近年來，公司治理一直是主管機關主要目標，提升監督管理能力、強化公司治理則反應公司整體體質，對企業而言，公司的營運績效及經營價值為企業首要目標，如何提高投資大眾投資意願及信心，使投資人降低所要求之必要報酬率進而降低公司之權益資金成本，一直都是企業思考的問題。本研究藉由2010年至2015年台灣上市上櫃公司之樣本，探討股權結構、偏離度及董事會特性與權益資金成本間之關聯性研究。
以權益資金成本為依變數檢視其與自變數之間的關聯性分析，將產業分成電子產業與非電子產業，並建立9個研究假說探討公司治理與權益資金成本的關係，研究顯示公司治理結構大部份顯著影響權益資金成本，除了考量股權結構、董事會特性與偏離度外，代理衝突的大小亦是相當重要的環節，為捕捉代理衝突對本研究主題的影響，另增額分析代理衝突、公司規模對權益資金成本之關係，研究結果突顯出代理衝突在公司治理變數中所衍生出的代理成本在股權結構和董事會特性下與權益資金成本間有一定關係的影響；公司規模與權益資金成本之間的係數關係，會因為資訊不對稱程度高低進而影響權益資金成本。本研究結果顯示公司治理結構良窳對權益資金成本具一定程度的影響力，同時亦檢測公司治理與權益資金成本間的交互作用，提供企業經營者及管理者瞭解公司治理與降低權益資金成本對公司的經營之價值、意涵，並期提供證券主管機關推動公司治理政策之參考依據。

In recent years, corporate governance has been the primary goal targeted by the competent authority to improve monitoring and management abilities. Strengthening corporate governance can reflect the overall composition of a company. For firms, the corporate business performance and business value are their priorities. How to improve investors’ investment intention and confidence and reduce investors’ demand on required rate of return to lower the equity cost of funds has been a concern for firms. This study collects samples from listed and over-the-counter firms in Taiwan from 2010 to 2015 to examine the relevance among stock right structure, departure, board characteristic, and equity cost of funds.
This study uses equity cost of funds as the dependent variable to examine its relevance with independent variables. The industry sector is divided into electronic and nonelectronic industries to separately discuss the relationships among departure, stock right structure, board characteristics, and equity cost of funds. The results reveal that the corporate governance structure influences equity cost of funds. In addition to stock right structure and board characteristics, the level of agency conflicts is a crucial element. To grasp the influence of agency conflicts on equity cost of funds, additional analysis of the relevance among agency conflicts, firm size, and equity cost of funds. The results manifestly indicate that agency costs deriving from agency conflicts during corporate governance have a certain level of influence on equity costs under the stock right structure and board characteristics. According to the relation between firm size and equity costs of funds, the level of information asymmetry may affect equity costs of funds.The results indicate that the quality of corporate governance structure has a certain level of influence on equity cost of funds. In addition, the interaction between corporate governance and equity cost of funds is examined to help business operators and managers understand the managerial value and meaning of corporate governance and reduction of equity cost of funds to a firm. The results also serve as a reference for securities competent authorities in promoting policies related to corporate governance.

目 錄
論文審定書 ⅰ
中文摘要 ⅱ
英文摘要 ⅲ
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 3
第三節　研究流程 7
第二章　文獻探討 8
第一節　公司治理之簡介 8
第二節　公司治理與權益資金成本之相關研究 12
第三章　研究方法 18
第一節　建立研究假說 18
第二節　變數說明與模型建構 24
第四章　實證結果與比較 34
第一節　資料來源 34
第二節　敘述統計分析 36
第三節　股權結構對權益成本之影響 40
第四節　董事會特性對權益資金成本之影響 47
第五節　公司治理對權益資金成本之影響 50
第六節　加入時間虛擬變數之實證結果分析 54
第七節　假說與實驗結論分析 58
第八節　其他增額分析 61
第五章　研究結論與建議 70
參考文獻 72
圖 目 錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖 7
圖2-1 世界銀行公司治理架構圖 10
圖4-1 樣本公司產業分布圖 35
表 目 錄
表2-2 公司治理與權益資金成本相關之文獻彙總 16
表3-2 變數、資料來源及預期符號 33
表4-1 樣本公司之產業分布表 34
表4-2 實證變數之敘述性統計值 38
表4-3 實證研究之相關係數矩陣表 39
表4-4 股權結構對權益資成本之影響 46
表4-5 董事會特性對權益資成本之影響 49
表4-6 公司治理對權益資金成本之影響 53
表4-7 電子產業權益資金成本加入時間虛擬變數之估計結果 56
表4-8 非電子產業權益資金成本加入時間虛擬變數之估計結果 57
表4-9 支持假說與否彙總表 60
表4-10 電子產業高代理衝突對權益資金成本之影響 63
表4-11 電子產業低代理衝突對權益資金成本之影響 64
表4-12 非電子產業高代理衝突對權益資金成本之影響 65
表4-13 非電子產業低代理衝突對權益資金成本之影響 66
表4-14 小企業對權益資金成本之影響 67
表4-15 大企業對權益資金成本之影響 68

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