隨著技術進步，研究者可使用的資料、系統更加完善，使得在房屋估計領域能做到更多不同程度的探索。本研究參考過往文獻以特徵價格模型做為理論基礎，並使用普通最小平方法與分量迴歸做為研究方法，透過數據處理技術整理全台灣2013年至2019年共計七年約兩百萬筆不動產交易資料，經由篩選最終使用十八萬筆進行探討。藉由完善的交易資料結合地理資訊系統(Geographic Information System, GIS)技術以及選舉資料庫，探討地方政治與人口流動兩種較少被討論的因素。實證結果指出，地方政府在特定執政黨執政下的確會顯著影響房價，且若同時在議會為多數時，此影響將更大。此外，人口流動整體具有正向顯著影響，但隨著區域細分，各地區將受人口規模與周圍房價差異呈現不同方向的結果。

With the advancement of technology, the materials and systems available to re-searchers have become more complete, enabling more different degrees of explora-tion in the field of housing estimation. This research refers to the previous literature based on the characteristic price model as the theoretical basis, and uses the ordinary least squares method and quantile regression as the research method. This article uses data processing technology to compile data on about two million real estate transactions in Taiwan for a total of seven years from 2013 to 2019. Through screening, 180,000 transactions were finally used for discussion. With the perfect transaction data combined with the geographic information system technology and the election database, the two less discussed factors of local politics and population flow are discussed. The empirical results indicate that the local government will in-deed significantly affect housing prices under the ruling of a particular ruling party, and this effect will be even greater if there is a majority in the parliament. In addi-tion, the overall population movement has a positive and significant impact, but with the subdivision of regions, each region will be affected by the difference in popula-tion size and surrounding housing prices in different directions.

論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究流程 2
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第一節 房價估計 4
第二節 政治影響 5
第三節 人口流動 6
第三章 研究方法 8
第一節 特徵價格模型 8
第二節 分量迴歸 9
第三節 分析流程 10
第四章 資料與樣本 11
第一節 資料來源 11
第二節 變數說明 12
第五章 實證結果 23
第一節 初步結果 23
第三節 人口流動影響結果 31
第六章 結論與建議 34

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