本研究探討我國銀行董監事教育程度對銀行風險之影響。本文蒐集了台灣35家銀行2008年至2017年之樣本，並使用美國聯邦金融檢查委員會提出的CAMEL指標做為銀行風險衡量的工具，以最小平方虛擬變數模型探討受過研究所以上教育之董監事對銀行風險的影響，並透過兩階段最小平方法以排除研究中產生的內生性問題，最後調整樣本期間為實施巴賽爾第三版協議年後的年度(2013年至2017年)做為本研究之穩定性測試。

實證結果發現，擁有研究所以上學歷之董監事對於我國銀行資本充足性、管理水平呈現正向且顯著的關聯性，但卻無法對銀行資產品質及流動性產生顯著的影響，此結果為董事會議題上提供了一個新的佐證，以供未來學者研究上參考，並作為金融機構在董監事提名及選舉上新的參考依據。
另外，於本研究中亦發現教育程度為研究所以上之銀行董監事，亦無法顯著影響銀行的獲利能力。

This study uses the sample of Taiwan’s bank to explores the impact of directors’ and supervisors’ education level on bank risks.
This paper collects samples of 35 banks in Taiwan from 2008 to 2017, and uses the CAMEL index proposed by the US Federal Financial Inspection Commission as bank risk measurement tool. Using Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) to discuss the influence of directors and supervisors with graduate school degree on bank risk. In order to solve the possible of endogenous problem, a Two-Stage Least Square (TSLS) method is added to eliminate it. Finally, the stability test of this study was conducted during the adjustment period for the year after the implementation of Basel III (2013-2017).

The empirical results show that the directors and supervisors with graduate school degree or above has a positive and significant correlation with the capital adequacy and management level in Taiwan’s bank, however, it can’t have a significant impact on bank’s asset quality and liquidity. This result provides a new evidence for the board issues, it can be used as a reference for future scholars and as a new reference for financial institutions in the nomination and election of directors and supervisors.
In this study, it is also found that the bank’s directors and supervisors have graduate school degree can’t significantly affect the profitability of banks.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機及目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 公司治理與董事會相關議題 5
第二節 教育背景相關議題 9
第三節 銀行風險之探討 12
第三章 研究方法 15
第一節 研究假說 15
第二節 研究樣本 19
第三節 變數定義 20
第四節 模型建立 25
第四章 實證結果 32
第一節 敘述統計 32
第二節 相關係數 34
第三節 共線性診斷 35
第四節 迴歸分析 36
第五章 結論 52
第一節 研究結論 52
第二節 研究貢獻 53
第三節 研究限制與建議 53
參考文獻 54
第一節 中文部分 54
第二節 外文部分 55

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