本篇研究建構一項衡量台灣上市櫃公司經理人能力優劣的新指標，且透過與
過去文獻所採用之經理人能力指標相比較，例如:歷年股價報酬率、歷年資產報
酬率、經理人薪酬、經理人在職年限，確立我們所建構的指標較過往研究更能衡
量經理人能力之高低。除此之外，我們也探討經理人能力與公司向銀行貸款利率
高低之間的關係。我們發現能力較高的經理人能夠替公司爭取到較低的貸款並減
少向銀行融資的幅度。實證結果建議公司聘請能力較高的經理人，藉以減少公司
的利息費用，進而提升公司未來獲利。

This research constructs a new measure of CEOs’ ability in Taiwan-listed
companies and proves that this measure outperforms than others, such as historical
return, historical ROA, CEO cash compensation, and CEO tenure. Furthermore,
we investigate the relationship between CEOs’ ability and interest rate of bank
loans. We reveal that companies with more capable CEOs reduce their borrowing
cost of bank loans and decrease their loan financing. Our empirical evidence
suggests that firms’ board of directors should hire and retain more able managers
in order to achieve lower loan interest payments and future growth.

目 錄
論文審定書 i
中文摘要 ii
Abstract iii
Ch 1 Introduction 1
Ch 2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 4
Ch 3 Data and Methology 7
3.1 Data and Sample Construction 8
3.2 Variable Measurement 8
3.2.1 CEOs' Ability Measure 8
3.2.2 Borrowing Cost of Bank Loans 9
3.2.3 Control Variables 9
3.3 Models 11
3.4 Summary Statistics of CEOs’ Ability Measure 12
Ch 4 Empirical Results 17
4.1 Univariate Tests 17
4.2 The Effect of CEOs’ Ability on Loan Cost 18
4.3 The Effect of CEOs’ Ability on External Financing 20
4.4 Endogeneity Issue 22
Ch 5 Concluding Remarks 24
Appendix 26
Reference 29


表 次
Table 1 Summary statistics on firm efficiency by industry 32
Table 2 CEOs’ ability 33
Table 3 Summary statistics. 34
Table 4 Correlation matrix 35
Table 5 Manager fixed effect 37
Table 6 Univariate analysis: test of differences in mean…….………….38
Table 7 Results of CEOs’ ability on borrowing cost of bank loans …...39
Table 8 Results of CEOs’ ability on loan financing 40
Table 9 Robustness test: two-stage least squares test (2SLS)…......….....42

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