消費者購買諸如豪華汽車之類的炫耀性商品，以滿足社會和功能需求。消費者在炫耀性商品市場上的效用所強調的異質性造成了兩大類：面向功能性和排他性的消費者群體；而在不同時期又會做出甚麼反應。賽局模型揭示了這種細分如何影響功能性和排他性，價格、利潤和功能性提升的程度。利用Hotelling 模型建構兩種類型消費者所組成的跨期市場，廠商透過兩階段訂價和產品差異性來獲得更大的利潤。消費者則是會選擇一個效用最大的時機購入產品，彼此間的選擇也存在著交互影響。

Consumers purchase conspicuous goods, such as luxury cars, to satisfy both social and functional needs. Heterogeneity in the emphases that consumers place on these two drivers of utility in conspicuous goods markets creates two broad groups: functional and exclusive consumer groups; and how they will react at different times. A gametheoretic model reveals how this segmentation affects functionality and exclusivity, price and profit,and the degree of functional enhancement. Using the Hotelling Model to construct a crossperiod market composed of two types of consumers, manufacturers obtain greater profits through twostage pricing and product differentiation.Consumers will choose the most effective time to buy products, and the choices between them also have interactive effects.

目錄
論文審定書 .................................................................................................................... i
誌謝 ............................................................................................................................... ii
摘要 .............................................................................................................................. iii
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... iv
第一章 緒論 ................................................................................................................. 1
第二章 文獻回顧 ......................................................................................................... 3
第三章 模型 ................................................................................................................. 6
第一節 消費者特性 .................................................................................................. 6
第二節 功能性的效用函數 ...................................................................................... 7
第三節 炫耀性的效用函數 ...................................................................................... 7
第四章 分析 ................................................................................................................. 8
第一節 決策順序 ...................................................................................................... 8
第二節 案例一：功能性消費者的市場 .................................................................. 8
第三節 案例二：炫耀性消費者的市場 .................................................................. 9
第三節 案例三：同時存在功能性和炫耀性消費者的市場 ................................ 13
第五章 結論與建議 ................................................................................................... 16
參考資料 ..................................................................................................................... 17
附錄 ............................................................................................................................. 18

圖目錄
圖1 消費者分布. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
圖2 所有消費者均選擇購買. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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