本文建構一個不完全市場競爭的模型，意欲在垂直相關的產業環境下，探討不同的工會組織結構對於廠商採取新技術誘因的差異，以及在特定的工會組織型態下，研究不同的市場競爭模式對於廠商採納新技術決策的影響。結果指出：（ⅰ）不論工會組織型態為何，對技術領先廠商而言，當產品替代程度相對低時，其在數量競爭下會較早採納技術；相對地，當產品替代程度相對高時，廠商在價格競爭下會較早採納技術；對技術落後廠商而言，無論產品替代程度為何，其皆會在數量競爭下較早採納技術。（ii）假定廠商從事數量競爭，兩廠商皆會偏好於分權制度下較早採納技術。（ⅲ）假定市場競爭型態為價格競爭，結果與數量競爭近似，唯技術領先的廠商在產品替代程度相對高時，會在集權工會下較早採納技術。

This paper builds an incomplete market competition model to examine firms’ incentive of adopting new technology with different union structures, as well as the influences of different market competition to firms’ new technology adoption decisions in the vertical related industrial environment. The results indicate that: (i) regardless of the type of union, for the technology leader, when the degree of product substitutability is relatively low, it will adopt the new technology earlier under Cournot competition. In contrast, when the degree of product substitutability is relatively high, it will adopt technology earlier under Bertrand competition. For the technology follower, regardless of the degree of product substitutability, it will adopt the technology earlier under Cournot competition. (ii) Given in Cournot competition, technology adoption can occur earlier in a labor union with decentralized than in a labor union with centralized. (ⅲ) Given in Bertrand competition, the results are similar to Cournot. Only when the degree of product substitutability is high enough, then the leader will adopt technology under centralized labor union.

論文審定書　i
摘 要　ii
Abstract　iii
目 錄　iv
圖目錄　v
1. 前言　1
2. 模型設定　6
3. 分權工會下的廠商決策　9
3.1 數量競爭　9
3.2 價格競爭　12
3.3 分權工會下廠商採納時點的差異：數量競爭vs.價格競　14
4. 集權工會下的廠商決策　17
4.1 數量競爭　17
4.2 價格競爭　18
4.3 集權工會下廠商採納時點的差異：數量競爭vs.價格競爭　19
5. 異種工會組織與技術採納的最適時機　23
5.1 數量競爭　23
5.2 價格競爭　24
6. 結論　27
參考文獻　29
附錄A：分權工會下的廠商決策　31
附錄B：集權工會下的廠商決策　38

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