經濟分析有助於法院以及反托拉斯機關對於聯合行為之認定，本文以誘因相容限制式之計量模型為經濟分析方法，酌以美國實務發展之附加因素制度，針對卡特爾個案為完整的分析。本文之模型加入了反托拉斯偵測函數以及資訊指數，使模型具有寡占市場中較高資訊透明度、卡特爾之行為會影響到反托拉斯機關偵測卡特爾之機率等一般化之特色。
市場中不同期間之變數改變時會影響卡特爾之穩定性，為了避免卡特爾崩毀，卡特爾之行為使得變數間具有一定的關係。本文以四段期間驗證變數是否具有以下三種關係：(1)當期利潤與下一期需求期望值呈正向關係，(2)當期利潤與下一期成本期望值呈正向關係，(3)當期利潤與跨期利潤差額之期望值呈反向關係。實證結果得到的結論為，部分的期間符合廠商為聯合行為之誘因相容限制式之三點關係，部分則只符合兩點關係，本文認為這是台灣汽油市場之特性所導致之結果；此一以理論模型及實證分析的方法，再配合經濟理論的討論，使得聯合行為之合意認定之完整性更加完備。

The main idea of this thesis is to explore and explain how to prove there is an agreement between cartel members by economic evidence. We use an econometric model which based on cartel member’s incentive compatibility constraints to analysis the case. In order to build a general cartel model, we introduce the probability of detection function and information index. Furthermore, we choose a cartel case and analysis whether there is an agreement between cartel members.
The stability of the cartel will be affected when variables change. We test whether the variables have the following three relationships in four periods: (1) a positive relationship between current margin and the demand exception (2) a positive relationship between current margin and the cost exception (3) a negative relationship between current margin and the exception change of margin. We get the following conclusions: some periods show their behaviors consist with theoretical model but some periods don’t, we believe that is affected by Taiwan gasoline market’s feature. We believe that cartel cases analyzed by appropriate theoretical models, empirical analysis, along with other plus factors would make judgment much fairer and better.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究方法與全文架構 3
第二章 聯合行為之經濟分析文獻回顧 4
第一節 聯合行為之證據 5
第二節 聯合行為之經濟分析 10
2.1 卡特爾訂價行為之特徵 11
2.2 卡特爾產量相關之特徵 12
2.3 計量模型之檢測 ─以無勾結嫌疑之廠商做比較 13
2.4 計量模型之檢測 ─從誘因相容限制式出發 14
第三節 促進行為-以資訊交換為例 14
3.1 市場中透明度提高對於資訊交換的影響 15
3.2 美國對於資訊交換之立場 17
第四節 促進行為─以價格保證為例 17
第五節 卡特爾動態訂價之經濟理論 18
第三章 聯合行為之理論模型 19
第四章 個案分析─以台灣汽油產業為例 27
第一節 台灣汽油市場之自由化 27
第二節 浮動油價機制之背景與爭議 28
第三節 台塑中油訂價外觀呈一致性 30
第五章 台灣汽油產業之聯合行為經濟分析 36
第一節 理論模型之修改 36
第二節 實證方法 37
第三節 實證模型 38
第四節 變數設定及資料來源 40
第五節 實證結果與分析 42
第六節 浮動油價公式─獨占性訂價之討論 47
第六章 結論 50
參考文獻 52

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