Goldstein and his agents, the enemies of the country: “It was sabotage! The agents of Goldstein had been at work” (80). After the “Hate Week,” “it was known that the chiefs of the Department intended that within one week no reference to the war with Eurasia, or the alliance with Eastasia, should remain in existence anywhere” (80). Thus, the reader can see how easily the people are manipulated by the Party, how they accept everything the Party tells them without a single slice of doubt. In fact, as Julia suggests to Winston, there could be no war between Oceania and Eurasia. “Far more acute than Winston” and “far less susceptible to Party propaganda,” she startles

Winston with her idea that “the rocket bombs which fell daily on London were probably fired by the Government of Oceania itself, ‘just to keep people frightened’” (68). Thus, under the hands of the Oceania government, the people become victims of war and poverty. They never know that their true enemy is neither Eurasia nor Eastasia but the Party. Subjected to its false propaganda, they do not and can never know the hidden truth. They are kept in the state of fallen-ness without knowing it.

Besides taking advantage of propaganda and spreading all kinds of false news, the Party also seeks to reform language itself to achieve its ideal of the absolute domination of the people. And the result of this reformation will be Newspeak. As Alok Rai maintains, “Newspeak is one of the key instruments of political domination, the necessary means for the ‘totalitarian’ control of reality” and “translating itself into the very form of reality, until it is transparent and co-extensive with ‘reality,’ language, following Orwell’s insight, becomes, precisely because of its invisibility and its insidious, irresistible power, the focus of a terrible vulnerability” (127). Thus, Newspeak is a weapon against the people’s sense of individuality. From Winston’s dialogue with his colleague Syme, the reader can see the Party’s purpose for the creation of Newspeak: “Orthodoxy means not thinking--not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness” and “Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is Newspeak” (24-5). Obviously, through Newspeak, the Party seeks to annihilate people’s freedom of independent thinking and thus prevent them from forming a sense of self. Without a sense of self, the possibility of looking for an authentic life suffers annihilation. Commenting on the effect of Newspeak, Michael Carter asserts that Newspeak is the most dangerous threat that Ingsoc imposes because it is “existentially undermining” (200). As language both constitutes man’s humanness and is its revelation, without language man can never know himself. Thus, it is clear that through Newspeak, Ingsoc “obliterates mine-ness and sucks the self into the mode of

unconscious being-for, that is, into an in-itself helplessly maintaining its own subjugation” (200). As if to furnish an example of what Newspeak will bring about for people, Winston depicts a completely “soulless” man:

As he watched the eyeless face with the jaw moving rapidly up and down, Winston had a curious feeling that this was not a real human being but some kind of dummy. It was not the man’s brain that was speaking; it was his larynx. The stuff that was coming out of him consisted of words, but it was not speech in the true sense: it was a noise uttered in unconsciousness, like the quacking of a duck. (25)

In Winston’s description, this man has lost his ability of independent thinking and a sense of self. Not able to see reality with his own eyes and to think with his own brain, he is “eyeless” and actually “not a real human being but some kind of dummy” (25). Indeed, this man is dehumanized, a “Being-in-itself” in Sartre’s terms. Completely realizing the significance of Newspeak, Winston surmises that “Unquestionably Syme will be vaporized” (25). It seems apparent to him that although Syme helped to create Newspeak, he is “fully conscious” of his creating it. Thus he is still beyond the control of Newspeak because of his sense of individuality and his power of independent thinking. Therefore, strictly speaking, he is “unorthodox.” And to be unorthodox is to commit “thought crime,” and “*Thought crime,*” as Winston writes in his diary, “*does not entail death: thought crime IS death*” (14).

Concerning Newspeak, John Strachey asserts that “the substitution of ‘Newspeak’ for ‘Oldspeak’ (or present-day English) is designed to effect nothing less than the destruction of human reason by linguistic means” (56). By this destruction, it will be “impossible to express thoughts unwelcome to the authorities” (Strachey 56). Partly as a reaction to this attempt of the Party, Winston starts a diary. In his diary,

he states that “Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two makes four. If that is granted, all else follows” (37). Clearly, he asks for intellectual independence. Besides, as Lillian Feder points out, by starting a diary, Winston is “committing against the state of Oceania: the use of language in the act of self-creation” (47). With this diary, with his act of self-creation and independent thinking, he asserts his own existence as independent of the Party.

Finally, the party’s manipulation of the people also includes the deliberate twisting of the content of history. As I have noted in the second chapter, the purpose of this forging of documents is to facilitate the Party’s rule, as the Party’s slogan goes: “who controls the present controls the past” and “who controls the past controls the future” (16). Indeed, by this continual forging of historical and other documents, memories become unreliable, and the citizens will have no choice but to believe whatever the Party wishes them to believe. Working as an agent in The Ministry of Truth, Winston is responsible for rewriting the content of all histories and newspapers for the Party. In his mind, he refuses to go against his conscience to say what he can not believe is true. Once he notices a photograph which shows evidence of the Party’s twisting of a historical fact. He tells Julia this fact:

*I know, of course, that, the past is falsified, but it would never be possible to prove it, even when I did the falsification myself. After the thing is done, no evidence ever remains. The only evidence is inside my mind, and I don’t know with any certainty that the other human being shares my memories. Just in that one instance, in my whole life, I did possess actual concrete evidence *after* the event –years after it”*

“And what good was that?”

“It was no good, because I threw it away a few minutes later. But if the same thing happened today, I should keep it.” (69)

Apparently, Winston harbors the idea of raising a revolution against the Party. And indeed he does. He tells Julia that if he would have kept the photo, he might have shown it to anybody. And this “might have planted a few doubts here and there” (69). He is not sure what difference it will make in his life. But he imagines that maybe “little knots of resistance springing up here and there--small groups of people banding themselves together and gradually growing, and even leaving a few records behind, so that the next generation can carry on where we leave off” (69). Thus, he intends to raise an intellectual revolution, to wake his fellow countrymen from the state of fallen-ness and live a life of authenticity. And it is in this respect for the past, for the authentic existence of humans that Winston writes down in his diary his critique of the age and his hope for the future human race:

“To the future or to the past, to a time when thought is free, when men are different from one another and do not live alone--to a time when truth exists and what is done can not be undone:

From the age of uniformity, from the age of solitude, from the age of Big Brother, from the age of doublethink--greetings!”(13)

These words are Winston’s “manifesto of independence,” the announcement of his political ideas. Using an archaic pen and a notebook that date from before the Party and writing down his personal history, Winston expresses his spiritual identity with the past, with the time when man had an individual character, possessed the freedom of independent thought and respected truth instead of falsity.

Third, family relationship is also invaded by the Party. Through Winston’s encounter with his neighbor Mrs. Parsons, the general family condition and the relationship between parents and children are rendered explicit:

With those children, he thought, that wretched woman must lead a life of terror. Another year, two years, and they would be watching her day and

night for symptoms of unorthodoxy. [...] It was almost normal for people over thirty to be frightened of their children. And with good reason, for hardly a week passed in which the *Times* did not carry a paragraph describing how some eavesdropping little sneak--“child hero” was the phrase generally used--had overheard some compromising remark and denounced his parents to the Thought Police. (12)

Under Winston’s observation, Mrs. Parsons is “a colorless, crushed-looking woman, with wispy hair and a lined face” (10). It is apparent that she is overburdened by family chores and also suffering psychologically from the menaces from her children. Winston thinks that she may be denounced someday by her own children to the Thought Police. Indeed, he is right. For actually her husband is arrested because his daughter overhears him calling “Down with Big Brother” in a dream and then denounces him to the Thought Police. Thus, by continual training, the Party has successfully deprived the children of their humanity, turning them into monsters. With incessant political activities, the Party has brainwashed the children, turning them into vehicles for monitoring its citizens. Under this condition, the parents’ attitudes to their children can only be fear and distrust. They can only feel alienated from their children and dare not love them too much. For lack of their parents’ education and care, the children become wild and unruly. And such is the case with the children of the Parsons. In “The Big Truth in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*,” Robert Currie argues that ‘the novel ironically exemplifies healthy parenthood in the figure of Tom Parsons, who loves his daughter so much that he is even proud of her skill in betraying him’ (63). Here, I contend that Tom Parson is so foolish that he fails to see the inhumanity of his daughter in her betrayal of him. So brainwashed by the totalitarian regime, he can not even see his becoming its victim. Failing to see his subconscious desire to rebel against the totalitarian government, he remains an

ignorant father who wrongly educates his daughter and loves her from a twisted point of view.

Under the Party's rule, the traditional family virtues seem no more existent, as Winston comments:

It was one of those dreams, which, while retaining the characteristic dream scenery, are a continuation of one's intellectual life, and in which one becomes aware of facts and ideas which still seem new and valuable after one is awake. The thing that now suddenly struck Winston was that his mother's death, nearly thirty years ago, had been tragic and sorrowful in a way that was no longer possible. Tragedy, he perceived, belonged to the ancient time, to a time when there were still privacy, love and friendship, and when the members of a family stood by each other without needing to know the reason. (14)

As Winston thinks, his mother "had sacrificed herself to a conception of loyalty that was private and unalterable" (14). "Such things," Winston considers, "could not happen today" (14). As he firmly believes, his wife Katherine "would unquestionably have denounced him to the Thought Police if she had not happened to be too stupid to detect the unorthodoxy of his opinions" (59). Winston's dream of his mother, then, clearly indicates both his alienation and his desire to return to that old past when the members of a family can love each other unconditionally, without fear and scruple. It is a time of authenticity. There is no dissemblance, and no psychological distance between parents and children or between husband and wife. Like his mother, people stick to a conception that is "private and unalterable" and are willing to sacrifice themselves for it; that is, they do what they believe is right, without fear and without considering whether some "Big Brother" approves of it or not. That is the reason why Winston toasts to

O'Brien, saying "to the past" when they are together in his domicile for a plot against the Party:

He filled the glasses and raised his own glass by the stem. "What shall it be this time?" he said, still with the same faint suggestion of irony.

"To the confusion of the Thought Police? To the Death of Big Brother? To humanity? To the future?"

"To the past," said Winston.

"The past is more important," agreed O'Brien gravely. (78)

As Heidegger asserts, authentic living is to make choices under the certainty of death:

Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-being, Dasein discloses to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-Being means to be able to understand itself in the Being of the entity so revealed--namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's *ownmost* and uttermost potentiality for Being--that is to say the possibility of *authentic existence*. (BT 307)

As the above quotation indicates, as a human being, we live in the realm of possibilities, but since death ends all our possibilities, not everything is possible for us. Thus, as Charles Guignon maintains, to confront death can lead us to see the weightiness of our own existence (130). For death, as Michael Carter asserts, "focuses *specifically* on the question of what it means to be" (154). With such an understanding, we can then decide what shape our life will be taking. To take a stand on our own death, then, is to live in such a way that, in each of our actions,

we express a clear understanding of where our life is going--of how things are adding up as a whole (Guignon 130). "Facing death, we are able to see possibilities 'as possibilities,' something we choose, and we see our lives as something we are defining through our choices" (Guignon 130).

And in *Existentialism and Humanism*, Sartre also states that when one makes choices for oneself, he is indeed choosing "for all men" and also creating "an image of man such as he believes he ought to be" (4).

In joining the Brotherhood and trying to revive the past, Winston is indeed choosing for mankind. He sees the danger of death in this act yet embraces its very certainty:

He had moved from thoughts to words, and now from words to actions. The last step was something that would happen in the Ministry of Love. He had accepted it. The end was contained in the beginning. But it was frightening; or, more exactly, it was like the foretaste of death, like being a little less alive. He had the sensation of stepping into the dampness of a grave, and it was much better because he had always known the grave was there and waiting for him. (70-1)

Winston knows that he will be caught by the Thought Police and will suffer a miserable death at their hands. Yet he still chooses this fate in the belief that his fight may bring a bright future for mankind and his spirit will share in its glory. It is just as O'Brien says, "there is no possibility that any perceptible change will happen within our own lifetime. We are the dead. Our only true life is in the future. We shall take part in it as handfuls of dust and splinters of bone" (78). Thus, his choice is made in expectation of a future death penalty and indeed achieves Heidegger's "authenticity." By this choice, Winston creates "an image of man" that will not bow to totalitarianism and will fight for the dignity and survival of

humanity in this inhuman world.

Furthermore, as Winston observes, “the past” does not yet die in the proles themselves for they are not completely affected by the rule of the Party. In other words, they stay human and are the regenerating force of the future. To him, the proles “were governed by private loyalties which they did not question” (73). As “they were not loyal to a party or a country or an idea” but “loyal to one another,” what actually mattered to them “were individual relationships” (73). To the proles, “a completely helpless gesture, an embrace, a tear, a word spoken to a dying man, could have value in itself” (73). As he confesses, by contrast to him as a member of the Outer Party, the proles “had held unto the primitive emotions which he himself had to relearn by conscious effort” (73). Thus, the Party’s influences on the proles are relatively weaker than on the members of the Outer Party. As we have noted in chapter II, the Party actually allows the proles to keep their old ways of life. And the proles themselves do not seem too much involved in the hatred that the Party tries to instill on them. They may be patriotic and easily dominated by this cause but their humanity remains untouched and can never be twisted by the Party’s rule. In their eyes, love is more essential to life than hate. Thus, a “driveling” love song “keeps its popularity” and “outlives” the “Hate Song” because it is closer to their life (97). In Winston’s belief, the proles will one day destroy the Party and regenerate a new world: “If there was hope, it lay in the proles. ...The future belonged to the proles” (98). For their life is nature’s life, which is unconquerable and keeps its vitality, for ever and ever: “The Birds sang, the proles sang, the Party did not sing. All round the world...everywhere stood the same sordid unconquerable figure, made monstrous by work and childbearing, toiling from birth to death and still singing” (98).

Fourth, through Winston’s relationships with both his wife Katherine and

his colleague Julia, the reader can see the Party also invades the relationship between husband and wife. And it is through the contrast of the two relationships that Orwell presents Winston's quest of the authentic life.

Let us first look at Winston's relationship with his wife. As a matter of fact, Winston's wife Katherine is a typical example of those people who have allowed the Party to take control of their private life, their personal relationships, and their individual thoughts and values. In Winston's eyes, Katherine "had without exception the most stupid, vulgar, empty mind that he had ever encountered" since according to his observation, she "had not a thought in her head that was not a slogan," and it appears to him that "there was no imbecility, absolutely none, that she was not capable of swallowing if the Party handed it out to her" (30). Sensing thus her lack of her individual values and thoughts, he nicknamed her "the human sound track" in his own mind (30). As I have noted in the introduction, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger elaborates on the state of fallen-ness. He asserts that "Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others" (BT 164). That is, a man who lives in the condition of fallen-ness never comes to the state of true self-awareness. In this condition of being, he lives "in the permanent condition of flux: he will be whatever he is instructed to be" (Carter 197). Katherine, then, lives in the state of "fallen-ness." That is, in her life, she never develops self-awareness and comes to see herself as independent of the Party. As Winston expresses, though with a noble appearance, she has "a face" with "as nearly as possible nothing behind it." (30). Actually, in Heidegger's terms, her "Being" is taken away by the Party. She develops no values of her own, judges everything according to the Party's imposed values and standards, and whatever she does is not out of her "willful choice" but in accordance with "the Party's principles." In her sexual relationship with Winston,

she has sex with him not because she “loves” Winston but merely out of her sense of “obligation” to the Party. As Winston recalls, when having sex with Katherine, he has the feeling that when he touches her, she seems to “wince and stiffen” and while she seems to embrace him, she is “simultaneously pushing him away with all her strength” (31). It thus seems to him that “to embrace her was like embracing a jointed wooden image” (31). But despite the lack of delight in their sexual union, it is Katherine who insists on their going to bed once a week. “They must,” she said, “produce a child if they could” (31). As Winston recalls, Katherine has two names for their sexual union: “One was ‘making a baby,’ and the other was ‘our duty to the Party’ (31). It thus appears to him that Katherine does not really love him but is using him to fulfill her obligation to the Party. In *Existentialism and Humanism*, Sartre maintains that “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world –and defines himself afterwards,” and sees that “existence is prior to essence” (3). In *Being and Nothingness*, he also distinguishes two modes of being: the “Being-for-itself” as essentially free and the “Being-in-itself” as not free. Here in the novel, in Winston’s phrases, Katherine seems to be dehumanized, her very “being” reduced to that of an object. For Winston uses several terms to describe her such as “a jointed wooden image” and “the human sound track,” and describes her body as being “frozen forever by the hypnotic power of the Party” (31). In Sartre’s terms, Katherine, then, has become a “Being-in-itself,” not a “Being-for-itself,” for she has allowed the Party to take control of her own being, to define her “essence.” She never reaches that kind of self-awareness to define herself by her choices. Without a sense of her own “individuality,” she is actually incapable of love. It is therefore no wonder that Winston never experiences both emotional and sexual satisfaction in his marriage with her. In deep sexual frustration, he thus thinks of leaving Katherine: “Yet he could have endured living

with her if it had not been for just one thing--sex" (30). And it once occurs to him to get rid of her forever as they are accidentally left alone with each other on a cliff in a community hike with some colleagues. As he confesses to Julia his thought of murdering Katherine:

The sun blazed down on them, the sweat tickled his face.

And the thought struck him....

"Why didn't you give her a good shove?" said Julia. "I would have."

"Yes, dear, you would have. I would have, if I'd been the same person as I am now. Or perhaps I would-I am not certain."

"Are you sorry you didn't?"

"Yes. On the whole I am sorry I didn't." (60)

Finally and inevitably, he and Katherine separate. Both sexually and emotionally frustrated, Winston then seeks satisfaction from another woman. He seeks out a prostitute in the street and has sex with her. But it appears he can find no sexual and emotional satisfaction with her, either. In his frustration, he asks himself: "Why did it always have to be like this? Why could he not have a woman of his own instead of these filthy scuffles at intervals of years? But a real love affair was an almost unthinkable event" (31). It is in this deep frustration and loneliness that he finds his life essentially unfulfilled.

Among Winston's relationships with his colleagues, the most special of all are those with Julia and O'Brien, his superior. From his relationships with them, we can tell how Winston is alienated from his surroundings and how he tries to break this isolation and find an authentic life. Let's first see his relationship with Julia. At first, he considers Julia an "enemy," an agent of the "Thought Police": "But this particular girl gave him the impression of being more dangerous than most.... The idea had even crossed his mind that she might be an agent of the Thought Police" (6).

Actually, he has the impression of Julia from her manner of dress:

She was a bold-looking girl of about twenty-seven, with thick dark hair, a freckled face, and swift, athletic movements. A narrow scarlet sash, emblem of the Junior Anti-Sex League, was wound several times round the waist of her overalls, just tightly enough to bring out the shapeliness of her hips.

Winston had disliked her from the very first moment of seeing her. (6)

Alienated from his surroundings, Winston can only judge a person by appearance. By Julia's manner of dress which seems to convey her orthodoxy, he judges her a dangerous figure. In fact, once alarmed by her following him, he thinks of attacking her, as he later confesses to Julia:

"I hated the sight of you," he said. "I wanted to rape you and murder you afterwards. Two weeks ago I thought seriously of smashing your head in with a cobble-stone. If you really want to know, I imagined that you had something to do with the Thought Police." (54)

But, as the former quotation indicates, his observation of the "shapeliness of her hips" indicates that Winston also harbors a sexual fantasy for Julia. Thus, the very idea of raping and murdering her indicates the frustration of his sexual attraction to her. And this is indicated by his dreams of being with Julia in the Golden Country:

The girl with dark hair was coming toward him across the field. With what seemed a single movement, she tore off her clothes and flung them disdainfully aside. Her body was white and smooth, but it arose no desire in him; indeed, he barely looked at it. What overwhelmed him in the instant was admiration for the gesture with which she had thrown her clothes aside. With its grace and carelessness it seemed to annihilate a whole culture, a whole system of thought, as though Big Brother and the Party and the Thought Police could be swept into nothingness by a single splendid

movement of the arm. That was a gesture belonging to the ancient time.

Winston woke up with the word “Shakespeare” on his lips. (15)

In Winston’s conscious mind, Julia’s appearance is associated with Big Brother, the Party, and the Thought Police. And this causes his frustration because he can never approach her as a would-be lover. But deep in his subconsciousness, he has the desire of living an “authentic” life with Julia. In his dream, he links the love of Julia with a long-lost past when people could love each other without such fear and scruple as caused by the Party. That in his dream Julia can cast off the garment symbolizing the dominance of the Party on the individual and join him in love is what Winston subconsciously desires and this foreshadows their later union against the Party. Later, when he receives Julia’s message of love, he is rather willing to risk his life for a confrontation with her:

At the sight of the words *I love you* the desire to stay alive had welled up in him, and the taking of minor risks suddenly seemed stupid. ...He did not consider any longer the possibility that she might be laying some kind of trap for him. He knew that it was not so, because of her unmistakable agitation when she handed him the note. Nor did the idea of refusing her advances even cross his mind. ...He thought of her naked, youthful body, as he had seen it in his dream.A kind of fever seized him at the thought that he might lose her, the white youthful body might slip away from him! (49)

As I have noted, Winston harbors sexual feelings for Julia. Here in this quotation, from his words that he is afraid that Julia’s “white youthful body might slip away from him,” we clearly see this point. Finding no sexual and emotional satisfaction in his marriage with Katherine and living actually in a state of celibacy and loneliness, Winston then seeks to fulfill his desires in his relationship with Julia. Here, I can suggest something concerning the nature of Winston’s love for Julia. As we know,

Winston wakes up from his dream of the Golden Country “with the word Shakespeare on his lips.” It could be that he is referring to Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*. And why is he thinking of this play after dreaming of Julia? Is he associating Julia with Juliet and himself with Romeo? Furthermore, is the Golden Country, then, another garden where Winston the Romeo first knows Julia the Juliet’s true love of him? As we know, Romeo first falls in love with Rosaline but fails to win her favor. Is Katherine, then, another Rosaline in Winston’s association? If such is the case, in their love affair, the Party then plays the role of the two discordant families. In *Romeo and Juliet*, in the garden scene, we hear Juliet talking to herself: “Romeo, doff thy name, / And for thy name, which is no part of thee, / Take all myself.” (2.2.46-8) Reading these words of Juliet, we can almost recognize the meaning of Winston’s dream in which Julia casts off her garment and comes toward him, forsaking her identity as a Party comrade and joining him in love. And his receiving the message of love from Julia is almost like Romeo’s overhearing of Juliet’s private confession of love. It is no wonder that he will risk his life to see Julia.

In his relationship with Julia, except for satisfying his sexual desires, Winston also perceives the political meaning of their sexual union:

He pulled the overalls aside and studied her smooth white flank. In the old days, he thought, a man looked at a girl’s body and saw that it was desirable, and that was the end of the story. But you could not have pure love or pure lust nowadays. No emotion was pure, because everything was mixed up with fear and hatred. Their embrace had been a battle, the climax a victory.

It was a blow struck against the Party. It was a political act. (56)

As David Wykes points out, “to oppose is to do the opposite, and *only* the opposite, so unchastity becomes the necessary conduct of those who wish to place themselves outside the boundaries of conduct approved by the state” (144). In their sexual

consummation, they destroy the attempt of the Party to annihilate their individuality. They achieve a sense of self-identity by taking the right to choose for themselves. And this act of choosing is done in the full consciousness of the certainty of death, as both of them are sure one day they will be caught:

In a way she realized that she herself was doomed, that sooner or later the Thought Police would catch her and kill her, but with another part of her mind she believed that it was somehow possible to construct a secret world in which you could live as you choose. All you needed was luck and cunning and boldness. She did not understand that there was no such thing as happiness, that the only victory lay in the far future, long after you were dead, that from the moment of declaring war on the Party it was better to think of yourself as a corpse.

“We are the dead,” he said.

“We are not dead yet” (60)

From the above quotation, one can see that despite the harshness of the outer world, Julia still thinks it possible to build a private utopia with her cunning. An authentic life, so long as she lives, is still realizable. But to Winston, such a life can be possible only after the fight with totalitarianism is successful. As he perceives, his sexual union with Julia is in essence different from that with Katherine because of the very sense of “mine-ness.” In other words, it is done purely of their own accord, not for fulfilling the “obligation” to the Party. Thus, it is indeed “a political act,” a spiritual fight and victory against totalitarianism. As a matter of fact, their act of choosing creates “an image of man” and is characteristic of “authentic existence.” As Winston states, he will not give up his humanity to the Party, even if it threatens him with death: “So long as human beings stay human, death and life are the same thing” (60).

In his relationship with Julia, Winston gradually learns true love:

Their first love-making had been simply an act of the will. But after the second time it was different. [...] She had become a physical necessity, something that he not only wanted but felt that he had a right to. When she said that she could not come, he had the feeling that she was cheating him. But just at this moment the crowd pressed them together and their hands accidentally met. She gave the tips of his fingers a quick squeeze that seemed to invite not desire but affection. (62)

In these continual contacts, Julia not only awakens Winston's long-suppressed sexual instinct but also his ability to love, to be considerate and understanding: "it struck him that when one lived with a woman this particular disappointment must be a normal, recurring event; and a deep tenderness, such as he had never felt for her before, suddenly took hold of him" (62). Their affair thus develops from simple sexuality to devoted love, just like that kind of love found in an old couple: "He wished that they were a married couple of ten years old" (62). He feels intensely the need to create a world of their own with Julia: "He wished above all that they had some place where they could be alone together without feeling the obligation to make love every time they met" (62). He thinks of renting the room above Mr. Charrington's store. The glass paperweight which Winston bought in Mr. Charrington's store actually symbolizes the authentic world they create:

He turned over toward the light and lay gazing into the glass paperweight. [...] It was as though the surface of the glass had been the arch of the sky, enclosing a tiny world with its atmosphere complete. He had the feeling that he could get inside it, along with the mahogany bed and the gateleg table and the clock and the steel engraving and the paperweight itself. The paperweight was the room he was in, and the coral was Julia's life and his

own, fixed in a sort of eternity at the heart of the crystal. (65)

As Kathryn M. Grossman points out, the Golden Country and the room Winston rents from Mr. Charrington are sanctuaries “not unlike Winston’s beloved glass paperweight” which appears as “refuges outside or beyond time where the criminal hero can escape his own oppressive culture” (141). And Troy Place also maintains that “the paperweight symbolizes escape from a self-defeating and unnatural routine, as it represents a suspension of time” (109). As I have noted in chapter II, to prevent people’s sex instinct from creating a world of its own which is outside the Party’s control, the Party tries to uphold sexual puritanism. From our discussion above, we do see that because of their sexual instinct, Winston and Julia indeed do create a world of their own. In their world, Julia can freely be herself. Assuming an identity of her own choice, she can take off her uniform, and put on her dress: “Yes, dear, scent, too. And do you know what I am going to do next? I am going to get hold of a real woman’s frock from somewhere and wear it instead of these bloody trousers. I’ll wear silk stockings and high-heeled shoes! In this room I’m going to be a woman, not a Party comrade” (63). And aside from being “a woman” rather than “a Party Comrade,” in their world Julia also assumes the role of a housewife and prepares food for Winston. It seems they have actually become a mid-twentieth-century traditional family. As David Wykes asserts, “the passion of the first stage of their love is quickly supplemented by a form of domesticity” and “Julia makes a home for Winston in their rented room, and she is given a number of maternal traits to link her to the memory of Winston’s mother” (140). Thus, their world indeed differs from the world of Big Brother which, with its pretension of love as represented by its “Ministry of Love,” is in fact a world of hate, fear, alienation, and inauthenticity. By contrast, theirs is a world of genuine love, of mutual belonging as symbolized by the glass paperweight and the coral within. As the glass paperweight recalls and

represents the past authentic life, so their love, as Wykes suggests, is a love “from the ancient time” (140). And like the coral, it has a life of its own and grows, until it is shattered to pieces by the invasion of the Party, as the love of Romeo and Juliet suffers the doom of destruction by the hate of the two rival families.

Winston’s alienation with his environment can also be vindicated by his trusting O’Brien as a comrade against the Party:

Winston had seen O’Brien perhaps a dozen times in almost as many years. He felt deeply drawn to him, and not solely because he was intrigued by the contrast between O’Brien’s urbane manner and his prizefighter’s physique. Much more it was because of a secretly held belief, merely a hope—that O’Brien’s political orthodoxy was not perfect [...] But at any rate he had the appearance of being a person that you could talk to, if somehow you could cheat the telescreen and get him alone. (6)

Again, as with Julia, Winston also judges O’Brien by his demeanor. He adores O’Brien’s urbane manner while ignoring O’Brien’s appearance, his “coarse, humorous and brutal face” that may suggest his essentially inhuman nature. In his subconscious mind, O’Brien may have become somehow a “father figure.” The fact is that being physically more powerful and much older, O’Brien is contrasted with Winston and brings him a sense of security. In his decision to rebel against the Party, Winston regards O’Brien as someone who can understand him and offer him instruction. Indeed, being fatherless, he may subconsciously desire a substitute-father in reality. During his torture by O’Brien, it seems rather strange that “for a moment he clung to O’Brien like a baby, curiously comforted by the heavy arm round his shoulders” (110). He still thinks of O’Brien as “his protector” and regards the pain O’Brien inflicts on him as coming

“from outside, from some other source, and it was O’Brien who would save him from it” (111). And during his imprisonment and “re-education,” he even dreams of being with O’Brien in the Golden Country: “He dreamed a great deal all through this time, and they were always happy dreams. He was in the Golden Country, or he was sitting among enormous, glorious, sunlit ruins, with his mother, with Julia, with O’Brien--not doing anything, merely sitting in the sun, talking of peaceful things”(121). Clearly, in his subconsciousness, he desires O’Brien to be part of his family. In his intellectual battle with O’Brien, he comes to admit that O’Brien’s mind “contains” his own, and “O’Brien was a being in all ways larger than himself” (113). He is ready to accept O’Brien and the Party intellectually:

Yes, even...He could not fight against the Party any longer. Besides, the Party was in the right. It must be so: how could the immortal, collective brain be mistaken? By what external standard could you check his judgments? Sanity was statistical. It was merely a question of learning to think as they thought. Only-! (122)

As for O’Brien, he may indeed try to play cynically the role of “the father figure” to Winston. Torturing Winston in The Ministry of Love, he tells Winston: “Don’t worry, Winston; you are in my keeping. For seven years I have watched over you. Now the turning point has come. I shall save you, I shall make you perfect” (108). Unlike Julia who seems to play the role of an ideal wife and leads Winston to live an authentic life, O’Brien leads Winston to the destruction of his humanity. In fact, his tutelage of Winston is a part of his lust for absolute power, as he tells Winston that “the real power, the power we have to fight for day and night, is not power over things, but over men” and that “power is in inflicting pain and humiliation” (118). Thus, the reader can see the real motivation behind all the Party’s devices of domination. It is not for safeguarding and improving the

welfare of the people but merely for the fulfillment of the Party's lust for complete power over men, as O'Brien reveals to Winston: "One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of power is power" (116). Thus, it is clear that O'Brien persecutes Winston only out of his ideal of absolute power. This power not only includes domination over another person's body but also over his mind, the very essence of his being: "Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing" (118). The result of wielding this power can only be the destruction of human nature and the complete annihilation of the possibility of living an authentic life:

Never again will you be capable of ordinary human feeling. Every thing will be dead inside you. Never again will you be capable of love, or friendship, or joy of living, or laughter, or curiosity, or courage, or integrity. You will be hollow. We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves. (113)

With these words, O'Brien states very clearly his purpose; that is, he means to deprive Winston of his humanity and redefine his "essence" in terms of the Party. By his words that "we shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves," we clearly see the violence involved in his plan to turn Winston into a "dummy," a soul-less man such as Winston observes while he is in the canteen with Syme. Besides, in wielding this power over another person, O'Brien is denying his victim the right for self-definition as asserted by Sartre in his *Existentialism and humanism*. He is indeed playing the role of God and defining human essence in his own terms. From the quotations above, one can also see that O'Brien seems to own the power of manipulation which may be beyond

Winston's imagination; that is, he seems to own the power to change a man's personality at his own will: "Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing" (118) and "We shall squeeze you empty and then we shall fill you with ourselves" (113).

Before his arrest by the Thought Police, Winston is fully confident that under whatever excruciating situation, he will still manage to keep his integrity. As he tells Julia, no matter how they may suffer at the hands of the Thought Police, what really matters is that they "shouldn't betray one another, although even that can't make the slightest difference" (73). In fact, such is both he and Julia's belief:

"....Confession is not betrayal. What you say or do doesn't matter; only feelings matter. If they could make me stop loving you—that would be the real betrayal."

She thought it over. "They can't do that," she said finally. "It's the one thing they can't do. They can make you say anything--*anything*--but they can't make you believe it. They can't get inside you."

"No," he said a little more hopefully, "no; that's quite true. They can't get inside you. If you can *feel* that staying human is worth while, even when it can't have any result whatever, you have beaten them. (74)

By these words "If you can *feel* that staying human is worth while, even when it can't have any result whatever, you have beaten them," Winston means that however terribly he may suffer under the hands of the Thought Police, he will not have what defines his authenticity; namely, his true love of Julia, deprived by the Party. So long as he stays human, he seems to mean, he creates "an image of man" that will never bow to totalitarianism. These thoughts of Winston remind one of Sartre's ideas as expressed in his *The Republic of Silence*: "Because the

Nazi venom seeped into our thoughts, every accurate thought was a conquest. Because an all-powerful police tried to force us to hold our tongues, every word took on the value of the declaration of principles. Because we were hunted down, every one of our gestures had the weight of a solemn commitment” (239). Like Sartre, Winston firmly believes that his inner life can never be vanquished by totalitarianism. To him, as to Sartre, what is actually crucial in the battle with totalitarianism is not the physical battle but that within the human mind and soul; that is, so long as he still keeps his spiritual independence, he has indeed fought a triumphant battle with totalitarianism. In fact, he harbors the idea that before his execution by the Thought Police, it is still possible to claim his identity as independent of the Party: “They would have blown his brain to pieces before they could reclaim it. The heretical thought would be unpunished, un-repented, out of their reach forever. They would have blown a hole in their own perfection. To die hating them, that was freedom” (124). Commenting on Sartre’s idea of human freedom, William Barrett remarks that the basic premise in Sartre’s view of human freedom is that “freedom is in its very essence negative, though this negativity is also creative” (242). Elucidating the nature of this freedom, he states:

At a certain moment, perhaps, the drug or the pain inflicted by the torturer may make the victim lose consciousness and he will confess. But so long as he retains the lucidity of consciousness, however tiny the area of action possible for him, he can still say in his own mind: No. Consciousness and freedom are thus given together. Only if consciousness is blotted out can man be deprived of this residual freedom. Where all the avenues of action are blocked for a man, this freedom may seem a tiny and unimportant thing; but it is in fact total and absolute, and Sartre is right to insist upon it as such, for it affords

man his final dignity, that of being man. (242)

Winston shares this idea of Sartre's. In fact, he strongly believes that however powerful a regime can be, it can never gain the power to perceive fully the workings of a man's inner world and take full control of it: "They could lay bare in the utmost detail everything that you had done or said or thought; but the inner heart, whose workings were mysterious even to yourself, remained impregnable" (74). But actually, Winston underestimates the power of the Party. The Party can indeed invade the region of the innermost heart. As a matter of fact, both Winston and Julia are under the continual monitoring of the Party. And it is after Winston is caught by the Thought Police and tortured by O'Brien that he comes to see this truth: "He knew that for seven years the Thought Police had watched him like a beetle under a magnifying glass. There was no physical act, no word spoken aloud, that they had not noticed, no train of thought that they had not been able to infer" (122). By this continual secret scrutiny of Winston's life, through reading his diary, bugging every word he says to Julia and monitoring every physical act of his and Julia's, the Thought Police has indeed successfully invaded the innermost region of Winston's heart, knowing exactly what he thinks, plans and fears most. After defeating Winston intellectually, O'Brien then destroys Winston's sense of moral integrity, as he promises: "We shall squeeze you empty and then we shall fill you with ourselves" (113). As O'Brien well knows, what is essential to Winston's authenticity is his love of Julia. As the coral of the paperweight symbolizes, their lives are indeed spiritually united: "The coral was Julia's life and his own, fixed in a sort of eternity at the heart of the crystal" (65). And it is with Julia that Winston not only creates a "private utopia" but "embarks on a romantic quest for a new world, a new concept of civil utopia" (Grossman 141). Thus, to achieve his aim, the last step for O'Brien is to break this spiritual

unity. And he knows exactly what to do. He uses what Winston fears most, rats, to terrify Winston into a spiritual betrayal of Julia. Concerning the betrayal scene, Julian Symons comments that “however great the pains expanded upon it,” the idea of room 101 will always strike the reader as “comic” rather than “horrific” because of the crude idea that under threat of the rats’ attack, Winston “abandons the love for Julia which is his last link with humanity” (29). Here, it is true that the rat scene may have some element of crudity in it. As a matter of fact, responding to Julian Symons’ criticism, Orwell remarks: “You are of course right about the vulgarity of the ‘Room 101’ business. I was aware of this while writing it, but I didn’t know another way of getting somewhere near the effect I wanted” (Meyers 150). But here I suggest that what Orwell may suggest here is the emotional effect the rats’ attack can have on Winston. In other words, Orwell seems to suggest that what totalitarianism can inflict upon its victims includes not only physical tortures but also psychological terrorism. In fact, if the reader looks more closely on Winston’s reactions to this attack, he or she can see how overwhelmingly terrified Winston is under this condition: “He was falling backward, into enormous depths, away from the rats. He was still strapped in the chair, but he had fallen through the floor, through the walls of the building, [...] into the gulfs between the stars—always away, away, away from the rats. He was light-years distant, but O’Brien was still standing at his side” (126-7). Clearly, O’Brien has achieved his aim of terrifying Winston into betrayal of Julia. And thus it is unnecessary to effect a real attack of the rats upon Winston. From the above quotation, we can see how overwhelmingly terrified Winston is by O’Brien’s threat of rats’ attack; how “desperately in his imagination” he strives to gain a safe distance from what terrifies him most.

After this betrayal, Winston can never believe in his own integrity. As

Lynette Hunter maintains, “Winston recognizes his betrayal of Julia and accepts it as an index of his inhumanity” (56). He can never claim himself as morally superior to O’Brien as he formerly believes:

His manner changed and he said more harshly:

“And you consider yourself morally superior to us, with our lies and our cruelty?”

“Yes, I consider myself superior.” (119)

Like Lynette Hunter, Richard Rorty also comments on the effect that Winston’s betrayal has on himself. He asserts that “presumably each of us stands in the same relations to some sentence, and to some thing” and that “if one can discover that key sentence and that key thing, then, as O’Brien says, one can tear a mind apart and put it together in new shapes of one’s own choosing” (149). Thus, “for Winston the sentence he could not utter sincerely and still be able to put himself back together was ‘Do it to Julia’ and the worst thing in the world happened to be rats” (149). In a word, this betrayal has annihilated Winston’s own belief in his own moral integrity, as he ruminates: “There were things, your own acts, from which you could not recover. Something was killed in your breast; burnt out, cauterized out” (128). With his authenticity annihilated, Winston resembles his colleagues who have “extinct eyes, like ghosts fading at cock-crow” (130). As Lynette Hunter suggests, “they are the dead in life, who come to life only when they hide their betrayals from themselves and fade back into corpses when they recognize them” (56). His fight for the authentic life has come to nothing. As Irving Howe maintains, “Orwell’s profoundest insight is that in a totalitarian world man’s life is shorn of dynamic possibilities” and “the end of life is completely predicable in its beginning, the beginning merely a manipulated preparation for the end” (35). Jeffery Meyers also comments that “like the

novels of Malraux and Sartre, *1984* expresses man's fears of isolation and disintegration, cruelty and dehumanization" (154). And Stephen Spender is right in suggesting that "in the end Big Brother and his Party are not bad because they are politically reactionary or even totalitarian, but because they indulge a lust for power which approaches very nearly to a lust for pure evil" (34).

From all the discussions above, I can assert that Winston indeed strives to fight for an authentic life not egoistically but for the very survival of humanity in a demonic world. Just like a glimmer of candlelight in the abyss of darkness, his fight is significant in our eyes. It represents the dignity of humanity which clings to its hope for preserving its last thread of integrity. In fact, though Raymond Williams suggests that Winston is "less experienced, less intelligent, less loyal and less courageous than his creator, the reader can still see something similar between Winston and his creator Orwell. Like Winston, as Stephen Spender asserts, Orwell was "a man more deeply concerned with the political future of society than with his own life or work" (33). In his essay "Why I write," Orwell lists several reasons for his ideal of being a writer. Except for "sheer egoism," and "aesthetic enthusiasm," he also mentions his "historical impulse" and his "political purpose." For his "historical impulse," he defines it as "desire to see things as they are, to find out true facts and store them up for the use of posterity" (4). And for his political purpose, he sees it as "desire to push the world in a certain direction, to alter other people's idea of the kind of society that they should strive after" (4). From all the discussions above, I may assert that Winston indeed shares these ideals of Orwell. Thus, if one is to see *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as Orwell's last will and testament, it may not be very far away from the truth. Commenting on the author and his work, Patrick Reilly also asserts that "Orwell is in our time the chief custodian of this tradition of

human responsibility and moral choice” and though it is true that “*Nineteen Eighty-Four* is ‘the last great book he happened to write before he happened to die,’ yet it is also a kind of testament, however unwitting, the finely appropriate crown to a life of unremitting moral effort. (64)

To end this chapter, I may cite Winston’s word: “You were the dead; theirs was the future. But you could share in that future if you kept alive the mind as they kept alive the body, and passed on the secret doctrine that two plus two makes four” (98). These words indeed fully express Orwell’s ideal of being a writer. It is this simple respect for the truth as it is that keeps humans true to their own existence and immune from the danger of being misled. In these words, the fight for authenticity becomes not just physical but also moral and spiritual.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

Risen after the Second World War, existentialism strives to offer humans spiritual guidance in a world where the existence of God is universally questioned. In “What is Existentialism,” Charles Guignon asserts that “whereas mainstream philosophy generally sees its role as discovering universally valid truths about such topics as knowledge, reality, and value, existentialism addresses questions that arise for individuals in the course of actually living out their lives”(1). The existentialists claim that “an inquiry of this sort is needed because the standard way of thinking about human beings—the conceptions of humans as members of a species or instances of a natural kind—generally leaves out of account such dimensions of life as passion, integrity, authenticity, and commitment” (Guignon 1). In the construction of an ideal society, if the rationalists can only regard humans as “instances of a natural kind” and thus ignore man’s inherent individuality, their dream of an ideal society will never become a reality but instead will turn into a nightmare. As Gorman Beauchamp contends, since “all civilization is predicated on order, regulation, some degree of regimentation—limitations that conflict with man’s natural or instinctual drives and result in the phenomenon Freud called repression,” civilized man has thus “exchanged a portion of his possibilities for happiness for a portion of security” (66). “In the tradition of rationally planned utopias, from Plato’s *Republic* to B. F. Skinner’s *Walden Two*, the ideal has been to enlarge that ‘portion of security’ by increasing the degree of civilization—to reorder society into a more harmonious, efficient (but more regimented, repressed) whole, in which each ‘unit’ plays only his socially determined role” (Beauchamp 66-67). “The price of utopia,” as

Lewis Mumford maintains, can then only be “total submission to a central authority, forced labor, lifetime specialization, and inflexible regimentation” (Beauchamp 67). By following this ideal as set up by the rationalist utopians, the possibility of the individual authentic life seems to be totally annihilated. Thus, for the rationalists who strive to construct an ideal state according to principles of reason, the claims of the existentialists for the authentic human life should not be left out of account lest their ideal should go awry into irrationality. In their individual dystopian works, both Huxley and Orwell offer their warnings of the modern trend toward irrationality. As Jerome Meckier asserts, *Brave New World* is “‘a monster of rationality’ in which the rational is raised to an irrational power” (177). In Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, one also sees the irrational desire to hold power merely for power’s sake.

In Chapter II, I point out that in Plato’s *The Republic*, there already exists an emphasis on human reason as the supreme human faculty which regulates the other faculties such as passion and will. And with his “Theory of the Metals,” Plato supports a hierarchical social system, dividing his citizens into three social groups, philosopher rulers, soldiers and the craftsmen. In his social hierarchy, Plato so overstresses the collective communal life of the philosopher rulers that they are actually deprived of their private life. With the regulation of family and sexual relationship among the ruling class members and the division of duties for the state among the citizens, Plato emphasizes the priority of the collective life over the individual personal life. Besides, the idea of censorship also limits the freedom of personal expression. As a result, his ideal state seems rather static, incapable of any development. In both *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eight-Four*, one can see how these ideas of Plato can be taken advantage of by the sinister World Controllers or the Inner Party members to achieve their purposes.

In *Brave New World*, the reader sees that for the purpose of consolidating the well functioning of the industrial new world, the World Controllers make use of such scientific methods as conditioning, hypnopaedia, soma and the feelies to deprive the citizens of their sense of individuality. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, one also sees that with a view of keeping in power and satisfying their morbid hunger for absolute power over man, the Inner Party members adopt such methods as practicing Newspeak, incessant propaganda, and surveillance to achieve the same effect for the citizens. As a result, the Controllers or the Inner Party members actually deprive the citizens of their possibility of living a truly authentic human life. Though both Huxley and Orwell may over-dramatize the actual human condition of the modern world, nevertheless their warnings for the modern man to keep their spiritual independence in face of the modern trend toward dehumanization should not be ignored. Just as George Kateb asserts:

1984 is a splendid work in defense of freedom and of equality. By predicting the future it may help to defeat its predictions; for that tactic to work, exaggeration is probably necessary. An image of pure evil must be presented, in order to sicken the decent man and make him more passionate in his attachment to the kinds of political good he still may be fortunate enough to enjoy. (85)

Like *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *Brave New World* is also a work “in defense of freedom and equality” and it may help to “defeat its predictions by predicting the future.” With its exaggerations, it also sickens the decent man and makes him consider what it means to be human. Reading the two dystopian works, the reader may see and learn to treasure the essential value of the individual authentic life.

From the previous chapters, one can see that “freedom” is the major

concern of Heidegger, Sartre, Huxley and Orwell in their individual works. To them, in this modern world where the impersonal power seems to take force and threaten the freedom of the individual in his or her quest for the authentic life, the assertion of the concept of freedom seems all the more important and urgent. To Heidegger, freedom means being conscious of our inclination to lead a life of fallen-ness and then striving to realize our uttermost possibilities in face of our essential Being-toward-death. To him, “authentic personal existence is a synthesis of the imposed and the willed, and the synthesis is achieved by taking up the imposed into the willed: I will my own past and the world as it is given in the immediate circumstances and in its ultimate interpretation, and with my will self-determined in this way I choose from the possibilities which remain open” (Blackham 98-99). To Sartre, freedom means both the will to keep our spiritual independence in face of all forms of oppression and the will to create ourselves and take responsibilities for our life. As Neil Levy asserts, “Sartre’s overriding concern in writing *Being and Nothingness* was to vindicate the fundamental freedom of the human being, against determinists of all stripes” and “it was in order to demonstrate our ultimate responsibility for our choices that he developed his notion of bad faith, which turns upon the manners in which people can attempt to deny their own liberty” (111). In Huxley’s *Brave New world*, one can see that perceiving the essential value of leading a life of authenticity, the protagonists like Bernard, Helmholtz, and the Savage strive to assert their freedom in face of the government’s dominance and oppression by creating a life of their own. In Bernard, one sees his quest to be himself in a world which enforces conformity. In Helmholtz, one sees his quest for both the true artistic beauty and the freedom for personal expression in a world which denies this possibility. In the Savage, the reader sees his quest for the eternal truth in a world without God. Also,

through Linda and Lenina, the reader can see and learn to treasure our ability to love. In our modern world where impersonality pervades, human love seems all the more valuable. For Huxley, the quest for truth, beauty and love actually comprises our authenticity. In Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the reader sees that in a world where oppression pervades and human love turns to distrust and suspicion, Winston Smith strives to uphold his spiritual freedom and authenticity with his keeping a diary, starting a love affair with Julia and joining in the Brotherhood for a revolution against the Party. Through the failure of his protagonist, Orwell makes the reader see the essential value of the individual authentic life. Indeed, for Orwell, the respect for the truth as it is and the treasure of the human love comprise the essence of human authenticity. By keeping this love and faithfulness, humans may never be devoid of hope. Indeed, for both Huxley and Orwell, human freedom means the quest for beauty, love and truth.

In the four authors, one also sees that all of them share a sense of deep concern for the human race. In Heidegger, the reader can see his differentiation between a life of fallen-ness and that of authenticity shows his great concern for the individual to lead a truly meaningful life instead of an unexamined one. Just as Mary Warnock notes, "there is obviously in Heidegger's writings the existentialist desire to shock his reader out of their complacent and unthinking ways, out of their unawareness of Being" and "the missionary zeal of the true Existentialist is nowhere more manifest than in him" (70). In Sartre, the reader sees that his ideas of existence before essence and choosing for mankind through one's actions endow humans with immense possibilities and a sense of love and responsibility for our fellow beings. In *Brave New World*, the reader sees the Christ figure John the Savage demonstrate his love for mankind by striving to

wake his fellow creatures from a life of enslavement with his rebellious words and actions. For Huxley, the Savage truly serves as his mouthpiece for his love for the human race. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the reader also sees that at the risk of his life, Winston shows his sense of responsibility for the human race both by starting a diary to keep a faithful record of the truth as it is and by striving to join the Brotherhood to start a revolution to revive the long lost past. For Orwell, the protagonist Winston Smith is actually his alter ego with his respect for the truth as it is and his love for mankind. For the four authors, love and responsibility for the human race indeed comprise the core of their individual works.

As a closure of my dissertation, it is perhaps good to indicate the development of the genre of dystopia after the mid-twentieth century. As I have noted, dystopia reflects the present-day concerns, giving the readers a didactic warning of what may come if the present-day evils are not redressed. Thus, since our present world is largely a world of democracy, dystopias thus move away from totalitarian concerns to our present problems. For example, published in 1953 during the Cold War and Mc-Carthy Eras, *Fahrenheit 451* by Ray Bradbury reflects the author's concerns about censorship and conformity during a period when free expression of ideas could lead to social and economic ostracization. And *The Handmaid's Tale* by Margaret Atwood, published in 1985, is a dystopia exploring themes of women in subjugation. It reflects our present-day concerns with women's rights. Now, does what alarmed both Huxley and Orwell about a totalitarian future for humans seem already out-dated? While Orwell's dystopia may seem outmoded to the modern reader, Huxley's dystopia nevertheless seems still possible and foreboding. In fact, it comes close to reflect our present conditions, as our present world is a world where science can be misapplied to cause disastrous results for humans and where the

traditional values are severely challenged. Yet, disregarding its accordance with the present situations, the humanistic values, and the truly authentic life as both novelists assert in their respective works will never grow outmoded.

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