人作為企業非常重要的資產，如何保留人才對於企業而言十分重要，最直觀的方式就是企業對於員工的投資。基於家族控制形態的高普遍性，家族控制下的員工投資是本文的研究內容。本文利用台灣上市公司員工用人費用資料，將員工用人費用拓展成四種不同的衡量方式，分別為平均所有員工用人費用、普通員工平均用人費用、高層的平均用人費用和員工指數，探討家族控制型態對員工用人費用影響的差異性，並進一步檢視家族企業的活躍度對員工用人費用的影響。研究結果發現，首先，家族企業的員工用人費用比非家族企業少。其次，勞力密集程度和人力資本密集程度會對影響家族企業相比非家族企業對員工的投資更少的現象產生影響，並且這一影響會因員工用人費用的種類產生差異。對普通員工平均用人費用而言只有在勞力密集程度和人力資本密集程度低的企業中，家族控制型態對其才有顯著的負向影響。家族控制型態對於高層的用人費用的負影響則是顯著存在於勞力密集程度和人力資本密集程度高的企業中，在勞力密集程度和人力資本密集程度低的企業中影響較低、甚至沒有影響。最後，家族企業的活躍度對於員工用人費用有著顯著的影響，然而這個影響會因員工職位高低產生差異，活躍的家族企業普通員工平均用人費用更低，但高層的平均用人費用卻更高。

People are the most important asset of enterprises, it is very important for firm to keep those talent employees, and the first thing to do is to set the compensation for its employee. Family control is common around the world, we use employee expenditure data of listed companies from Taiwan to find out how the family control will affect the employee investment. We use three difference employee expenditure to estimate the employee investment, expenditure of all employee, expenditure of ordinary employee, expenditure of top employee and employee index. In addition, we the affect of active family firm. We find that, first, family firm invest less than nonfamily firm on employee, what’s more, the affect from labor intensity and human capital intensity will differ from the type of employee expenditure. Second, for the expenditure of ordinary employee, only when labor intensity and human capital intensity is low, family control will have the negative impact. For the expenditure of top employee, the negative impact is more announce when labor intensity and human capital intensity is high. Last, the active family control will have impact on employee expenditure and will also differ from the type of employee expenditure. The active family control firm invest less for the ordinary employee and invest more for the top employee then the non-active family firm.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
表次 v
第一章、緒論 1
第二章、文獻探討和假說建立 4
一、 員工投資 5
二、 家族控制型態和員工投資 7
三、 家族企業的員工投資 9
第三章、資料和樣本 11
一、 員工投資 11
二、 家族控制型態 12
三、 控制變量 14
四、 敘述統計分析 14
第四章、實證分析 21
一、 家族控制型態 21
二、 勞力密集度影響 24
三、 其他因變數 26
四、 家族企業活躍度 27
第五章、結論 29
附錄 30
參考文獻 31

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