博碩士論文 etd-0824110-165525 詳細資訊


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姓名 鍾智明(Chih-ming Chu) 電子郵件信箱 E-mail 資料不公開
畢業系所 企業管理學系研究所(Business Management)
畢業學位 碩士(Master) 畢業時期 98學年第2學期
論文名稱(中) 公司治理對於金融海嘯前後公司績效之影響
論文名稱(英) Does corporate governance influence company performance in the financial tsunami.
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    摘要(中) 公司治理的好壞通常會跟績效畫上等號,公司治理是指對公司進行監督和管控,以保障利害關係人權益,並持續讓公司健全營運來為股東創造利潤。通常在金融危機總是有一些公司表現的比較出色,而本研究就是以公司治理好壞的程度來判斷這些公司在面對金融危機時,能有怎樣的表現。本研究主要分為兩大部分,第一是驗證公司治理和績效到底是否具有密切的關係,第二部分是研判當有好公司治理的公司是否能在遇到金融危機時,可以具有較健全的體質度過難關,在績效方面可以表現地較穩健;本研究總共分為金融業、傳統產業和電子業來進行討論,而選取的樣本是從2000年3月至2009年9月的季資料,若有完整則一間公司會有39筆資料,並把2008、2009年定義為金融海嘯發生期間,公司治理指標部份視為自變數,共分大三類分別是股權結構、董事會職責和財務透明度等8個指標,公司績效部分視為應變數,共有ROA、ROE和Tobin’s Q。
    摘要(英) Corporate governance is usually related to corporate performance. Corporate governance means company should be controlled and monitored to protect the stakeholder’s rights, and keeps creating profit by making company run well. Usually there are some companies run well during the financial crisis. This essay separates the companies into good corporate governance companies and bad corporate governance companies. First it shows the relationship between performance and corporate governance. Second, it proves companies which have good corporate governance actually perform better during the financial crisis. It classes three industries to discuss, which are financial industry, traditional industry, and electronic industry. It uses 8 corporate governance indexes to identify the relationship between performances. The samples are from 2000 to 2009, and it defines 2008 and 2009 as the span of financial tsunami in the research. In this research it use ROA, ROE , and Tobin’Q to represent the company’s performance.
    關鍵字(中)
  • 電子業
  • 金融業
  • 金融海嘯
  • 公司治理
  • 企業績效
  • 關鍵字(英)
  • firm performance
  • corporate governance
  • financial tsunami
  • electronic industry
  • financial industry
  • 論文目次 第壹章、 緒論………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
    第一節 研究動機與目的………………………………………………………………………………1
    第二節 研究流程………………………………………………………………………………………….3
    第三節 論文架構與內容………………………………………………………………………………4
    第貳章、 文獻回顧…………………………………………………………………………………………..5
    第一節 公司治理…………………………………………………………………………………………..5
    第二節 金融危機………………………………………………………………………………………….21
    第叁章  研究方法…………………….…………………………………………………………….…….25
    第一節 研究方法架構………………………………………………………………………………25
    第二節 樣本選取與資料來源……………………………………………………………………26
    第三節  研究假說……………………………………………………………………………………….33
    第四節  統計模型……………………………………………………………………………………….36
    第肆章   實證分析與結果…………………………………………………………………………….40
    第一節 敘述統計………………………………………………………………………………………..40
    第二節 相關係數分析………………………………………………………………………………..51
    第三節 迴歸分析………………………………………………………………………………………..55
    第四節 在金融海嘯中績效幅度變化檢定結果………..…………………………………61
    第伍章   研究結論…………………………………………………………………………………………66
    第一節 結論……………………………………………………………………..……………………….66
    第二節 研究限制及建議………………………………………………………………………….68
    參考文獻………………………………………………………………………………………………………………69
    參考文獻 一、中文部分
    1. 李禮仲,2009,重建企業道德-公司治理從全球金融海嘯獲得的經驗教訓,證卷櫃檯買賣中心月刊,第121期,33-39。
    2. 林宜勉,1999,盈餘資訊性與管理者股權之關聯性研究,企銀季刊,第23期,175-193。
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    4. 柯承恩,2000,我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議,會計研究月刊,第173期,75-81。
    5. 陳惠玲,2002,由財報重編看財報可信度及CPA簽證品質─財務透明度評估之一,貨幣觀測與信用評等雙月刊,第42期,15-31。
    6. 葉匡時,2001,公司治理-導讀,台北:遠見。
    7. 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩,2002,公司治理與評等系統,商智出版。
    8. 葉銀華、邱顯比,1996 ,資本結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論,臺大管理論叢,第7期,57-90。
    9. 張訓華,1991,股權結構對公司績效影響之研究,政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
    10. 詹錦宏、楊麗弘,2001,臺灣上市公司股權結構與經營績效之研究-產業特性與股權質押之觀點,臺灣銀行季刊,第52期,202-220。
    11. 楊嘉倫,2009,以系統思考探討次貸風暴動態過程及槓桿解,中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
    12. 劉倩妏,2004,以投資人關係為目的之資訊揭露,中正大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
    13. 劉靜容,2003,經理者股權與公司績效─內生轉換聯立方程模型分析,淡江大學產業經濟學系未出版碩士論文。
    14. 簡上智,1995,家族企業上市後股權結構變動對企業經營績效影響之研究,     成功大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
    二、英文部分
    1. Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson, 1986, Asset pricing and the Bid-ask Spread. Journal of Financial Economics 17: 223-249.
    2. Bacon, J., 1973, Corporate directorship practices: Membership and Committees of the Board. New York: The Conference Board and American Society of Corporate Secretaries.
    3. Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose, Charles Wyplosz, 1996, Contagious Currency Crises, NBER working paper 5681.
    4. Baysinger, R.D. and Butler, H.N., 1985, Corporate and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1, 101-124.
    5. Bazerman, M.H. and Schoorman, F.D., 1983, A Limited Rationality Model of Interlocking Directorates: An Individual, Organizational, and Societal Decision. Academy of Management Review 8, 206-217
    6. Berle, A. and G. C. Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: MacMillan.
    7. Bhagat, S. and Black, B., 1999, The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance. The Business Lawyer, 54, 921-963.
    8. Blair, Margaret M., 1995, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century. Washington, D.C., the Bookings Institution
    9. Botosan, C.A., 1997, Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review (July):323-349.
    10. Classens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang, 2002, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, Journal of Finance, 57, 2741-2771.
    11. Diamond, D.W., and R.E. Verrecchia, 1991, Disclosure, liquidity, and the Cost of Capital. The Journal of Finance 46, 1325-1360.
    12. Edward S., 1989, Real Exchange Rate, Devaluation and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries Cambridge: MIT Press.
    13. Fama, Eugene F., 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
    14. Fan, P. H. and T. J. Wong, 2002, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earning in East Asia, Journal of Accounting and Economics.
    15. Frankel, Jeffrey A. and Andrew K. Rose, 1996, Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical Treatment, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers 534.
    16. Fredrickson, J. W., D. C. Hambrick, and S. Baumrin, 1988, A Model of CEO Dismissal. Academy of Management Review, 13, 255-270.
    17. Healy, Paul M., Krishna G. Palepu, 2001, Information Asymmetry , Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature,Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, P405-440.
    18. Hudson, C., J. Jahera, and W. Lloyd, 1992, Further Evidence on the Relationship between Ownership and Performance, The Financial Review 27, 227-239.
    19. Jensen, M. and Ruback, R. S.,1983, The Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 11,24-29.
    20. Jensen, M., and W. H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency cost and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360
    21. Kaminsky, Garciela and Saul Lizondo and Carmen M. Reinhart, 1997, Leading Indicator of Currency Crises, IMF working paper 97.
    22. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 2002, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance, 57, 1147-1170.
    23. Leftwich, R. W., R. L. Watts, J. L. Zimmerman, J. C. Burton and K. Schipper, 1981, Voluntary Corporate Disclosure: The Case of Interim Reporting, Journal of Accounting Research, 19(50), 50-77.
    24. Leland, H., and Pyle, D. H., 1997, Information Asymmetric, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation, Journal of Finance, 32,371-388.
    25. Lorsch, J. W. and E. MacIver, 1989, Pawns and Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
    26. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, 1988, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315.
    27. Osward S. L. and Jahera Jr., 1991, The Influence of Ownership on Performance: An Empirical Study. Strategic Management Journal 12, 218-228.
    28. Oviatt, B. M., 1988, Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship, Incentives for Congruent Interests. Academy of Management Review 13, 214-225.
    29. Pearce, J.A. and Zahra,S.A., 1992, Board Composition from a Strategic Contingency Perspective, Journal of Management Studies, 29(4), 53-58.
    30. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics 52, 737-783.
    31. Singh, H. and F. Harianto, 1989, Management- Board Relationships, Takeover Risk, and the Adoption of Goldenb Prachutes. Academy of Management Journal 32,7-24.
    32. Spence, M., 1973, Job Market Signaling, Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 355-379.
    33. Vance, S. C., 1995, Inside or Outside Directors: Is There Really a Difference Across The Board, 15-17.
    34. Vance, S. C.,1983, Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20,431-436.
    35. Yeh, Kuang S., 1997, Board Network Structural Change Before and After Initial Public Offerings in Taiwan. Sun Yat-Sen Management Review International Issue, 93-104.
    36. Yermack, D., 1996, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-211.
    三、參考資料網站
    OECD網站:www.oecd.org
    世界銀行網站:www.worldbank.org
    TEJ網站:www.tej.com.tw
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  • 口試日期 2010-06-24 繳交日期 2010-08-24

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