本篇論文延伸自Liu and Ma(2012)，在治療成功機率隨著疾病嚴重程度而降低且醫生的利他程度是未知的情形下，探討在與健保單位訂定契約後，醫生如何針對病患的疾病嚴重程度選擇不同的治療方式。其中包含醫生在接受合約同時承諾治療方式的選擇，另一個則是醫生在接受合約後不能承諾治療方式的選擇，而是在觀察到病患疾病嚴重程度後才決定治療方式。在醫生可承諾治療方式的選擇時，我們發現在特定情況下，醫生選擇的治療方式並不會完全和社會福利最佳下的選擇相同。在無法承諾治療方式的選擇時，我們也發現醫生根據病患的疾病嚴重程度所選擇的治療方式也與社會福利最佳下的選擇出現基本上的不同，並且有部分的醫生可以得到超額報酬。

We modify the environment of Liu and Ma (2012) to incorporate the negative rela- tion between the treatment successful rate and the severity of illness. This study discuss- es the doctor’s choice of treatment given the diagnosis of patient’s illness severity after the contract is signed between doctors and the health care agency. A doctor can choose different timing to decide on the treatment plan in such a contract. First, doctors are able to commit the choices of treatments when the contract is signed. Second, doctors are un- able to commit the way of treatments and they will decide which treatment is appropria- te after the severity of patient’s illness is revealed. When doctors are able to commit to the choices of treatments, the treatment choices made by the doctors coincide with the welfare-maximizing ones, except when the more effective treatment is too expensive. When the doctors are not able to commit, we find that the doctor’s choice of treatments are in general different from the first best choice and a significant portion of doctors
may obtain excess benefits.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
圖次 v
第1章 緒論 1
第2章 文獻回顧 3
第3章 基本模型 5
第4章 利他醫生的決策 12
4.1 利他因子為已知資訊 12
4.2 利他因子為未知資訊 16
　　4.2.1　　治療方式可承諾 16
　　 4.2.2　　治療方式不可承諾 28
第5章 結論與建議 37
參考文獻 39
附錄 40

圖次
圖 一 0<l ̂<A<B 7
圖 二 0<A<l ̂<B 8
圖 三 0<A<B≤l ̂ 8
圖 四 社會福利最佳下之b_1=2b_2時的治療區間 10
圖 五 社會福利最佳下之b_1<2b_2時的治療區間 10
圖 六 社會福利最佳下之b_1>2b_2時的治療區間 11
圖 七 治療方式可承諾下之b_1=2b_2時的治療區間 18
圖 八 治療方式可承諾下之b_1<2b_2時的治療區間 20
圖 九 治療方式可承諾下之b_1>2b_2時的治療區間 22
圖 十 治療方式可承諾下之b_1>2b_2時的治療區間延伸 24

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