根據公司現金持有理論，本文做一個控制股東的流動性資產偏好的分析框架， 證明就公司所有權而言，具有高控制權分離程度的民營上市公司更可能投資不足。本文運用中國民營上市公司3,246個觀察數，期間為2008-2014。其中有1,965投資不足觀測個數樣本。外部投資者保護能減少控制股東攫取公司利益；具有高現金流量權的投資不足樣本公司，其超額控制權也會減少控制股東攫取公司利益。現金持有方面，超額控制權會降低公司現金持有水平；民營上市公司經理人會進行營運資產的投資，也會進行金融資產的投資。另外公司價值方面，控制權會減損公司價值。具有超額控制權的投資不足樣本公司其現金持有水平會減損公司價值。簡言之,基於投資不足樣本公司,控制股東經由減少投資留住公司現金且利用資產轉移來達到侵占少數股東利益目的.

To study corporate cash holding, I construct a framework analysis of the liquid asset preferences of the controlling shareholders and show that privately listed firms with controlling shareholders whose control is more separated from ownership were likely to slightly underinvest during the 2008 to 2014 period. The findings are as follows: Outside investor protection reduces that controlling shareholders will embezzle cash in a sample of underinvestment, and excess control rights also decrease that controlling shareholders embezzle cash in a sample of underinvestment which firms with high cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. Further, privately listed firms with excess control rights will reduce their corporate cash holding. The firm manager investment existing assets in place, and financial assets investment. In terms of firm value, a firm with control rights will reduce firm value in the sample of underinvestment. Additionally, promoting cash holding in privately listed firms with excess control rights will lower firm value. In short, the controlling shareholders uses embezzlement funds through underinvestment and asset transfer to achieve the expropriation interests of minority shareholders in sample of underinvestment.

審定書 ⅰ
摘要 ⅱ
ABSTRACT ⅲ
TABLE OF CONTENTS ⅳ
LIST OF TABLES ⅵ



Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 The purpose of the study 1
1.2 Motives for the study 2
1.3 Why is equity market in China a good case for this study 3
1.4 Contribution to the literature 4
1.5 The structure of the paper 5

Chapter 2 Literature Review 6
2.1 Domestic Literatures 6
2.2 Foreign Literatures 6

Chapter 3 One Period Model of Interest Expropriation and Hypotheses Development 9
3.1 Ownership Structure Literature 9
3.2 A Portion of Expropriation Interest of the Corporate Net Profit 10
3.3 The Ratio of Expropriation Interest and Utility Maximizing 11
3.4 The Probability of Investment in High Liquid Assets 17
3.5 Maximizing the Interest of Controlling Shareholder 20

Chapter 4 Sample and Empirical Results 32
4.1 Sample and Variables 33
4.2 Expected Investment and Descriptive Statistics 34
4.3 Empirical Results .. 37
4.4 Check of the Sample of Overinvestment 51
4.5. Robustness 52

Chapter 5 Discussions 54

Chapter 6 Conclusions 56
6.1 Conclusions 56
6.2 Future research 58

References 59
Appendix 1 Correlation and Collinear Test in Sample of Underinvestment 66
Appendix 2 Correlation and Collinear Test in Model of Cash Holding 67
Appendix 3 Cash Holding in Sample of Underinvestment 68
Appendix 4 Correlation and Collinear Test in Model of Firm Value 69
Appendix 5 The Amount of Overinvestment in Sample of Overinvestment 70
Appendix 6 Cash Holding in Sample of Overinvestment 71
Appendix 7 Firm Value in Sample of Overinvestment 72

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