本篇論文建構一個受比賽情境影響的Tullock 團隊競賽模型。參與團隊競賽的成員所付出的努力及干擾程度和隊伍擁有者組織球隊及分配獎金的決策都可能會受到情境因素的影響。一般認為隨著勝負受情境因素的影響越大，隊員們為勝利所付出的努力程度會越小。另一方面，若隊伍間競賽時的干擾行為無法被有效約束，受到干擾的隊員也會降低他們付出努力的意願。研究結果顯示在能夠使用干擾行為時，情境因素必須足夠大才會使努力及干擾程度隨著情境因素的增加而減少，表示適當的情境因素能夠使比賽進行得更激烈，當中也不會有沒付出努力而坐享隊伍獲勝成果的隊員。另外，我們也檢視了隊伍擁有者對於獲勝獎金分配以及如何建構隊伍來使隊伍獲勝機率最大化的可能決定因素。

A Tullock-type contest success function with a tractable noise parameter is considered to understand how team members’ effort toward winning is affected by this uncertainty. This tractable noise parameter might also affect members’ sabotage level toward the opponents if such an “unlawful” action was somewhat tolerated, and it could affect team owner’s decision on how to form a team and allocate the total winning prize among team members as well. The conventional wisdom suggests that as winning becoming more uncertain due to the noise factor, the team members exert less effort toward winning. Similarly, members who are sabotaged by the opponents may also make less effort. However, we find that if sabotage activity is allowed in the contest, this tractable noise parameter must have big enough impact on winning to make effort and sabotage level decrease as it increase. Otherwise, the effort toward winning and sabotage level may increase with this tractable noise parameter. That is, an appropriate level of the tractable noise parameter can make the contest more intense, and no freeriding occurs among team members in the contest. Finally, we also discuss the team owner’s decision on how to form a team and distribute prize money among team members in order to maximize the winning chance.

學位論文審定書............................................................................................................. i
摘要................................................................................................................................. ii
Abstract........................................................................................................................... iii
第一章緒論................................................................................................................. 1
第二章文獻回顧......................................................................................................... 2
第三章模型................................................................................................................. 4
第一節沒有干擾下的團隊競賽........................................................................ 4
第二節有干擾下的團隊競賽............................................................................ 6
第四章隊伍擁有者問題............................................................................................. 10
第一節獎金分配................................................................................................ 10
第二節隊伍組成................................................................................................ 12
結論................................................................................................................................. 14
參考文獻......................................................................................................................... 15
附錄................................................................................................................................. 16

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