本研究企圖找出政府花費少量成本，即可促使廠商誠實的呈報排放汙染量之機制。廠商生產產品的同時伴隨著汙染發生，政府對排放汙染之廠商課汙染稅，在廠商主動呈報排放汙染量的情況下，廠商是否會向政府誠實的呈報應繳納的汙染稅成為一個重要的議題。本文設立不同的呈報條件下之政府政策，觀察廠商是否會因應不同政策所選擇誠實呈報汙染量。
　　本研究認為，政府可透過蒐集廠商生產的產品總量之資訊（資訊成本），來推斷廠商所呈報的排放汙染量是否誠實，政府監控廠商生產產品總量的資訊成本，比起監控個別廠商所排放汙染量之高監控成本，政府所花費的資訊成本應該較少，為比較有效率的監控機制。

　　This study attempts to design a mechanism such that the government can encourage firms to honestly report the amount of emissions with less inspection costs. With the production of products by firms, pollution occurs at the same time. The government imposes a pollution tax on the firms, which emit pollution. When the firms are asked to report the amount of emissions, it is a great concern whether or not the firms honestly report the payable pollution tax to the government. This study sets up reporting mechanisms under different inspection policies, and discusses whether firms will choose to honestly report emissions.
　　It is found that the government can infer whether the amount of emissions is reported honestly by comparison with the total amount of market products. The monitoring cost of market products is considerably less than the inspection cost for all individual firms and should be a more efficient way of encouraging honest reports.

論文審定書…………………………………………………………... …….….......i
中文摘要 …………………………………………………………... …….….......ii
英文摘要 ….……………………………………..……………………………….iii
目錄 ………………………………..………………………………………..…….iv
圖次 ………………………………………………..…………………………........v
第 一 章 前言……..………………………………………………………………………………..…………1
第 二 章 單期理論模型……..………….……………………………………….……….….…....…5
第 三 章 雙期理論模型………………………………………………………………………………19
第 四 章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………………………………..36
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………….…….….……………..38

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