博碩士論文 etd-0113112-173542 詳細資訊


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姓名 黃郁婷 (Yu-ting Huang) 電子郵件信箱 E-mail 資料不公開
畢業系所 企業管理學系研究所(Business Management)
畢業學位 博士(Ph.D.) 畢業時期 100學年第1學期
論文名稱(中) 從公司治理角度探討家族持股與公司股利政策之關係 
論文名稱(英) Corporate governance in Taiwan: The nonmonotonic relationship between family ownership and dividend policy
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    摘要(中) 在台灣,家族控股是一個普遍存在的現象。本文探討台灣家族企業中,控制家族的現金流量權與股利發放政策之間的關係。股利發放的水準對公司來說是非常重要的,因為這影響到公司治理以及投資政策。本論文之實證結果發現:控制家族持有低水準的現金流量權時,因為其控制股東的地位處於隨時會被取代的威脅下,控制家族傾向多發放股利以保留個人財產,因而造成控制家族的現金流量權與股利發放之間的正向關係。然而,當控制家族持有至一定水準之可以剝削弱勢股東的現金流量權時,其欲剝削弱勢股東的欲望會使得控制家族的現金流量權與股利發放之間產生負向的關係。最後,當控制家族持有高水準的現金流量權時,其背負著過大的單一公司之特定風險,會使得控制家族的現金流量權與股利發放之間的又轉為正向的關係。本研究又發現,這種控制家族現金流量權與股利發放之間的非單一線性關係也存在於財務生命週期處於成熟階段的公司,因為財務生命週期處於成熟階段的公司擁有豐沛的內部保留盈餘可供其用於股利發放。
    摘要(英) This study examines the relationship between cash flow rights and dividend payout policy of listed family firms in Taiwan, an economy characterized by a predominance of family-controlled firms. Dividend payout levels are important because they are crucial to governing the firm and managing its investments. The empirical results show that at a low level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, the threat to lose control any time makes controlling families claim more in dividends. This yields a positive relationship between dividend payout and the cash flow rights of controlling families. Meanwhile, at a moderate level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, the entrenchment effect creates a negative relationship. Finally, at the very highest level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, excessive firm-specific risk again yields a positive relationship. This nonmonotonic relationship between controlling family cash flow rights and dividend payout also holds for financially mature firms that have high earned to contributed capital mix.
    關鍵字(中)
  • 核心代理問題
  • 生命週期理論
  • 家族持股
  • 股利政策
  • 公司治理
  • 關鍵字(英)
  • Dividend policy
  • Family ownership
  • Life-cycle theory
  • Principal-principal conflict
  • Corporate governance
  • 論文目次 Contents
    Acknowledgements.……………………………………………………. i
    Chinese Abstract...……………………….….……..…………………... ii
    Abstract………………………………….………...…………………… iii
    Chapter 1 Introduction………………….……………………………… 1
    1.1 Rationale…………………….………………………………. 1
    1.2 Motivation……………………….…………………….…….. 2
    1.3 Purpose………………………………………………………. 4
    1.4 Overview of the research methodology……………………... 6
    Chapter 2 Literature Review………….……………………….……….. 9
    2.1 Family firms……………..…………………………………... 9
    2.2 Control-enhancing mechanisms…………………………..…. 12
    2.3 Agency problems……………..……………………………... 17
    2.4 Dividend payouts……………..……………………………... 19
    2.5 Controlling shareholders and payout policy………………… 23
    Chapter 3 Theory and Hypotheses………….………………….………. 27
    Chapter 4 Data and Methodology………….………………….……….. 32
    Chapter 5 Empirical Results………….………………….…………….. 37
    5.1 Descriptive statistics……….….……………………………... 37
    5.2 Regression results……….….………………….…………….. 40
    5.2.1 Cash flow rights and dividend payouts………………. 40
    5.2.2 Robustness tests for first set of hypotheses…………... 42
    5.2.3 Joint effect of cash flow rights and life-cycle theory… 42
    5.2.4 Additional tests…….….……………………………... 43
    Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusion………….……….……………... 65
    6.1 Discussion…………………………...……….……………… 65
    6.2 Conclusion…………………………...……….……………… 69
    References……………………………………………………………… 71
    Appendix Variable description………………………………………… 77
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